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This dissertation, “Modernist Spacing: Spatial Rhetoric and Poetics in the Modernist 
Novel,” examines how Anglo-American modernist novelists explored and tested the 
complexity of space and its relationship to aesthetics, culture, and politics. By closely 
attending to works by Virginia Woolf, Jean Rhys, Djuna Barnes, and Elizabeth Bowen, each 
chapter demonstrates how modernist texts exploit space’s semantic mobility—the unfixed 
and provisional meanings conferred upon space that allow it to converge with, break away 
from, and transform into other spaces. Building on the work of major philosophers and 
spatial theorists, the project offers critical frameworks for the study of space in modernist 
literature that can account for space’s heterogeneous meanings, subcategories, and 
representations while avoiding the common conceptual pitfalls which beset much scholarship 
on literature and space. The dissertation argues that language and space share a metonymic 
capacity to link the real and the abstract; in this way, modernist literature is uniquely 
equipped to reveal space’s power as an instrument for both repression and liberation.  
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INTRODUCTION: MODERNIST SPACING 
“The problem is that any search for space in literary texts will find it 
everywhere and in every guise: enclosed, described, projected, dreamt of, 
speculated about.” 
 
    —Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (15) 
 
It is a commonplace that time is the dominant term governing modernism’s aesthetic, 
cultural, and philosophical concerns, that although a fascination with newness, rupture, and 
the nature of duration falls short of an overriding definition of modernism’s diverse projects 
(to say nothing of conventional periodization’s time-blinkered inadequacies), we recognize 
modernism by these time-steeped features all the same. It is a commonplace, too, that by the 
time postmodernism superseded modernism as the cultural dominant, time had (as Marx 
would have it) “annihilated space” so thoroughly that the previous orthodoxies of space-time 
gave over to a paradigm of virtual instantaneity—to total, atemporal spatialization. Rapid 
development during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of technologies of speed and 
communication set in motion the twinned processes of time-space compression (the elision of 
spatial distances by the speeding up of time-relationships) and time-space distanciation (the 
emergent interconnectedness of people and places spread out over greater and greater 
possible distances) (Harvey 147; Giddens 14). The vertiginous effects of this simultaneous 
shrinking and expanding of spatio-temporal relationships were minutely recorded by 
modernist artists and writers, but come postmodernism this work had finished. 
Globalization’s eradication of distances in time and space had produced a decentered and
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iterative spatial logic, one that foreclosed perspectival coherence and offered no new 
orienting paradigm in return. This was not space as literary modernism understood it, as 
distances and magnitudes scaled against the imperfect measuring rod of lived time. This was 
a spatiality that abolished distances and flattened space into an exhaustively interconnected 
and synchronic temporality: a closed system fixed in “dead time.” Understanding this 
bewildering shift thus demanded not only a reorientation of critical inquiry across the 
humanities and social sciences—what Fredric Jameson dubbed the “spatial turn”—but a 
response from modernist scholars invested in questions of space, spatiality, place, and 
geography (Jameson 154). If the transition from modernism to postmodernism was indeed a 
change from a culture of time to a culture of space, what would a deliberately spatial 
criticism entail for the study of literary modernism?  
My dissertation, “Modernist Spacing: Spatial Rhetoric and Poetics in the Modernist 
Novel,” addresses this question by undertaking a two-pronged approach to the study of space 
and modernism. It examines two notions of the “spatial turn” as it relates to modernist 
literature: first, as a relatively recent theoretical approach which has attracted and thwarted 
scholars seeking to reclaim modernism’s fundamental spatiality; and second, as one of the 
most aesthetically and politically significant paradigm shifts within literary modernism itself, 
a radically new rhetoric of space which made modernist innovation in narrative form and 
style possible. In this introductory chapter, I will provide an overview of spatial criticism in 
modernist literary studies and its place in the larger context of twentieth-century spatial 
theory, arguing that the equation of space with geography has hobbled modernist spatial 
criticism by reducing our understanding of space to one of its subcategories. Despite 
compelling recent work on “planetary” modernisms, scalability, and the (now) global turn, 
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this flattening of space against the surfaces of the globe has limited the scope of our 
scholarship and allowed us to sidestep the necessary task of addressing space’s notorious 
conceptual complexity. The four following chapters attempt to counteract this critical 
tendency by demonstrating how diversely Anglo-American women modernists conceived 
space in their novels. Each text explores and tests what I argue is space’s fundamental 
semantic mobility: its ability to converge with, break away from, and transform into other 
spaces through the unfixed and provisional meanings we confer upon it. Language and space 
share a metonymic capacity to link the real and the abstract, I argue, and it is at their juncture 
that modernist literature demands our attention. 
Jameson’s suggestion that the contemporary postmodern moment was “dominated by 
categories of space rather than by categories of time, as in the preceding period of high 
modernism,” and that the idea of a “spatial turn” might “offer one of the more productive 
ways of distinguishing postmodernism from modern proper” has been canonized in the short 
history of modernist spatial studies as its originary call to arms, and there was indeed a brief 
period in the mid-2000s when modernist studies seemed poised to make full and productive 
use of Jameson’s proposition (Jameson 16, 154). Troubled always by an obligation to align 
their priorities with one term against another in a series of reductive binaries (high/low, 
center/periphery, traditional/new, Victorian/modern, modernist/postmodernist), modernists 
could hardly let this provocation stand. But no sooner had they declared the “spacious 
times”1 of modernity a necessary focal point in the study of spatiality than space was 
effectively reduced to geography, a loosely-defined term whose magnitude ranges in 
                                                 
1 Ford Madox Ford, The Soul of London (qtd. in Thacker 2).  
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modernist studies from the public and private spaces of the built environment to the vast 
global territories of empire. In Geographies of Modernism: Literatures, Cultures, Spaces 
(2005), Peter Brooker and Andrew Thacker ask, “where was modernism?” (3), claiming that 
a “spatial history of modernisms” must address the question by “ground[ing] the use of 
geographical tropes in the material practices and places of modernity” while remaining 
“responsive . . . to their discrete and palimpsestic local, regional, national and transnational 
provenances” (Brooker 4). Laura Doyle and Laura Winkiel argue in Geomodernisms: Race, 
Modernism, Modernity (2005), that, because modernist artists thought and wrote consciously 
about “experiences of encounter and dispersion, place and exile, global connection and local 
alienation,” a consideration of “place, proximity, and position” in relation to space as well as 
history becomes essential to “both the creation and the interpretation of modernisms” (Doyle 
1-2). Susan Stanford Friedman considers such overtly spatial histories essential for breaking 
out of the confines of periodization, which enforce a narrow conception of modernity as 
chiefly a Western phenomenon. In a 2006 essay addressing the state of the field, she argues 
that a period-bound framework like the Modernist Studies Association’s emphasis on fin de 
siècle to midcentury, for example, privileges Anglo-American modernisms at the expense of 
continental European movements which began in the mid-nineteenth century (Friedman, 
“Periodizing” 426-427). Shifting modernism’s geographical rootedness in certain 
metropolitan nodes of empire thus requires considerations of both time and space. “Fredric 
Jameson’s imperative—‘Always historicize!’” Friedman writes, “leads unthinkingly into 
binaries of center/periphery unless it is supplemented with the countervailing imperative—
Always spatialize!” (426). 
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That the imperative to spatialize should countervail historicism at all seems contrary 
to a critical undertaking predicated on the decentering of modernism’s historically 
Eurocentric biases. Framing the movement away from the usual sites of Western 
metropolitan modernism as explicitly a spatial move, rather than a historicizing one, has 
troubling implications that I will address later in this chapter. What strikes me, however, in 
the aftermath of Jameson’s proposed paradigm shift is how even a question as 
straightforwardly geographical as “where was modernism?” reveals itself to be tangled in a 
nexus of critical anxieties dredged up by the division of time and space. Brooker and Thacker 
preface the question by addressing the more obvious political implications of the 
cartographic impulse. Maps, atlases, geographies—all claim the status of authorized 
representations of space. A “geography of modernism” would be “embedded in structures of 
power,” as such discourses of space always are (Brooker 1). But the peril of reducing 
geography to “simple spatial tabulations of culture” is compounded by “a tension within the 
very phrase ‘geography of modernism,’” they claim: an opposition of terms along the axes of 
space (geography) and time (modernity) which threatens to conjure up controversies long 
since put to rest in the history of both spatial theory and modernist criticism:  
To suggest . . . that we examine modernism within the spatial frameworks of 
geography might seem perverse or, even in some ways, reactionary. After all, 
wasn’t the effect of New Criticism to see literary texts as spatial, synchronic 
forms divorced of historical context? And wasn’t Michel Foucault 
metaphorically ‘firebombed’ by critics in the late 1960s for suggesting that 
space and not time was at the centre of his interests? (1) 
 
I want to make a few observations on what might seem in the above passage like a 
comparatively low-stakes lapse in rigor before explaining how such lapses reveal a 
fundamental quality of spatial language and representation which the critical obsession with 
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time and space has served to obscure. The trouble begins with the spectral term presiding 
over their discussion of geography and modernism and the “tension” allegedly holding them 
in conflict: space. Observe the definitional confusion that emerges as Brooker and Thacker’s 
“spatial frameworks” unspool into a tangle of concepts only notionally related to geography: 
they begin by hazarding that a consideration of modernism’s relationship to geography might 
seem, to some, to privilege space over time, over history, possibly over modernity itself 
(therefore the “tension” inherent in a “geography of modernism”). This concern then moves 
outside the bounds of physical space as they suggest that geocriticism might be mistaken for 
a regression into New Critical interest in “spatial” form, as if putting modernism on the map 
might risk putting it to rest, again, in the well-wrought urn of aestheticism. How such a 
misunderstanding could happen is not explained, and suddenly we are with Foucault in 1966, 
in a heroic firefight between the boundless ontological categories of Space and Time. 
 Space, invoked first as geography, fans out metonymically into a range of 
semantically-overlapping senses, from textual form to ontological category, with little 
account of how these “spaces” interrelate conceptually. While Brooker and Thacker may be 
guilty, at worst, of providing a glib overview of familiar critical caveats, their conflation of 
spatial categories is nevertheless symptomatic of a number of problems dogging modernist 
spatial criticism. The conceptual sleights of hand at work in this passage, intentional or not, 
tell us something vital about space’s inherently metonymic nature. This dissertation argues 
that the linguistic and representational mechanisms by which one form of space can 
transform into spaces of a very different kind (geography into textual form, for example), 
were vital to modernist authors’ efforts to understand the changing times and spaces of 
modernity. As literary criticism continues to expand its spatial and geocritical toolsets, such 
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mechanisms must be interrogated in our own methodologies as well. Thus, what seems 
conspicuous to me in Brooker and Thacker’s work—as it does elsewhere in modernist 
geocriticism—is not a natural tension between geography and modernism, but the absence of 
a genuine account of space. Rectifying this deficit will require both a reckoning of the spatial 
turn’s history and a critical strategy for its future. But to do this, we must assess what I 
suspect has served as an alibi for this fuller reckoning: the problem of time. 
The Dead, the Fixed, the Undialectical   
To begin with, a geography of modernism only seems “perverse” or “reactionary” if 
one’s understanding predates the rise of critical geography in the 1960s through the 1980s 
and its emphasis on the asymmetrical power relations shaping both physical geography and 
human spatial practices. Ernst Bloch proclaimed in 1962 that “the primacy of space over time 
is an infallible sign of reactionary language,” but Foucault’s “firebombing” along similar 
lines of argument by a “Sartrean psychologist” in 1966—midway between the publication of 
Gaston Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space in 1957 and Henri Lefebvre’s The Production of 
Space in 1974—marked the rising heights of an already irreversible shift in spatial thinking 
(qtd. in Massey 42; qtd. in Soja, Postmodern 19). Space had hitherto been “treated as the 
dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile”; time as “richness, fedundity, life, dialectic’” 
(Soja, Postmodern 19). Yet Foucault’s thinking was being shaped—alongside that of other 
geographers, social scientists, and philosophers—by the recognition that space is 
“fundamental in any form of communal life,” as it was “in any exercise of power.” Space, in 
Lefebvre’s formulation, was social, the social product of social relations and practices. As 
Edward Soja writes in Postmodern Geographies (1989), “the reassertion of space in critical 
social theory does not demand an antagonistic subordination of time and history,” but “a call 
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for an appropriate interpretive balance between space, time, and social being, or what may 
now more explicitly be termed the creation of human geographies, the making of history, and 
the constitution of society” (23). By the time Foucault recounted his incendiary exchange in 
1984, the once prevailing notion that “space was reactionary and capitalist,” while “history 
and becoming were revolutionary,” was by his own admission already an “absurd discourse.” 
Yet literary critics hark back to Foucault’s “firebombing” with a reflexivity that 
borders on the superstitious, as if crossing themselves against the “the dead, the fixed, the 
undialectical.” Outmoded elsewhere, genuine credence in the anti-historical implications of a 
full engagement with space would suggest rather serious issues with the state of geocriticism 
in contemporary modernist studies, but I think the invocation of these old debates is 
somewhat disingenuous. For of all forms of spatial criticism compelled to chasten themselves 
before the altar of Time, geocriticism tends to be least contrite. The push to understand 
modernism geopolitically—not as a singular Western phenomenon, but as network of diverse 
global modernisms—derives less from the theoretical debates of the larger spatial turn than it 
does postcolonial studies in literature, especially in its recovery of submerged histories from 
the “peripheries” of empire. But perhaps more obviously, geocriticism deals with space’s 
most instinctive definition: geographic space, which is to say real space. Of space’s many 
incarnations, geographic space perhaps requires the least conceptual wrangling: not only 
intuitive, geographic space is also helpfully manifest. This is the space that determines the 
fates of people and nations, the space that can be carved up, warred over, or violently altered, 
yet never ceases to be categorically what it is. Abstracted, but never reducible to abstraction, 
geographic space is inherently political, inherently implicated in the historical. It has no 
quarrel with time.   
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If this last claim seems an over-simplification, it is one to take seriously. Though 
geocritical work has continued to nuance the diverse global literatures we now recognize as 
distinct modernisms, there has been less exact nuancing of this scholarship’s spatial 
definitions and methodologies, particularly with regard to navigating the conceptual 
complexities unique to the study of modernist texts. This is partly an effect of modernist 
studies’ fraught history: however passé the old debates about time and space, the notion that 
space might be static and apolitical, that it should necessarily equate to form, holds particular 
weight. Astradur Eysteinsson notes that critics have regularly linked modernism’s aesthetic 
and political projects by noting an “overemphasis on form” mirroring “the authoritarian order 
and discipline of the fascist state” (Eysteinsson 15). Significantly, that formalism is figured 
as a repudiation of time in favor of space, or, as Frank Kermode writes, “order as the 
modernist artist understands it: rigid, out of flux, the spatial order of the modern critic or the 
closed authoritarian society” (Kermode 111). With this critical precedent (combined with 
modernism’s narrow Eurocentrism and actual flirtations with fascist politics), the trepidation 
toward explicitly spatial approaches becomes easier to understand. Yet as literature’s spatial 
turn expands from the global to the planetary, the purported fixity and lifelessness of space, 
its supposed closure to the revolutionary possibilities of history and becoming, seem an 
insufficient explanation for the neglect of spatial study outside the framework of geopolitics. 
How, if we are to take Friedman’s injunction to “always spatialize” seriously, can we rely on 
spatial concepts and methodologies to open up modernist studies beyond its Eurocentric and 




This contradiction is seldom addressed because it is understood as having been 
resolved by the reduction of space to geography. In work like Brooker and Thacker’s, the 
familiar ontological oppositions of time and space, or of openness and closure, are invoked 
only to be equated to, and then displaced by, a seemingly correspondent opposition: 
modernism and geography. But both terms in this dyad are obviously implicated in history 
and politics. Thus, in a sort of feint, this scholarship gestures to space’s philosophical snares 
while offering geocriticism’s rich historicity as a counterpoint. It thereby avoids 
differentiating itself from historicism altogether.2 Nor does it really answer the question, “Is 
space political?” Thus, the frequent citations of Foucault’s “firebombing” or of New 
Criticism’s political foibles seem to me perfunctory at best, and disingenuous at worst. They 
have the effect of raising old debates in order to create the illusion of engaging with current 
ones. In The Concept of Modernism (1990), Eysteinsson identifies what was then modernist 
studies’ “central paradox”: “we need to ask ourselves how the concept of [aesthetic] 
autonomy, so crucial to many theories of modernism, can possibly coexist with the equally 
prominent view of modernism as a historically explosive paradigm” (16). Now, within the 
context of the recent spatial turn, we need to ask how our refusal to engage with the idea of 
“spatial, synchronic forms divorced of historical context” can possibly continue in a 
discipline that nevertheless unquestioningly recognizes such structures as a type of “space.” 
As we continue to we fix our gaze on the more overtly political arenas of “real” space, our 
                                                 
2 This move is not unique to modernist geocriticism: “‘His [Levi-Strauss’s] ruse’, writes Fabian, ‘is to substitute 
diachrony for history. That sleight of hand is supported, much like the diversions all illusionists try to create 
while operating their magic, by directing the reader’s attention to something else, in this case to the 
“opposition” of Space and Time’ (p. 54). Moreover, he argues, ‘Levi-Strauss leads us to believe that space here 
could mean real space, perhaps the space of the human geographers’ … while it is actually a taxonomic space, 
indeed a map” (Massey 38). 
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methodological reliance on spatial concepts—even those we now reject—must be revisited 
and interrogated. 
We might begin by engaging more seriously with recent spatial theory, particularly 
work that offers ways of rethinking the old paradigms and debates currently limiting 
modernist spatial criticism. Critical geographers and spatial theorists have long noted the 
absurdity of time’s alleged monopoly on the realms of social and political possibility (hence 
Lefebvre’s insistence that space is socially produced and Soja’s concept of a trialectics 
uniting “spatiality, historicality, and sociality”) (Soja, Thirdspace viii). But according to 
Doreen Massey in For Space (2005), space has been repeatedly misunderstood as signifying 
“ideological closure,” not because it inherently lacks dynamism or openness (per Bergson), 
nor because its political and social potential has been deprioritized in favor of historicism 
(per Soja), but because the conceptual move which counterposes it to time conceals a 
slippage that robs it of its vitality, leaving something in its place that cannot be accurately 
labeled “space” (Massey 25). Massey, like Foucault, traces this lapse to Bergson3: 
Bergson’s concern was that time is too often conceptualised in the same 
manner as space (as a discrete multiplicity). We misunderstand the nature of 
duration, he argued, when we ‘spatialize’ it—when we think of it as a fourth 
dimension of extension. . . . The instantaneous slice through time was 
assumed to be static, as it is in the form in which it is invoked in Zeno’s 
paradox. It was then awarded the label ‘spatial’. And finally it was argued: 
anyway, if there is to be real becoming (the genuine continuous production of 
the new), then such supposedly static slices through time must be impossible. 
Static time-slices, even multiplied to infinity, cannot produce becoming. (22-
23) 
 
                                                 
3 Massey writes: “Indeed Soja (1989) argues that Bergson was one of the most forceful instigators of a more 
general devaluation and subordination of space relative to time which took place during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. . . . And the classic recantation by Foucault of the long history of the denigration of space, 
begins: ‘Did it start with Bergson, or before?’” (21). 
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Massey counters that if static “slices through time” are impossible, then the kind of space 
they ostensibly comprise must also be impossible. But more importantly, such “time-slices” 
should not be labeled space. What is yielded by the subtraction of time and duration from the 
flux of being, she argues, is actually representation. Massey draws attention to the blurred 
distinction between space, an ontological category, and spatialization, whose “action of 
setting things down side by side; of laying them out as a discrete simultaneity” shades into 
the domain of representation (23). And because representation is so often understood in this 
line of thought as the fixation (rather than the opening up) of meaning, a metonymic “chain 
of meaning” is forged between representation, spatialization, and space whereby space takes 
on the static attributes of representation (24). “The slide here from spatialisation as an 
activity to space as a dimension is crucial,” Massey asserts; it is how space has come to 
equate to synchrony, rigid formal order, and closure to political possibility (23). 
 This seems to me to have profound implications for modernist spatial studies. The 
metonymic slide by which “[r]epresentation—indeed conceptualisation—has been conceived 
of as spatialisation” (20) promises to clarify a field of study in which space and 
representation serve as objects of study and conceptualization as a methodological tool. It 
urges reassessment of New Critical “spatial form” as well. Soja argues that we cannot treat 
space simply as “a focus for empirical investigation,” or what I would call in literature the 
typological approach to spatial studies (wherein criticism organizes itself by what type of 
space it examines: geographic, urban, natural, architectural, domestic, etc.) (Soja, 
Postmodern 7). Neither can spatial study suffice as a “metaphorical recomposition of social 
theory, a superficial linguistic spatialization that makes geography appear to matter 
theoretically as much as history.” The banner of the spatial turn cannot function, as it has in 
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modernist studies, as a cover for historicist work; nor should literary critics deploy spatial 
concepts merely to reconstitute old methodological approaches. True spatial study “requires a 
much deeper deconstruction and reconstitution of critical thought and analysis at every level 
of abstraction, including ontology,” Soja writes. In other words, spatial form still matters, no 
less to modernist studies than to the social sciences, even if its seeming apolitical nature 
opposite time poses barriers to its recuperation (as when Brooker and Thacker challenge the 
anti-spatial assumptions which would read “tension” into the phrase “geography of 
modernism,” but call their project a “spatial history of modernisms” (my emphasis)). If 
critical consensus dictates a rejection of those “concepts of modernism” (to borrow from 
Eysteinsson) which signify ideological closure, we should ask: must spatial criticism operate 
as veiled historicism in order to remain open to the political?  
The Politics of Space 
One way to answer these questions—to test the horizons of political possibility within 
modernist studies—is to examine how spatial concepts operate within the discipline. Spatial 
language has been a familiar feature in the terrain of literary criticism since long before the 
spatial turn. Literature’s diverse spaces include not only poetic and fictional representations 
of material spaces, but the structure of textual forms and the numerous metaphoric and 
conceptual spaces (spheres, margins, liminal spaces, positionalities, etc.) adapted from social 
and cultural theory. The problem posed by the arrival of the spatial turn, then, was how to 
define in precise terms what an explicitly spatial criticism would entail for the study of 
literature—an enterprise which would require, before all else, a definition of space. Literary 
modernism, a movement which came to fruition just as spatial paradigms were being 
radically reimagined everywhere from physics to the visual arts, would surely provide fertile 
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ground for such an endeavor. But the spatial turn in modernist studies has largely side-
stepped this challenge. In Moving Through Modernity: Space and Geography in Modernism 
(2003), Thacker warns against the diffuseness of the term space, which can seem “so 
semantically vague as to be shorn of all value in critical discussion” (Thacker 5). It is a 
problem that “can be overcome by staying attentive to the precise nuances within spatial 
vocabularies,” he argues (5). Yet Thacker’s book (which has become a touchstone text in 
recent modernist spatial criticism) betrays a fundamental indecisiveness on the matter, 
uncertain whether it best to calibrate the sensitivity of the literary critical instrument to 
space’s constant semantic oscillations, or to resolve that definitional slipperiness by affixing 
space’s conceptual bounds to those of geography. In any case, this tentativeness appears 
decided by Geographies of Modernism.  
One effect of the trend towards strict geocriticism is that the profusion of “spatial” 
language elsewhere in literary criticism continues apace while rigorous definitional work 
within spatial studies stagnates. Critical language, Minrose Gwin observes, “abounds with 
gaps, geographies, ‘women’s spaces,’ queer space, borders, openings, abysses, aporias, 
interstices, chora, curves, edges, terrains, landscapes, topographies: all evocative of 
something alluringly both of and beyond the cartographies of language” (Gwin 9). The 
suggestion of spaces outside the representational bounds of language speaks to the 
imaginative and emancipatory promise of spatial language—precisely those qualities which 
forfend space from ideological closure, I argue. But for Lefebvre, delight in space’s 
horizonless metaphoricity often belies a reluctance to offer definitions of actual space: 
No limits at all have been set on the generalization of the concept of mental 
space. . . . We are forever hearing about the space of this and/or the space of 
that: about literary space, ideological spaces, the space of the dream, 
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psychoanalytic topologies, and so on and so forth. Conspicuous by its absence 
from supposedly fundamental epistemological studies is not only the idea of 
‘man’ but also that of space—the fact that ‘space’ is mentioned on every page 
notwithstanding. (Lefebvre 3) 
 
Spatial metaphor’s poetic reach, while attractive to critics, ironically permits literal space to 
recede from view behind a thicket of figurative displacements. Space-as-metaphor becomes 
conventionalized as a placeholder for indeterminacy serving the particular linguistic needs of 
a given critical discourse. To complicate matters further, broad cross-disciplinary interest in 
the subject of space already ensures "that the categories that control discussions of human 
spatiality are not fixed,” writes Wesley Kort (Kort 1). The language we use to talk about 
space, though richly generative, “lacks conventions” (5).    
What’s more, the backflow of spatial metaphors into geocritical writing has made the 
relation between literal and figurative spaces less clear. Indeed, much geocriticism neglects 
to examine how spatial terms and frameworks borrowed from other disciplines change in the 
process of translation to the study of literature. Without definitional conventions or 
established theoretical frameworks for spatial study, spatial analogies borrowed from other 
disciplines are apt to lose their metaphoricity, becoming reified as spatial forms in and of 
themselves. As Frank Kermode writes, “'spatialization' is one of those metaphors which we 
tend to forget are metaphorical, like the metaphor of organic form” (Kermode 178). Our 
tendency to “forget” its representational nature persists in part because spatialization’s 
relationship to real space is primarily metonymic, rather than metaphoric: a “chain of 
meaning” linking real space to representation which Massey describes as allowing a slippery 
substitution of terms. This metonymic sleight of hand, by which a representation or 
conceptualization of space becomes mistaken for space itself, presents a methodological 
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exigency, since literary geocriticism must deal with both real and representational spaces. 
Crucially, however, such a process of substitution, while metonymic in its general movement 
between the concrete and the abstract, is not solely a rhetorical function of linguistic 
representations of space, but a quirk of space’s ontology as well. It operates under cover of 
what Lefebvre calls space’s “double illusion,” or its capacity to appear at once “opaque” and 
“transparent” (Lefebvre 27). The “illusion of opaqueness,” in Soja’s paraphrase, perceives 
space as “a superficial materiality, concretized forms susceptible to little else but 
measurement and phenomenal description” (Soja, Postmodern 7). By contrast, the “‘illusion 
of transparency’ dematerializes space into pure ideation and representation.” Together they 
form a double illusion, both contradictory and collusive: each illusion “refers back to the 
other, reinforces the other, and hides behind the other” in our understanding of space, writes 
Lefebvre, concealing its true nature as a product of social relations (Lefebvre 27).  
This double illusion manifests rather bluntly in modernist geocriticism, which tends 
to treat “opaque” geographic space as uncomplicatedly the object of spatial study and spatial 
concepts and metaphors as merely the “transparent” methodological apparatus overlaying or 
mediating that object. While much of this scholarship urges critics to adequately nuance their 
critical frameworks—to avoid, as Brooker and Thacker state, “simple spatial tabulations of 
culture” (Brooker 1)—few interrogate the blind spots which assumptions of spatial 
transparency and opacity present for literary geocriticism (nor notice when their 
undertheorized critical foundations shift and resettle into this bifurcated vision of space). 
Susan Stanford Friedman, for example, argues that modernist studies must “examine the 
spatial politics of historical periodization,” particularly “the way that generalizations about 
historical periods typically contain covert assumptions about space that privilege one location 
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over others,” in order to move away “from exclusivist formulations of modernity and 
modernism” (Friedman, “Periodizing” 426). Eliminating the temporal boundaries which 
confine modernism to the early twentieth century would bring other modernisms, particularly 
those outside the West, into view. The illusion of opacity operates straightforwardly here: 
space’s equivalence to place, to material, geographical location, is treated as a given. The 
illusion of transparent space, on the other hand, functions more subtly. Though the end-goal 
of Friedman’s project is a more geographically-diverse modernism, what is termed 
“spatialization” in her method is not a geographical practice, but rather the elimination of 
temporal bounds as a definitional framework: the removal of time is mistaken, once again, 
for the production of space. “Always spatialize!” (Friedman’s “counterimperative” to 
Jameson’s “Always historicize!”) represents a heuristic for rethinking the geographically-
limiting parameters of conventional periodization, not a call to theorize modernism’s 
relationship to space and spatiality (440). But embedded in a putative critique of 
Eurocentrism is an equally problematic framing made invisible by the pretense of 
“spatialized” analysis. In formulating the problem as a quasi-mathematical issue of 
dimensionality, Friedman reduces modernism’s Eurocentrism to an innocent methodological 
error, a byproduct of narrow periodization. The appearance of ideological innocence which 
spatialization produces thus absolves modernist studies of its more obvious faults: its 
colonization, its racism, its white supremacy.  
Friedman’s framework also demonstrates how Lefebvre’s double illusion can 
function as a metonymic movement from abstract to reified space. A shorthand for the 
abandonment of periodization, “spatialization” sets in motion Massey’s chain of meaning 
linking representation to spatialization, spatialization to space: first, the absence of time is 
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misidentified as the presence of space; next, spatialization (representation) reifies into opaque 
space as Friedman’s heuristic method converges, and is then conflated, with her project’s 
geopolitical priorities. This is the nature of the double illusion, that opacity and transparency 
each “reinforces . . . and hides behind the other” such that the two illusions can’t easily be 
disentangled (Lefebvre 27). The intuitive materiality of geographic space (which requires no 
definition) combined with the veil of innocence cast by spatial abstraction conceals the 
metonymic slide from representation to “real” space.  
I would submit that the inherent “tension” within modernist geography is not to be 
found somewhere along the axes of time and space, as Brooker and Thacker suggest, but 
within space itself: here, in the metonymic continuum between materiality and abstraction 
that enables geocriticism to vacillate between illusions of opacity and transparency. “The 
shifting back and forth between the two,” writes Lefebvre, “and the flickering or oscillatory 
effect that it produces are . . . just as important as either of the illusions considered in 
isolation” (30). That this fundamental mobility in our spatial apperception so often goes 
unexamined speaks to space’s general undertheorization within modernist geocriticism.  
Assumptions of opacity and transparency imply a reductive understanding of human 
spatiality, that there is “real” space, on one hand, and abstract representations, on the other. 
Refuge into either conception ignores the covert interplay of illusions within the field, which 
reifies spatialized methods (read: metaphors) while cloaking the process behind geographic 
opacity. By contrast, a theoretically robust geocriticism would interrogate how transparency 
and opacity interact in our methodologies, with an eye to how critical frameworks “produce” 
(and often misrepresent) space.  
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These concerns are borne out in recent efforts to re-scale modernist studies’ purview 
beyond the bounds of the global. Michael Tavel Clarke and David Wittenberg note that 
geocriticism has generally been delinquent in examining the underlying assumptions in its 
spatial frameworks. Whereas “human geographers have continued to debate both the political 
significance of different scales of analysis and the principle that one’s choice of analytical 
scale has important ideological implications,” they observe, in literary studies, “a global scale 
of analysis has gradually triumphed during the past twenty-five years without substantial 
controversy” (Clarke 11). However, in a 2018 essay titled “Scale and Form; or, What was 
Global Modernism?” Thomas S. Davis and Nathan K. Hensley ask “how a renovated 
modernist studies might coordinate macro-level analyses of the world-as-system—the 
maximalist model—with particularized attention to individual cultural objects or moments 
within them” (Davis). In other words, they examine the extent to which modernism’s scope 
can expand beyond the global while meeting the methodological demands of literary studies, 
which require analysis at “minimal scales.” The essay also outlines the need for updated 
modes of analysis in answer to the political weaknesses of global approaches, which can slip 
“easily, even necessarily, into intellectual colonization,” such that “all literary activity, from 
anywhere or anytime might conceivably be subsumed under the sign of modernism.” Aarthi 
Vadde suggests that this colonizing tendency can be disrupted by differentiating expansion 
from scalability. While expansion merely enlarges the breadth of modernism’s domain, 
scalability specifies the field’s capacity to accommodate expansion “without changing its 
governing principles”—that is, its fundamental organization, epistemological framework, and 
methods of analysis (Vadde). Vadde argues that canonical Western modernism proves 
incapable of scaling smoothly; it has failed to find modernisms reproduced in its own image 
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elsewhere on the globe, thereby giving the lie to the argument that globalizing modernist 
studies requires aesthetic and ideological assimilation. 
Davis and Hensley put a premium on readings which “scale up and down” between 
micro- and macro-analyses, emphasizing the part-whole relationship which enables the critic 
to “slide between individual text and global system” (Davis). However, Vadde’s contention 
that global modernism resists smooth scalability indicates a fundamental problem with the 
form of movement Davis and Henlsey describe, which Bruno Latour terms the “zoom 
effect.” Latour explains that the convention of imagining movement between scale domains 
as a fluid “zooming” action “emerges from the optics of photography, from the zoom created 
by the use of a lens aptly called ‘telescopic’” (Latour 94). But as with many spatial analogies, 
the zoom effect’s metaphoricity often disappears in its application to scalability. This is an 
error, Latour argues, “[f]or neither the schema of space, nor that of time, appear continuous: 
levels of reality do not nestle one within the other like Russian dolls. It cannot be said that 
the small or the short lie within the large or the long, in the sense that the largest or the 
longest contain them but with just ‘fewer details’” (94). The zoom effect is a visual metaphor 
reified into an illusion of spatial isotropy: its seamless shifting between large and small (or 
global and local) homogenizes space, erasing the incommensurable epistemological 
differences between scale domains. 
A scale (such as the global) is therefore not a category of space, but a unit of analysis. 
It is delimited not by scope so much as by the nature of the data it contains and the 
epistemological cohesion of its organizing principles. To “scale up and down” is to compare 
sets of fundamentally different data. This is called scale variance. “As the opposite of 
smooth zoom and scalability,” Derek Woods writes, “scale variance names the observation 
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that things happen differently at different scales due to physical constraints upon becoming” 
(Woods 65). The zoom effect, in contrast, “reduces qualitative differences of space to 
quantitative ones” (63). As Vadde argues, attempting to scale modernism “up” means 
discovering heterogeneous forms of data—other literary phenomena that can be named 
“modernism,” but not on the terms set by the Eurocentric canon of the early twentieth 
century. Modernism, while global, defies smooth scalability.   
What should be clear from the zoom fallacy is that, although scales are not forms of 
spaces, they are often mistaken as such. Close-reading modernist texts across a “global” scale 
is not the same as engaging with geographical space, but we often forget that certain spatial 
concepts are metaphors for how we analyze our subjects rather than constitutive elements of 
space itself. Leaving such assumptions unchallenged risks falling into precisely what Soja 
warns against, literary spatial studies as a “metaphorical recomposition of social theory,” a 
“superficial linguistic spatialization” of conventional methods which the field mistakes for 
engagement with spatiality (Soja, Postmodern 7). Characterizing the synecdochic 
relationship between text and world system as a smooth continuum of scales along which one 
can simply “zoom” in and out, for example, reifies a relational representation into transparent 
space, a field within which the illusion of effortless movement is possible.  
Although the appearance of such spatial transparency is an illusion, smooth-scaling 
nevertheless enacts a covert form of spatial violence. In her 2015 book, Planetary 
Modernisms: Provocations on Modernity Across Time, Friedman answers her own call to 
“spatialize” modernist studies by offering a hyper-scaled model of planetarity. Planetary 
modernism imagines modernity as “multiple, polycentric, and recurrent instances of 
transformational rupture and rapid change” occurring “across the millennia” and beyond the 
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now standard scopes of the global and transnational (Planetary ix). The appeal to a “greater 
expanse of time and space” is meant to upend the framework of periodization, which 
unavoidably positions Western modernism as “the powerful center to the rest’s weak 
periphery” (7). But planetarity is also an open avowal of the zoom effect’s illusion of spatial 
transparency: “I privilege planetary because it bypasses the overdetermined associations of 
the other terms,” Friedman explains (7). “Planetary has an open-ended edge that 
transnational and global lack” (8). Yet to obliterate the margins of nation and globe by 
superimposing a new scale (whose terminology suggests a coded appeal to scientism) 
effectively creates a blank slate on which to replot and reimagine modernism, one wiped 
clean of the ideological taint of institutional Eurocentrism and colonization. The sanitizing 
nature of spatialized models like Friedman’s is a feature of transparent space: “The illusion 
of transparency goes hand in hand with a view of space as innocent, as free of traps or secret 
places,” writes Lefebvre. “Anything hidden or dissimulated—and hence dangerous—is 
antagonistic to transparency . . .” (Lefebvre 28). A planetary model of modernism offers a 
utopian shortcut past the necessary work of dismantling the ideological structures—the “traps 
and secret places”—that have ensconced Eurocentrism within the field. But Friedman’s 
framing suggests that such traps will not be bypassed at all, but merely better concealed: by 
positioning planetarity’s spatializing framework against the purported Eurocentrism of 
Jameson’s imperative to historicize, she ascribes to non-Western modernisms a deeply 
problematic quality of historylessness.   
Moreover, rescaling modernist studies to the scope of the planetary does little to 
address the danger of intellectual colonization. “If modernism is everywhere and (a 
precursory) in every period,” Bashir Abu-Manneh argues, “then it loses its coherence as a 
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category and becomes a form of identitarian self-affirmation” (Abu-Manneh). The more we 
expand modernism, “the more epistemologically colonizing and conceptually diluted it must 
be,” concur Davis and Hensley (Davis). It is both difficult to deny and difficult to prove 
global modernist studies guilty of wishing to “bestow” the banner of modernism on inchoate 
aesthetic movements across time and space. Thus, a more productive and necessary 
endeavor, I argue, would be to examine not only what spaces our scholarship lays claim to, 
but what spaces it produces—not just methodologically (in terms of scales or frames of 
analysis), but institutionally, in the actual social spaces of the academy.  
Changing the location, scale, and spatiality of modernism would mean changing the 
space that modernist studies occupies in our literature departments, publishing houses, and 
professional organizations. But perhaps counterintuitively, expanding the intellectual scope 
of modernist studies could further cloister it institutionally. A significant flaw of Planetary 
Modernisms is its failure to fully imagine the repercussions of a planetary-scale modernism 
on academic labor conditions. The problems, however, are implicit in the very shape of its 
project. The book’s scale takes Friedman’s readings outside the range of her expertise in 
twentieth-century Anglo-American modernism to subjects as far-flung as poetry from 
fifteenth-century northern India and the Tang Dynasty in China, which she reads in 
translation. Her methods consequently raise questions: is a search committee seeking to fill a 
position in modernist studies more likely to hire a scholar of fifteenth-century Chinese 
poetry, or a European modernist with “qualifications” to teach general education courses in 
world literature? And if the European modernist can be tapped to teach Chinese poetry, what 
space for experts in Tang Dynasty literature can we expect the Anglophone, austerity-minded 
university to make at all? Friedman devotes a subsection of a single chapter to questions of 
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“institutional pragmatism,” in which she states that “[i]nstitutionalization of any field of 
study should reflect the nature of the intellectual project, not the other way around” 
(Planetary 342). But this perfunctory assertion does little to address that Friedman’s book 
risks reinstating the very geographical dynamic it disavows: by locating the center of the 
newly-planetary modernist studies in the institutional space occupied by an already-
established scholar of Anglo-American modernism. Though Planetary Modernisms aims to 
decenter canonical modernism from its narrow moorings in time and space, it does not 
seriously consider how “scaling up” would shape the social spaces of university teaching and 
scholarship. 
It should be stressed that ongoing work in geocriticism has richly demonstrated how 
geography and geopolitics shape and produce subjective experience, cultural practices, and 
artistic representation and has made a strong case for the critical and pedagogical usefulness 
of mapping literary spaces against real geographies (chapters two and four in this dissertation 
build upon the crucial foundational work of this scholarship). My intention in this 
introduction so far has been to build a narrative tracing the development of certain underlying 
errors and assumptions which I argue have shaped modernist geocriticism to its detriment. 
Chief among these is the failure to theorize the relationship between “real” and abstract 
space, despite productive models offered by theorists like Massey and Lefebvre. Specifically, 
I argue that the double illusion of transparency and opacity has prompted critics to focus on 
geography at the expense of space more broadly. Geographic space offers an illusion of 
opacity which the abstract spaces treated by theory and formalism do not. Unlike transparent 
space, it commands an impression of obvious political and material consequence—a clear 
attraction to a field which has been accused of fetishizing the political immobility of form 
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and order. However, I want to challenge the notion that real space is the lone realm of the 
politically possible by turning our attention to how the dynamic between space and 
representation—which Lefebvre calls a double illusion; Massey, a sliding “chain of 
meaning”; and I, a metonymic relationship of spatial mobility—can become the field on 
which spatial politics unfold.  
In sum, the reduction of space to geography within modernist studies appears 
overdetermined by a number of critical anxieties and desires: the wish to subvert the 
paradigm of modernism’s domination by temporal categories (while remaining grounded, 
whether wittingly or not, in strongly historicist methodologies); the determination to push the 
bounds of modernist studies beyond its conventional Eurocentrism; and the association of 
certain forms of transparent space (textual, mathematical, philosophical) with ahistoricism 
and reactionary politics. There is also the undeniable material, historical, and political import 
of geographic space. It is imperative, then, to continue to re-examine the structures, priorities, 
and assumptions by which geocriticism has organized itself in modernist scholarship. I argue 
that the first place to look is in the very conceptual confusion which has troubled the field: in 
our complicated apperception of space and the difficulties we encounter when we try to 
conceptualize it, especially in language. But to reengage fully with space—and inaugurate a 
true “spatial turn”—we must examine how modernist texts themselves have plumbed the 
fullness of space’s mobile complexity. 
The Poetics of Space 
 Perhaps the earliest and best-known study of modernist spatiality is Joseph Frank’s 
1945 essay “Spatial Form in Modern Literature,” which argues that "modern literature" (not 
yet "modernist" in 1945) was moving toward a "spatial," rather than linear, narrative 
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structure.  Contra Jameson’s pronouncements, Frank stresses the inadequacy of temporal 
frameworks for understanding narrative form in novels like Ulysses, À la recherche du temps 
perdu, and Nightwood.  He begins the essay with a discussion of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s 
Laocoön, which argues that, unlike the spatial form of the plastic arts (which can be 
apprehended by the viewer in a single instant of time), formal structure in the literary arts is 
essentially temporal.  The sequential nature of language—one word following another in a 
progression through time—is best accommodated by the temporal form of narrative 
sequence, in which events typically proceed in a manner meant to be understood as unfolding 
in natural time (Frank 223). “Time and space were the two extremes defining the limits of 
literature and the plastic arts in their relation to sensuous perception,” Frank writes.  
 However, Frank observes in the development of modernist poetry and fiction a 
movement away from the temporal toward a predominantly spatial form. This spatial trend is 
most evident in the Imagist movement led by Ezra Pound, who defines a poetic image as 
“that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time” (qtd. in 
Frank 226). Frank argues that because a poetic image is meant to be apprehended in an 
instant, the complex of ideas and emotion which constitute it must be approached according 
to their “spatial,” rather than their temporal or syntactic, arrangement: “Such a complex is not 
to proceed discursively, according to the laws of language, but is rather to strike the reader’s 
sensibility with an instantaneous impact” (226). This spatial understanding of Imagist poetry 
accords more or less with Pound’s view, but Frank’s far more contentious claim is that the 
trend towards spatial form can also be traced in the development of modernist fiction. As he 
writes of Djuna Barnes’s Nightwood, his definitive example of spatial form in the novel, 
“[T]hese chapters are knit together, not by the progress of any action—either physical action, 
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or, as in a stream-of-consciousness novel, the act of thinking—but by the continual reference 
and cross-reference of images and symbols which must be referred to each other spatially 
throughout the time-act of reading” (439).  Because modernist novels like Nightwood are 
structured on a principle of “reflexive reference,” favoring fragmentariness over narrative 
coherence, Frank claims that they can only be “reread” to be understood (434).   
That reading is by necessity a “time-act” (especially in the case of lengthy prose-
fiction) is perhaps the thorniest problem in Frank’s theory of spatial form. The impossible 
task of fully extricating the “spatial” novel from the temporal act of reading reveals just one 
way Frank thwarts his argument by restricting his scope to the boundaries of the text. But 
responses to Frank's theory in more recent scholarship tend to take greater issue with the 
ahistorical and apolitical implications of his New Critical approach than with the fallacious 
double-conflation of linearity with time and nonlinearity with space, an error many of these 
critiques replicate. Frank Kermode’s warning that “spatialization” is a metaphor whose 
metaphoricity is often forgotten is pertinent here. The tendency to confuse the actual and the 
metaphorical is often replicated (and sometimes amplified) in the responses such formalist 
thinking provokes; hence Thacker’s objection that, in Frank’s theory, “there is no real 
discussion of social space: the spaces of geographical analysis, or even the spaces of literary 
institutions such as publishers or magazines” (Thacker 4). Here Frank’s understanding of 
“nonlinear” narrative as somehow abstracted from temporal relations and organized “in 
space” undergoes a second metaphorical convolution: Thacker conflates nonlinearity first 
with spatialization, then with actual (social) space by extension. This is Massey’s metonymic 
“chain of meaning” run amok, and though Thacker slides effortlessly between space and 
representation, he never explains how these spaces fundamentally interrelate. 
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 Something happens when space meets language: certain spaces transmute effortlessly 
into other kinds of spaces; actual and abstract space interchange invisibly. “Metaphor, in the 
original sense of the word, enables travel, conveying a sense of one’s mobility, of being 
borne from one point to another,” writes Minrose Gwin (Gwin 9). It can “become the motion 
between meanings that often destabilizes both sets of meanings instead of making one more 
fixed or knowable.” But space is “already metaphoric, laden with instability and paradox,” 
Gwin observes; it is a “noun . . . always on the verge of becoming a verb, and an oily one at 
that” (6). Space’s inherent metaphoricity has had a considerable part to play, I think, in the 
dearth of concerted efforts to distinguish literary spatial criticism from its cousins elsewhere 
in the humanities and in the social sciences. The urgency of establishing conventions, let 
alone theoretical frameworks, for how literary critics might think uniquely about space is 
undercut by the sense that we are “allowed,” perhaps, to relish in metaphor and linguistic 
play—in endless deferral.  
Yet this metaphoricity is where I argue literary studies gains a special purchase on 
space. I have discussed the metonymic relationship between space, spatialization, and 
representation and how it often aids the conflation, via Lefebvre’s double illusion, of 
categorically different forms of spatiality. But it is crucial to note that, while overlapping 
spatialities demand rigorous critical attention, their slippery interactions are a quality, not an 
error. Space is not easily parceled out into fixed and discrete categories. Physical space is 
continuous by its nature: to paraphrase Lefebvre, when we think about two spaces partitioned 
by a boundary or a border, we are thinking as much about their contiguity as we are about 
their separateness (Lefebvre 87). Thus, metonymy and synecdoche, rather than metaphor, 
seem better models for understanding space’s relationship to representation, linguistic or 
 
29 
otherwise. Metonymy is a literary trope indicating semantic relationships of contiguity and 
proximity; it thus entails a spatial form of conceptual thinking. This spatial thinking is also 
inherently mobile, requiring the figurative conveyance of names between things closely 
associated in meaning. In the case of synecdoche, a subclass of metonymy which deals with 
part-whole relationships, this linguistic relationship is explicitly spatial. Space’s pliability as 
a figurative device speaks to its essential complexity and its capacity to slip out of the 
meanings we attempt to fasten to it. But metonymy opens up in space an expansive 
continuum between the abstract and the real.4 
 It is in the metonymic contiguity between heterogeneous spatialities that a critical 
through line can be found: a rhetoric and a poetics of space. Massey’s “chain of meaning” is 
more than linguistic: the metonymic thoroughfare it opens up between the abstract and the 
real reflects our relationship to space. I argue that space’s conceptual and representational 
evasiveness—the paradoxes that confound our theories of space; the way one kind of space 
can slip under, or transform into, another type as if by sleight of hand—is a fundamental part 
of our everyday perception and apprehension of space. Space is inherently mobile, and for 
this reason evades easy definition or theorization. Moreover, this mobility has political 
implications. Especially important for my project is the idea that a particular space is always 
a potential site for resistance against the meanings and functions imposed upon it. This 
contested, unstable quality is a given feature of social spaces, as Lefebvre argues. But I argue 
further that space’s metonymic nature allows people to both imagine and realize claims to 
                                                 
4 Hugh Bredin writes: “[Metonymy] may lack the brilliance and glamor of metaphor, but it is more closely knit 
into the fabric of language. In its very conventionality it retains and expresses many of our everyday values and 
prejudices, and our inherited knowledge of the world. This is perhaps the only reason for saying that it is a mark 




space. Spatial rhetoric exploits the continuum between materiality and abstraction, especially 
those points where the distinction is unclear—where the territory is up for grabs, in other 
words. Massey is keen to emphasize what literary critics are already well aware of, that the 
association of representation with fixation of meaning should not be taken as a given 
(Massey 26). This should be a focus of future spatial studies: the unsettled nature of both 
space and representation, and how their juncture via spatialization occupies no fixed location, 
but can be mobilized along a metonymic chain ranging from the real to the abstract. 
In making these arguments, the following chapters rely on a number of useful 
concepts from spatial theory.  Lefebvre’s concept of social space, for example, demands a 
rethinking of traditional notions of space that reduce it to a geometrical abstraction—a kind 
of nonentity which, paradoxically, can contain innumerable objects, subjects, and meanings.  
For Lefebvre, “space is never empty: it always embodies a meaning,” and a “social space” is 
that which both produces distinct social practices and is shaped by them (Lefebvre 154).  
Space is therefore always political, always ideological: “It is a product literally filled with 
ideologies” (qtd. in Thacker 17).  The central part which social space plays in the production 
of social practices and ideologies makes it a productive concept for modernist studies, 
particularly regarding modernist artists’ engagement with ideas of modernity and 
modernization.  Equally useful is Lefebvre’s distinction between representations of space 
and representational spaces.  Representations of space are the official, abstract depictions of 
space conceived by architects, planners, and governments in the form of maps, charts, and 
plans (Thacker 20).  Despite their abstract quality, Thacker explains, Lefebvre’s 
“[r]epresentations of space modify the spatial texture of a city or landscape according to 
certain ideologies, and are linked to codes and signs—for example, those used on a proposed 
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redevelopment plan of a city site” (20).  Modernists looked to these representations of space 
to decipher the rapid changes wrought by modernization, finding such representations by 
turns invigorating and lacking.  Representational spaces, by contrast, constitute a symbolic 
space as imagined by those inhabitants furthest removed from such sites of official 
representation and production: artists and writers, the “underground of social life,” as 
Lefebvre puts it (Lefebvre 33).  A representational space, he writes, “is alive: it speaks.  It 
has an affective kernel or centre: Ego, bed, bedroom, dwelling, house; or: square, church, 
graveyard.  It embraces the loci of passion, of action and of lived situations, and thus 
immediately implies time” (42). Much of modernist poetry and literature is about the 
increasing difficulty of finding such “loci” or “kernels” of affective experience: they are 
works fraught with the pessimistic or uneasy suspicion that such centers cannot hold. Thus, 
in Lefebvre’s thinking, we can begin to see how the fragmentary, “spatial” narratives of 
Joseph Frank’s theory might be shaped by actual social spaces, by abstract representations of 
space, or by the representational spaces of affective experience.  
Like Lefebvre’s representational spaces, which privilege the inhabited, emotional 
experience of a space over the abstract, often hegemonic, representations which officially 
label and rationalize space, Michel Foucault’s concepts of the utopia and the heterotopia 
theorize types of spaces which exist either to resist or counterbalance other spaces.  Much 
like its traditional meaning (literally, “no place”), a utopia for Foucault is a space which 
exists outside reality and whose purpose is to reflect a perfect version of society, “or else 
society turned upside down” (Foucault, par. 11).  A heterotopia, on the other hand, is a space 
that exists in reality but which serves as a “counter-[site], a kind of effectively enacted utopia 
in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are 
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simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted” (par. 12).5 Thacker finds the concept of 
the heterotopia particularly useful for discussing the relationship between physical spaces 
and the heterotopic space of the modernist text:   
The disorientating heterotopia of a modernist narrative might be directly 
indebted to urban space; experiments with typography and line spacing in 
modernist poetry could be linked to the emergence of heterotopic sites in 
modernist cities.  Here the material form of the text is a transformation of 
some specific external space; turning, for example, the streets of Dublin into a 
meandering narrative in Ulysses, such that we read the twists and turns of 
meaning as an embodiment of urban space. (Thacker 28) 
 
Thacker enriches Frank’s theory of spatial form by demonstrating how textual space might 
mimic the experience of actual physical spaces, comparable to the way by which stream-of-
consciousness and interior monologue endeavor to recreate the subjective experience of time.  
The goal of such textual representations of space, however, is not verisimilitude; these texts, 
like the spaces they represent, aim to undermine traditional understandings of the meaning 
and function of textual spaces.  Like physical heterotopias, the modernist heterotopic text 
“represents, contests, and inverts” traditional literary forms and texts; Ulysses, for example, 
is at once recognizable and unrecognizable as a rewriting of Homer’s Odyssey. If the 
modernist text can be viewed as a kind of heterotopic space, we can read it as an attempt to 
question and resist hegemonic claims to a multiplicity of spaces: spaces of text, of canon, of 
empire, and of the body.   
                                                 
5 An example of a heterotopia is the mirror: “The mirror is, after all, a utopia, since it is a placeless place. In the 
mirror, I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space that opens up behind the surface; I am over 
there, there where I am not, a sort of shadow that gives my own visibility to myself, that enables me to see 
myself there where I am absent: such is the utopia of the mirror. But it is also a heterotopia in so far as the 




Chapter one of this dissertation argues that the intensely embodied spatial experiences 
of characters in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (1925) evoke the spatial distortions of Roger 
Caillois’s understanding of psychasthenia, a form of psychosis in which the subject cannot 
locate herself accurately in the position in space occupied by her body. It is this unmooring of 
the subject’s consciousness from a fixed perspective in the world—but not from sensate 
space itself—that produces the novel’s innovative narrative spaces and enables Woolf to 
mount a political critique of rationalized space from an embodied perspective. Chapter two 
reexamines the subject of embodiment and space by exploring the consonances between 
monstrous bodies and monstrous landscapes in Jean Rhys’s Voyage in the Dark (1934), in 
which the specter of racial hybridity manifests in a modernist-gothic depiction of imperial 
and colonial space that achieves its most terrifying incarnation when the spaces of imperial 
center and periphery collapse in monstrous confusion. I argue that Voyage in the Dark 
attempts to retrieve a marginalized (albeit white) colonial perspective by deciphering and 
remapping the terrain of British literature, but that it deliberately fails in this endeavor to read 
the cultural space of empire, stopping short of writing all the way back to any originary 
canonical text. In chapter three, I read the attempt to negotiate a new form of domesticity in 
Djuna Barnes's Nightwood (1936) through the novel’s elaborate and profane interior spaces 
as part of the Decadent project to “rescue” the body from its corporeal transience by mooring 
it in the atemporal beauty of aestheticized interior space, a project that is nonetheless 
counteracted in the novel by an equally forceful repudiation of domesticity and a flight to the 
more recognizable modernist space of the city street. My fourth chapter examines how 
literature and propaganda in WWII Britain exploited the conceptual flexibility of the home as 
both material space and abstract idea, arguing that Elizabeth Bowen’s The Heat of the Day 
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(1948) serves as a conscious record of how the spatial, linguistic, and conceptual continuity 
between home and home front allowed the public space of the state to invade and subsume 
the private spaces of domestic life, reshaping interiors and interiority in its image. Each 
chapter builds on the work of major philosophers and theorists of space to develop a robust 
critical framework for the study of modernist spatiality, one that is flexible enough to account 
for space’s heterogeneous meanings, subcategories, and representations, but that has the 
necessary rigor to avoid falling into the contradiction and confusion of terms which besets 
much scholarship on literature and space. Language and space are linked by their metonymic 
capacity to unite the realms of the real and the imagined, I argue, and in this way modernist 
literature is uniquely equipped to reveal space’s power.
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CHAPTER 1: “THE BODY INTERVENES”: SENSATE SPACE IN VIRGINIA 
WOOLF’S MRS DALLOWAY  
 
“Space considered in isolation is an empty abstraction,” Henri Lefebvre writes in The 
Production of Space (1974). “Although in one sense this ‘substance’ is hard to conceive of, 
most of all at the cosmic level, it is also true to say that evidence of its existence stares us in 
the face: our senses and our thoughts apprehend nothing else” (12). However easily we intuit 
or rationalize it, the “naïve” space of our daily lives conceals from us its own conceptual 
complexity. Lefebvre calls this deception space’s “double illusion”: its ability to appear at 
once “transparent” and “opaque” (27). The “illusion of transparency,” as Lefebvre terms it, 
arises from our understanding of space as abstract: as geometric dimensionality or infinite 
extension, for example. The “illusion of opacity” (or the “realistic illusion”), on the other 
hand, concerns space as the manifestly obvious thing we occupy and encounter in the 
physical world—an illusion of uncomplicated “naturalness,” the notion that objects have a 
truer existence than subjects (29). Laid side by side in this manner, the two illusions would 
appear antithetical, but Lefebvre insists that each works with the other to produce a seamless 
double illusion of simultaneity. Nevertheless, there is a tendency to think of real and abstract 
space as two discrete realms—one existing out in the world and the other in the intellect—
and this in spite of the heroic effort needed to imagine one without thinking about the other. 
In fact, for some, one realm may be more heroic than the other. Virginia Woolf gently 
satirizes the inclination in Mrs Dalloway (1925):
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Away and away the aeroplane shot, till it was nothing but a bright spark; an 
aspiration; a concentration; a symbol (so it seemed to Mr Bentley, vigorously 
rolling his strip of turf at Greenwich) of man’s soul; of his determination, 
thought Mr Bentley, sweeping round the cedar tree, to get outside his body, 
beyond his house, by means of thought, Einstein, speculation, mathematics, 
the Mendelian theory—away the aeroplane shot. (24) 
 
The airplane in Mrs Dalloway famously opens up two kinds of spaces: the vast airspace only 
recently made accessible by the technological advancements of a rapidly unfolding 
modernity (and by the demands of modern technological warfare, more particularly) and an 
innovative narrative space drawn up from the shifting points of view of characters whose 
lines of sight intersect at the plane’s skywritten message overhead. But for Mr Bentley the 
plane opens up further spaces still. As it recedes from sight, it transforms into an abstraction 
first (“a bright spark, an aspiration, a concentration”) and then into a representation of 
abstraction generally (“a symbol . . . of man’s soul”) (my emphasis). A marvel of technology, 
the airplane functions as a metonym for modern scientific thought, alongside “Einstein, 
speculation, mathematics, the Mendelian theory.” The phrase, “by means of thought,” points 
to the contiguity between conceptual and actual spaces: intellectual work is the vehicle for 
physical transcendence via modern technology. But in inverse fashion, the plane itself 
functions as a vehicle for mental transcendence, a figurative mode of transportation to the 
realm of abstract thought generally, which Mr Bentley casts in explicitly spatial terms 
(“outside his body, beyond his house”). Massey’s “chain of meaning” linking space and 
representation is figured here as a movement through physical space into abstraction, made 
possible by Bentley’s metonymic imagination.  
Unlike other London spectators that day in June, Bentley appears less interested in 
reading the plane’s message than he is in the plane’s ability to read and dominate the space 
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below. Not only is the airplane a symbol of the drive to escape from the body into the realm 
of pure cerebration, its perspective from above the city coincides with that of the map, the 
abstract, authorized representation of space par excellence. Paul K. Saint-Amour argues that 
Woolf’s technique of linking characters’ discrete points of view into a panoramic narrative 
aligns it with “the aeroplane’s mobility and capacity for penetrating overview” (145) such 
that “the narrator’s gaze” becomes, “shockingly, the gaze of total war” (148). But Saint-
Amour’s characterization of that gaze (“conspicuously mobile, surveillant, penetrating, 
sometimes totalizing”) implies a perspective of domination I find difficult to detect in 
Woolf’s narrative strategy (147). It flattens the complex spatial textures and dimensionality 
which Woolf generates from her characters’ interior worlds and levels the intricate linkages 
and uneven affinities between perspectives which bind her narrative together. It also misses 
in the fleeting portrait of Mr Bentley Woolf’s subtle burlesque of the masculinist fetish for 
rationalized space, which, despite the undeniable significance the novel places on metonyms 
for aerial warfare, does not resemble its conception of narrative space. Arguing that Woolf’s 
strategy is ultimately prisoner to “total war’s inexorable logic” (149) thus seems less an 
evidentiary claim than the imposition (from a birds-eye view, no less) of a compelling, but 
fallacious, visuospatial metaphor. Saint-Amour’s “all-encompassing cartographic gaze” 
places an inordinate emphasis on the spatial transparency of the optical field, which 
homogenizes difference and regularizes perspectival space (156). This is a rather literal 
application of Bruno Latour’s error of the “zoom effect”; the cartographic gaze implies scale 
and hierarchy—“a sense of proportion,” to quote the novel’s Sir William Bradshaw. 
It seems to me that if we can read these moments as the top-down panoramic vision 
of an all-seeing narrative strategy (or technology of air warfare) capable of locating bodies 
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geographically within the city—but complicated, of course, by an adherence to the shifting 
fragments of various characters’ interior monologues—we can also read the expansive spaces 
of Woolf’s narratives from the individual body outward. We can read her writing, in other 
words, as a textual representation of an embodied form of mapping, a practice that relies on 
an understanding of space as something that is structured solely (or at least initially) through 
the body’s ability to occupy, move through, and “sense” space. Bodies and space are 
inextricably implicated in one another, Elizabeth Grosz reminds us, “for bodies are always 
understood within a spatial and temporal context, and space and time remain conceivable 
only insofar as corporeality provides the basis for our perception and representation of them” 
(84). Woolf’s writing is preoccupied with how space and its dimensions impinge and play 
upon the body and how, conversely, the body extends its faculties for sensing and knowing 
(its ability to process visual, acoustic, and proprioceptive information) into the space around 
it, building spaces—or a sense of a space—from the body out. This chapter argues that Mrs 
Dalloway thwarts the disciplining of space and bodies by exploring their nexus in sensate 
experience. Contrary to Saint-Amour’s argument, Woolf resists the deadly rationalization of 
space (whether represented by total war, urban planners, or the medical profession) by 
centering the production of space in the body, against the tide of various regulatory efforts to 
abstract political space from its human origins. The claims space makes on the body are 
subverted by reconceptualizing space as something generated by and through bodies: the 
subject becomes the origin and sovereign of the space her body occupies.  
Mrs Dalloway positions the spatial rhetoric of rationalized space against the spatial 
poetics of embodiment as both political critique and narrative strategy. Sir William 
Bradshaw’s doctrine of “proportion” is a spatial project, I argue: it disciplines the literal body 
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politic into a form of rationalized space, operating metonymically to subsume and abstract 
the vital materiality of lived space for its ideological purposes. But those with a vexed 
relationship to embodiment (like the infirm or the disabled) experience space with an 
intensity which cannot be disciplined by rationalized space: wavering between alienation 
from their own bodies and heightened embodiment, they allow Woolf to imagine radical 
forms of spatiality that create the foundation for narrative innovation and political resistance. 
I apply Roger Caillois’s concept of psychasthenia to demonstrate how Woolf’s depiction of 
sensate experience also forms the basis of her narrative strategy, which replicates its 
“disordered” spatial logic by loosening the subject’s consciousness from a fixed bodily 
perspective. Examining Woolf’s experimentation with perspectival disturbance through the 
characters of Clarissa Dalloway and Septimus Warren Smith, I argue that their sensate 
experiences produce narrative space by a logic of metaphor: unlike metonymy or 
synecdoche, which operate via extant contiguities, metaphor requires an imaginative leap of 
radical identification—one which puts it out of bounds of the metonymic reach of 
rationalized space.  
“A Sense of Proportion”: Disciplining the Body Politic 
Evelyn T. Chan argues that Woolf’s portrait of Sir William Bradshaw, the Harley 
Street doctor charged with treating Septimus’s shell-shock, serves as a larger critique of “the 
problem of medical professionalism” in British society (Chan 26). “By the twentieth 
century,” writes Chan, “the medical profession had established itself as one of the most 
powerful professional institutions of all time, and come to be regarded as a principally 
representative example of the specific kind of social order which professional organization 
created” (26-27). Chan notes the expansive ambitions of such organizations, who imagined 
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state oversight as their ultimate conquest. Sir Bertrand Dawson, addressing the West London 
Medico-Chirurgical Society in 1918, avows that “‘the rearing of a healthy race’” necessitates 
the establishment of a Ministry of Health “to serve as the “brain” of the “body politic” of the 
profession” (qtd.in Chan 29). But the medical profession might serve, by extension, as the 
“brain” of the body politic of the greater public too: in 1921, the president of the British 
Medical Association speaks of British medicine’s “‘ever-growing efficiency’” in 
“‘organizing itself into a vast unified guild of a medico-political kind, which later will 
embrace the entire world’” (qtd. in Chan 29). The ideal “social order” instantiated by such 
organizations was meant to be reproduced outside the profession in society at large: medical 
professionalism was an explicit political project to shape the nation in its image via the 
disciplining of “medical” bodies, reimagined on a mass scale as “populations.”  
The metaphor of the body politic is apt, of course. It conceives of the state in the 
image of a healthy, disciplined, and productive human body, with government as its “head” 
and the rest of the populace as the “body.” The body politic is a spatial metaphor, a way of 
representing an ordered vision of state space via a spatialized image of its population rather 
than its geography. It is also, crucially, a synecdoche by which the singular mass “body” 
subsumes, and takes precedence over, individual constitutive bodies. As Grosz explains, the 
“statist representation of the body politic presumes an organized cohesive, integrated body, 
regulated by reason,” which “can let no body outside of its regulations: its demand for 
identification and documentation relentlessly records and categorizes . . .” (107). This model 
seems to better explain the totalizing undercurrents of Mrs Dalloway’s narrative strategy than 
does the optic metaphor of Saint-Amour’s “cartographic gaze.” For the ordering principles of 
scale, regularity, and hierarchy which define rationalized conceptions of space are distilled in 
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the philosophy of Woolf’s avatar of the medical profession, Sir William Bradshaw. 
Bradshaw’s doctrine is “proportion”: “Sir William said he never spoke of ‘madness,’” Woolf 
writes; “he called it not having a sense of proportion” (Woolf, Dalloway 82). 
Bradshaw’s prescription for “proportion” is defined, from his point of view, 
somewhat vaguely: seeing individual patients for no more than “three-quarters of an hour” 
and prescribing a monotonous course of rest-cures both fall under the rubric of “proportion” 
(84). But its effect is prodigious: “Worshipping proportion, Sir William not only prospered 
himself but made England prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade childbirth, penalised 
despair, made it impossible for the unfit to propagate their views until they, too, shared his 
sense of proportion . . .” (84). Proportion is not a method of treating the infirm, Woolf’s 
narrator reveals, but a ruthless eugenicist project to discipline the body politic. Its “sister” is 
“Conversion,” which “feasts on the wills of the weakly, loving to impress, to impose, adoring 
her own features stamped on the face of the populace” (85). Conversion is the dark truth to 
Bradshaw’s program of proportion: “How he would work—how toil to raise funds, propagate 
reforms, initiate institutions! But conversion, fastidious Goddess, loves blood better than 
brick, and feasts most subtly on the human will” (85). Bradshaw’s biopolitical project is thus 
allied with the spatial politics of the modern city. Liam Lanigan writes that modernization of 
cities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries “reflected a commitment to the idea of 
physical determinism: the belief that the physical environment could be used to alter the 
behavioral patterns of people, or even their beliefs and desires” (Lanigan 5-6). In both this 
philosophy and Bradshaw’s, individuals are subordinated to the rationality of the larger 
system, which they are meant to be shaped by, rather than the other way around. Both 
projects rely on the disciplining or removal of undesirable bodies (6). 
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The ability of “proportion,” as exemplified by Bradshaw, to order space is evident in 
the scene outside the flower shop in Mrs Dalloway, in which a stately motor car’s engine 
backfires, disrupting the consciousness of the crowd and drawing the onlookers’ attention 
into its mysterious wake.  The incident sets off a relay of tangentially-linked interior 
monologues, from anonymous characters (an “Edgar J. Watkiss” sets off the chain reaction) 
to more central figures like Septimus, Lucrezia, and Clarissa (14-18).  Yet as the bystanders 
speculate on the identity of the car’s unknown passenger—“Was it the Prince of Wales’s, the 
Queen’s, the Prime Minister’s?”—these inner thoughts accrete into a collective space of 
sensate awareness (15):  
The car had gone, but it had left a slight ripple which flowed through glove 
shops and hat shops and tailors’ shops on both sides of Bond Street.  For thirty 
seconds all heads were inclined the same way—to the window.  …something 
had happened.  Something so trifling in single instances that no mathematical 
instrument, though capable of transmitting shocks in China, could register the 
vibration; yet in its fulness rather formidable and in its common appeal 
emotional; for in all the hat shops and tailors’ shops strangers looked at each 
other and thought of the dead; of the flag; of Empire.  …For the surface 
agitation of the passing car as it sunk grazed something very profound.  (19) 
 
The passing of the car and the stir it causes results in a sudden awareness of cultural memory, 
which, in the form of “trifling” “single instances,” seems to occur just below the level of 
conscious thought—a “surface agitation,” a physical “vibration,” “emotional,” like the 
passing through of a ghost.  In its “fulness,” however, the moment constitutes the 
“formidable” whole of British history and culture, communicated by the ineffable sense of 
aristocracy and power issued forth by the car—a metonym for the state.  It also constitutes 
the more recent, but equally formidable, memory of the First World War, a trauma embodied 
by Septimus most particularly.  The sound of the car’s engine, a relatively new technology, 
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would elicit thoughts of mechanized warfare: hence, “the dead,” “the flag,” a dying 
“Empire.”   
The car moves narrowly through the crowd like a needle gathering stray threads of 
awareness, only to let them unravel as the moment passes. But it also has a physical effect on 
the bodies of the spectators. For that passing moment, “all heads were inclined the same 
way”; onlookers stand “even straighter,” rearrange their hands, and “let rumour accumulate 
in their veins and thrill the nerve in their thighs at the thought of Royalty looking at them” 
(15-16). The car lifts “some flag flying in the British breast of Mr Bowley,” who raises his 
hat “high” as it passes (17). Clarissa “stiffen[s] a little” (15). While Woolf’s depiction of the 
random collisions of a splintered collective consciousness seem indicative of the newly-
disfigured global awareness brought on by modernity and post-war life, the catalyst for this 
moment—the rumored presence of the head of the body politic—actually disciplines the 
state’s citizenry into ideal political bodies. They comport themselves differently, become 
upright, unified, loyal.  
But what of bodies that resist discipline? As Septimus watches the motor car stop in 
traffic, he sees instead the “gradual drawing together of everything to one centre before his 
eyes, as if some horror had come almost to the surface and was about to burst into flames” 
(13). Terrified, he realizes he has disrupted the crowd’s spatial conformity by blocking 
traffic: “Was he not being looked at and pointed at; was he not weighted there, rooted to the 
pavement, for a purpose? But for what purpose?” Septimus’s immobility signals his inability 
to assimilate to the hegemonic space of the body politic: he is out of proportion. But as Grosz 
argues, “If the relations between the body and the city are the object of critical focus, the 
body itself must shake free” from “statist investment” in the ideal of a “cohesive” body 
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politic “regulated by reason” (106-107). A representation of space through the sensorium of 
the ill, “insane,” or undesirable body might pose such a counterforce to the ideology of 
proportion. 
“A Central Oyster of Perceptiveness”  
The geographer Gillian Rose observes that “[m]asculinist rationality is a form of 
knowledge which assumes a knower who believes he can separate himself from his body, 
emotions, values, past and so on . . .” (G. Rose 7). Masculinist geographers “made no 
connection between the world as it was seen and the position of the viewer, and the truth of 
what they saw was established by that claim to objectivity,” Rose states (7). This rationalist 
perspective of space aligns closely with Mr Bentley’s imaginative flight “outside his body” 
into the realm of abstract thought via the metonymic path opened up by the skywriting 
airplane. It accepts the objectivity of the “cartographic gaze” as spatial truth. 
Yet Woolf is fascinated by contradictions to this conception of space. In her essay 
“Abbeys and Cathedrals,” Woolf describes how the sight of St. Paul’s creates a spatially 
distorted perspective as her narrator approaches the massive structure: “. . . St. Paul’s 
dominates London.  It swells like a great grey bubble from a distance; it looms over us, huge 
and menacing, as we approach.  But suddenly St. Paul’s vanishes.  And behind St. Paul’s, 
beneath St. Paul’s, round St. Paul’s when we cannot see St. Paul’s, how London has shrunk!” 
(Woolf, “Abbeys” 43). London has not “shrunk” of course.  Rather—and strangely—the 
absence of the cathedral’s huge dimensions brings out in sharp relief the tight spaces of the 
modern city streets, tighter still when swarming with Londoners pushing for elbowroom. 
“Something of the splendour of St. Paul’s lies simply in its vast size, in its colourless 
serenity,” Woolf writes, explaining that once inside the building, “[m]ind and body seem 
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both to widen in this enclosure, to expand under this huge canopy…” (45). Woolf is charting 
the disorienting shift in perspective as one moves toward and then into the building: one 
either sees St. Paul’s in full scale or not at all, while the surrounding cityscape shifts in 
relation to it. Even the subject’s perception of the dimensions of her mind and body shifts. St. 
Paul’s dimensional constancy in spite of changing proximity and perspective parallels its 
symbolic significance relative to the rest of London. Its psychic pull coincides with the 
perspectival distortions it creates in the space surrounding it.   
Woolf’s emphasis on perspective and scale in “Abbeys and Cathedrals” is useful here 
because it anchors even the panoramic vision of an omniscient narrator in bodily senses and 
sensations, emphasizing the body’s position relative to the objects that fall within its visual 
scope. This focus on the proximity of bodies to their spatial surroundings reestablishes 
embodiment as a crucial factor in discussions of space, particularly in the context of visual 
representations of the city, from which the primacy of the body (i.e. the instrument for 
vision) tends, I think, to recede. In fact, the visual nature of the information provided by 
maps—what Lefebvre would call abstract “representations of space”—invites a kind of 
fallacious slippage by which space itself is subsumed into the regime of the visual. What’s 
more, by flattening space into two dimensions, traditional maps reduce space to an image of 
surfaces, eliminating even the three-dimensional contours which theorists like Lefebvre and 
Grosz identify as contributing to the naïve Euclidean conception of space as a fixed or empty 
“container.” Yet space’s most profound property is arguably its ability to position, orient, 
contain, and restrain bodies according to its parameters. Space is something we move 
through or inhabit, but not until we find ourselves in cramped, claustrophobic, or otherwise 
objectionable quarters do we tend to think of it as something experienced primarily through 
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bodily sensation and orientation. In other words, we don’t think of space as spatial—or at 
least not consciously, because of course our bodies are constantly processing and acting on 
spatial data.  
Woolf’s essay “On Being Ill” addresses this selective awareness by describing how 
the heightening and dulling of various senses during illness intensifies the body’s awareness 
of itself as a mediator between consciousness and the outside world. Yet this mediation is 
perpetual, both in illness and in health: 
All day, all night the body intervenes; blunts or sharpens, colours or 
discolours, turns to wax in the warmth of June, hardens to tallow in the murk 
of February. The creature within can only gaze through the pane—smudged or 
rosy; it cannot separate off from the body like the sheath of a knife or the pod 
of a pea for a single instant; it must go through the whole unending procession 
of changes, heat and cold, comfort and discomfort, hunger and satisfaction, 
health and illness, until there comes the inevitable catastrophe; the body 
smashes itself to smithereens, and the soul (it is said) escapes. (14-15) 
 
The sensory distortions of illness make manifest to us the ways consciousness is shackled to 
the body, Woolf says, but I think her metaphor of “the creature” trapped gazing (listening, 
tasting, sensing) through the windowpane of the body oversimplifies even her own 
representations of the body’s relationship to the mind, to itself, and to the outside world. The 
creature gazing through the pane suggests an absolute distinction between the internal and 
the external rather than a continuity between the two that is actualized by the body, a 
continuity which Woolf acknowledges elsewhere in her work. Take, for example, her 
membranous description in “Oxford Street Tide” of the mind of a high-street shopper 
becoming “a glutinous slab that takes impressions,” upon which “Oxford Street rolls off . . . a 
perpetual ribbon of changing sights, sounds and movement,” or in “Street Haunting,” her 
essay on London walking, how “[t]he shell-like covering which our souls have excreted to 
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house themselves, to make for themselves a shape distinct from others, is broken” the 
moment the narrator exits her home and enters the city street, after which “there is left of all 
these wrinkles and roughnesses a central oyster of perceptiveness, an enormous eye” 
(“Oxford” 21; “Street” 21-22). This anonymous, vulnerable “oyster of perceptiveness” is not 
the disembodied vision of an omniscient narrator, but an organ of pure sensation. Both essays 
imagine subjectivity as organs which are wholly exposed to the world and impinged upon 
indiscriminately by sensory information. By wresting perception from the realm of 
disembodied abstraction and returning it, via metaphor, to the body, Woolf represents the 
conceptually complex nature of sensation: her metaphoric image of sensation is itself capable 
of sensing. As Brian Massumi explains, “sensation is never simple. It is always doubled by 
the feeling of having a feeling. It is self-referential” (15). Massumi makes clear that calling 
sensation “self-referential” is not necessarily the same thing as calling it “self-reflexive”: 
“The doubling of sensation does not assume a subjective splitting, and does not of itself 
constitute a distancing. It is an immediate self-complication” (15). The seeming redundancy 
of Woolf’s sensing metaphor-for-sense captures, I believe, this instantaneous self-
complication.  
 And yet this sensorium is not simply self-complicating; it is also capable of 
expanding outward, generating vast spaces of ineffable subjective experience. To say, “‘I am 
in bed with influenza,’” Woolf writes, does little to express “how the world has changed its 
shape,” how “the whole landscape of life lies remote and fair, like the shore seen from a ship 
far out at sea” when one is ill (“On Being Ill”). Musing on these immense spatial 
transfigurations, she wonders why illness is not “among the prime themes of literature,” 
given “the undiscovered countries that are then disclosed,” the “wastes and deserts of the 
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soul a slight attack of influenza brings to light,” and the “precipices and lawns sprinkled with 
bright flowers a little rise of temperature reveals.” Woolf’s turns to other examples of 
mundane experience to explore the creative potential of the body’s capacity for spatial 
extension. Woolf begins “Street Haunting” with exact specifications as to the atmosphere 
proper to “rambling the streets of London”: a winter’s evening is ideal, she says, for “[t]he 
evening hour… gives us the irresponsibility which darkness and lamplight bestow.  We are 
no longer quite ourselves” (20).  From London’s ambience, its shadows, and the anonymity 
of its crowds, walkers glean their identity, or rather their nonidentity, for by exiting the 
confines of our homes and exposing ourselves to the elements of the street “we shed the self 
our friends know us by” (20).  Woolf explains the need to become “no longer quite 
ourselves” by escaping the interior landscape of “one’s own room”:  
For there we sit surrounded by objects which perpetually express the oddity of 
our own temperaments and enforce the memories of our own experience.  
That bowl on the mantelpiece, for instance, was bought at Mantua on a windy 
day…. The moment was stabilized, stamped like a coin indelibly among a 
million that slipped by imperceptibly.  (21)  
 
Personality and memory so extensively saturate private space that the peculiarities of one’s 
individual character are “enforced” back upon the inhabitant; the separation between self and 
space dematerializes. Woolf notes this saturation of personal space later in the essay, too, 
writing: “It is always an adventure to enter a new room; for the lives and characters of its 
owners have distilled their atmosphere into it, and directly we enter it we breast some new 
wave of emotion” (34).  
 But once outside, the “shell-like covering” of our personalities is shed, leaving the 
“central oyster of perceptiveness,” the “enormous eye” (21-22). One of the stipulations of the 
urban walker’s transformation is that she must not dig “deeper than the eye approves” (23).  
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Not only would doing so negate the pleasure of the eye’s contentment “with surfaces only”—
“glossy brilliance[s]” and colorful flowers “burning” out of reach behind “the plate glass of 
the florists’ windows”—it would encumber the eye’s mobility, “impeding [its] passage down 
the smooth stream by catching at some branch or root.”  Woolf’s narrator more or less 
adheres in this moment to a strict practice of flânerie, of detached and fleeting observation, 
but her observations throughout the essay argue that she can’t help but leave her advice 
unheeded. It is not the case that the narrator’s eye glances trippingly off surface to surface, 
but that her gaze is both brief and piercing—a clairvoyant’s penetrating glance. Woolf is in 
fact outlining on a subliminal level the incompatibilities between flânerie and fiction writing: 
she warns that though the eye may retrieve the city’s “prettiest [visual] trophies,” treasuring 
them up either in the present tense of perception or in memory, “[t]he thing it cannot do (one 
is speaking of the average unprofessional eye) is to compose these trophies in such a way as 
to bring out the more obscure angles and relationships” (23).  In fact, Woolf dismisses the 
role of the “average unprofessional eye” altogether in the next line: this “sugary fare” is too 
easily gratifying, and “we become conscious of satiety.”  With sudden abandon, she goes 
beyond mere dismissal to embrace fully the dangers of “digging deeper”: “What, then, is it 
like to be dwarf?” she asks (24).  Within a brief paragraph she has rejected the traditional 
flâneur, his leisure and detachment, and fully immersed herself in the sensate experience of 
another’s subjective world. 
Baudelaire writes of the flâneur: “‘Like a roving soul in search of a body, he enters 
another person whenever he wishes’” (Benjamin 55).  But for Woolf, however easily another 
person’s being may be entered, his or her body is not so easily shed.  Her vicarious 
experiences, to begin with, are far more intense and actively sought after.  During the scene 
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of the brief sojourn in the shoe shop, the narrator moves from respectfully analyzing only 
what the dwarf appears to be thinking to taking complete imaginative license, purporting to 
know exactly what is going on in her head: “…the dwarf stuck her foot out with an 
impetuosity which seemed to claim all our attention.  Look at that!  Look at that! she seemed 
to demand of us all….  She looked soothed and satisfied.  Her manner became full of self-
confidence” (24).  The narrator can only conjecture as to what the dwarf is feeling: she 
“seemed” to demand everyone’s attention; she “looked” content; her “manner” gives the 
appearance of self-confidence.  But then: 
She was thinking that, after all, feet are the most important part of the whole 
person; women, she said to herself, have been loved for their feet alone.  
Seeing nothing but her feet, she imagined perhaps that the rest of her body 
was of a piece with those beautiful feet.  (24) 
 
Now there is no pretense of surmising the dwarf’s thoughts.  The imagination has taken full 
hold of the narrator, while the flâneur’s characteristic detachment has dissipated.  “She was 
thinking,” the narrator now says, rather than “she might be thinking.”  We are now given 
access even to the dwarf’s inner monologue, to her fantasizing and her brief reveries.  The 
experience of entering the consciousness of the dwarf is in fact so intense, that for the 
narrator everything—the entire fabric of the cityscape—becomes attuned to the distinct 
register of her deformity: “But she had changed the mood; she had called into being an 
atmosphere which, as we followed her out into the street, seemed actually to create the 
humped, the twisted, the deformed.”  Woolf’s narrator is incapable of gliding “smoothly on 
the surface” of others’ lives; the experience is one of intense embodiment. The entire texture 
of the street is changed.  
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“Into each of these lives one could penetrate a little way, far enough to give oneself 
the illusion that one is not tethered to a single mind, but can put on briefly for a few minutes 
the bodies and minds of others,” the narrator says of the pleasures of street haunting (“Street 
Haunting” 35). Like so many of Woolf’s metaphors for embodiment, the attraction of 
inhabiting other lives is imagined as a journey in space: “And what greater delight and 
wonder can there be than to leave the straight lines of personality and deviate into those 
footpaths that lead . . . into the heart of the forest where live those wild beasts, our fellow 
men?” Yet the Woolf of “On Being Ill” urges caution, arguing that too much identification 
could have the opposite effect: 
About sympathy for example; we can do without it. That illusion of a world so 
shaped that it echoes every groan, of human beings so tied together by 
common needs and fears that a twitch at one wrist jerks another, where 
however strange your experience other people have had it too, where however 
far you travel in your own mind someone has been there before you—is all an 
illusion. (On Being Ill) 
 
Here, too, vicarious identification is imagined as having spatial ramifications, but in this 
case, Woolf suggests that a humanity bound by true sympathy would alter the world 
negatively: “buildings would cease to rise; roads would peter out into grassy tracks . . .” (On 
Being Ill). Woolf dramatizes this ambivalence about “sympathy” in Mrs Dalloway, where it 
is figured as the unstable delineation between sanity and madness. 
Psychasthenia and Narrative Space 
 Clarissa Dalloway, aging and permanently weakened since her recovery from 
influenza, experiences similar spatial distortions to those described in “On Being Ill.” For 
her, embodiment swings between acute awareness of sensate experience and alienation from 
her body: “She felt very young; at the same time unspeakably aged. She sliced like a knife 
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through everything; at the same time was outside, looking on. She had a perpetual sense . . . 
of being out, out, far out to sea and alone; she always had the feeling that it was very, very 
dangerous to live even one day” (7). This feeling of the intimate danger of inhabiting a 
body—experienced at once as urgent and distancing—is at odds with her sense of her body’s 
insignificance to society at large. “But often now this body she wore . . . this body, with all 
its capacities, seemed nothing—nothing at all. She had the oddest sense of being herself 
invisible; unseen; unknown; there being no more marrying, no more having of children now . 
. .” (9). Her sense of biological and social redundancy as an aging woman is translated into 
spatial metaphors: “Narrower and narrower would her bed be,” she thinks. “So the room was 
an attic; the bed narrow; and lying there reading, for she slept badly, she could not dispel a 
virginity preserved through childbirth which clung to her like a sheet” (26-27). The shrinking 
social function of Clarissa’s body withers space with it, circumscribing her sphere of 
influence to the chaste narrowness of her former sickbed. She “felt like a nun who has left the 
world,” writes Woolf (25). 
Yet Clarissa’s consignment to the cloister of age and illness is utterly at odds with the 
intense embodiment she experiences in relation to space, particularly social space. Social 
space—whether the city street, or her party—draws Clarissa out of her body, expanding the 
sensate space she occupies: 
But she said, sitting on the bus going up Shaftesbury Avenue, she felt herself 
everywhere; not "here, here, here"; and she tapped the back of the seat; but 
everywhere.  She waved her hand, going up Shaftesbury Avenue.  She was all 
that.  So that to know her, or any one, one must seek out the people who 
completed them; even the places.  Odd affinities she had with  people she 
had never spoken to, some woman in the street, some man behind a counter--
even trees, or barns.  It ended in a transcendental theory which, with her 
horror of death, allowed her to believe, or say that she believed (for all her 
scepticism), that since our apparitions, the part of us which appears, are so 
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momentary compared with the other, the unseen part of us, which spreads 
wide, the unseen might survive, be recovered somehow attached to this person 
or that, or even haunting certain places after death . . . perhaps—perhaps. 
(129-130) 
 
Though Clarissa insists she feels “herself everywhere” and not “‘here, here, here,’” in the 
seat her body occupies, her sentiments are a repudiation of the rationalist desire to transcend 
embodied subjectivity typified by Mr Bentley and masculinist geography. Clarissa’s is not a 
fantasy of objective distance from “the social position of the knower,” as Rose puts it (G. 
Rose 7). Rather, Clarissa posits that one can only be known by “seek[ing] out the people who 
completed them; even the places.” The ambition is to locate the self, not transcend it. Even 
the “transcendental” aspect of Clarissa’s theory of metaphysics isn’t wholly transcendental—
it derives its vitality, its salve against the fear of death, from its fantasy of communal 
embodiment and sensate connection with others. Clarissa’s embrace of social space is thus a 
rejection of the finality of death and the isolation imposed by social redundancy. Craig 
Gordon notes that Woolf bases the “possibility of collectivity upon a mode of vital, affective 
embodiment” (Gordon 33). He argues that “the affective body remains unassimilable to the 
ordering regimes of . . . representational projects and as such provides a basis for 
community” (33). Gillian Beer concurs, claiming that Woolf’s reverence for communality 
comes from “her practice of writing out of the mass and out of the body” (Beer 50). 
Sympathy, communality, and identification thus produce a social space that is necessarily 
sensate for Woolf.  
 While I agree that the affective body is “unassimilable” to the “ordering regimes” of 
representation, I would add that, because Woolf’s medium is representational, she must 
employ deliberate rhetorical and narrative strategies to adequately render this resistance to 
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representation. Those states of embodiment most impervious to representation are, of course, 
the most difficult to inhabit vicariously. Elaine Scarry notes the impossibility of expressing 
the reality of one’s own pain (“that which cannot be denied”) and substantiating the 
authenticity of someone else’s (“that which cannot be confirmed”) (Scarry 4). She suggests 
that the impulse to “invoke analogies to remote cosmologies” (one thinks of Woolf’s 
“undiscovered countries” revealed by sickness) “is itself a sign of pain's triumph, for it 
achieves its aversiveness in part by bringing about, even within the radius of several feet, this 
absolute split between one's sense of one's own reality and the reality of other persons” (4). 
Limitations to imaginative sympathy don’t just pose barriers to the forms of communality 
and connection Woolf prizes; they fracture them with unbreachable distances. However, I 
argue that Woolf attempts to transcend the representational limitations of embodiment 
signified by such analogies of distance by experimenting with their literalization. She 
refigures the dynamics of bodily assimilation and alienation through trope, offering in 
defiance of the metonymic, spatializing strategies of Bradshaw’s doctrine of proportion a 
model of metaphoric identification that teeters on the edge of materialization. While 
metonymy suggests a form of continuity that integrates constituent parts into a cohesive 
whole, metaphor implies no such essential connection. As Hugh Bredin explains, “metaphor 
creates the relation between its objects, while metonymy presupposes that relation. This is 
why metonymy can never articulate a newly discovered insight, why it lacks the creative 
depth of metaphor” (Bredin 57). Like Bradshaw himself, metonymy is “necessarily 
conventional.” Metaphor, on the other hand, requires a radical imaginative leap to create 
connections of affinity or sameness. 
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Scarry writes that “the events happening within the interior of [another] person's body 
may seem to have the remote character of some deep subterranean fact, belonging to an 
invisible geography that, however portentous, has no reality because it has not yet manifested 
itself on the visible surface of the earth” (Scarry 3). Yet Mrs Dalloway figures internal 
geographies as always on the verge of becoming communal space: sensate experience of 
space extends subjectivity beyond the physical confines of the body. Clarissa imagines that 
she and Peter Walsh might live on “somehow in the streets of London, on the ebb and flow 
of things, here, there . . . in each other,” because she is “part, she was positive, of the trees at 
home; of the house there . . . part of people she had never met; being laid out like a mist 
between the people she knew best, who lifted her on their branches as she had seen the trees 
lift the mist, but it spread ever so far, her life, herself” (8). She likens the “suspense” of 
“hesitating one moment on the threshold of her drawing-room” to that of a diver pausing 
“before plunging while the sea darkens and brightens beneath him,” watching “the waves 
which threaten to break, but only gently split their surface, roll and conceal and encrust as 
they just turn over the weeds with pearl” (26). Clarissa’s metaphorical experience is so 
“exquisite” that she feels she has “filled the room she entered.”  
 Clarissa’s metaphors for sensate experience waver, in Woolf’s narrative voice, 
between the figurative and the literal; their description often unfurls at such length that they 
become narratives in and of themselves. The unstable metaphoricity of Clarissa’s sensate 
experience opens her body up to space and to an expansive communality with the world. But 
for Septimus, it threatens to collapse space, negating the distances separating subjects and 
objects. Woolf represents his vivid hallucinations as the literalization of metaphor; like 
Clarissa, he also has a vision of the sea: “But he himself remained high on his rock, like a 
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drowned sailor on a rock. I leant over the edge of the boat and fell down, he thought. I went 
under the sea” (58). Septimus is in fact resting in a chair in Regent’s Park with his wife. But 
what begins as a simile, “like a drowned sailor on a rock,” is literalized in the next sentences 
as he imagines having fallen overboard into the sea. As Rezia knows, this is a common 
hallucination for Septimus: “Then there were the visions. He was drowned, he used to say, 
and lying on a cliff with the gulls screaming over him. He would look over the edge of the 
sofa down into the sea” (119). The intensity of these “visions,” however, threaten to collapse 
the boundaries between people: “. . . suddenly he would cry that he was falling down, down 
into the flames!” Rezia thinks. “Actually she would look for flames, it was so vivid.  But 
there was nothing. They were alone in the room” (119). Septimus’s embodied experience is 
powerful enough to fuse the “absolute split between one's sense of one's own reality and the 
reality of other persons,” as Scarry puts it. For a moment, it transports Rezia to the “invisible 
geography” of her husband’s disordered sensorium.   
While Septimus’s illness fuses the divide between actual and imagined space through 
the literalization of metaphor, it also transports him across those distances, dislocating him 
from space. Roger Caillois writes that “. . . the invariable response of schizophrenics to the 
question: where are you?” is “I know where I am, but I do not feel as though I’m at the spot 
where I find myself” (Caillois 30). Septimus often relies on Rezia to physically anchor his 
perspective in his body, to “hold his hand to prevent him from falling down” into the flames 
he imagines engulfing the sofa, or place “her hand down with a tremendous weight on his 
knee so that he [is] weighted down” while “transfixed” by the spatial distortions his condition 
produces (“the excitement of the elm trees rising and falling . . . would have sent him mad”) 
(Dalloway 57, 19). Grosz explains that such forms of psychosis don’t necessarily entail the 
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obliteration of the self, but merely the detachment of the sufferer’s subjectivity from “the 
space occupied by his body”: “he may look at himself from outside himself, as another 
might; he may hear the voices of others in his head” (Grosz 89-90). Septimus’s visions of his 
dead friend Evans, auditory hallucinations of birds singing “piercingly” in Greek, and 
conversations with unseen others (“‘To whom??’ he asked aloud, ‘To the Prime Minister,’ 
the voices which rustled above his head replied”) are, in fact, the displacement of his 
interiority into spaces outside his body (21, 57). 
 Caillois notes that the “feeling of personality” derives from one’s sense “of 
distinction from [one’s] surroundings, of the connection between consciousness and a 
particular point in space” (Caillois 28). The particular psychological condition describing the 
breakdown of this sense is called psychasthenia: 
To these dispossessed souls, space seems to be a devouring force. Space 
pursues them, encircles them. . . . It ends by replacing them. Then the body 
separates itself from thought, the individual breaks the boundary of his skin 
and occupies the other side of his senses. He tries to look at himself from any 
point whatever in space. He feels himself becoming space. . . . All these 
expressions shed light on a single process: depersonalization by assimilation 
to space. . . . (Caillois 30) 
 
We can see this process of “depersonalization by assimilation” in Septimus’s response to Dr 
Holmes’s advice to “take an interest in things outside himself” (18). Unable to apply a 
healthy “sense of proportion” to this prescription, Septimus is instead overwhelmed by his 
physical contiguity with the world outside his body: “The earth thrilled beneath him. Red 
flowers grew through his flesh; their stiff leaves rustled by his head” (58). The sound of his 
wife’s voice in his ear “rasp[s] his spine deliciously” and sends “running up into his brain 
waves of sound” (19). He imagines that “the human voice” can “quicken trees to life”: “. . . 
leaves were alive, trees were alive. And the leaves being connected by millions of fibres with 
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his own body. . . .” Septimus seems to experience his body as having no distinction from his 
surroundings—his perceptions of “things outside himself” are intensely embodied 
experiences. Sound “rasps” his spine as if by touch; the leaves on trees attach to his body via 
fibrous threads; red flowers grow through his body. The intensity and fantasticality of 
Septimus’s perceived physical connection to the space outside his body calls to mind 
Woolf’s other representations of ill, disabled, and atypical bodies, such as the “dwarf” who 
calls “into being an atmosphere” in London’s streets that seems “actually to create the 
humped, the twisted, the deformed.”  
One can recognize in psychasthenia the fundamental logic of Mrs Dalloway’s 
narrative strategy. Grosz explains that, for the subject, the “anchoring of subjectivity in its 
body is the condition of coherent identity, and, moreover, the condition under which the 
subject has a perspective on the world, becomes the point from which vision emanates” (89-
90). Embodiment is requisite for vision and perspective—it gives the lie to the idea that the 
subjective intimacy of Woolf’s narrative technique might equate to the penetrating 
“cartographic gaze” of total war. Just as the psychasthenic subject “breaks the boundary of 
his skin and occupies the other side of his senses,” Woolf’s hopscotching narrative technique 
disrupts the boundaries between her characters’ consciousnesses, using free indirect 
discourse to highlight the ambiguous margin between first- and third-person points of view. 
The embodied spatial distortions experienced by Clarissa and Septimus—their ability to 
locate their own subjectivity in spaces not occupied by their physical bodies—set the 
conditions of possibility for Woolf’s narrative innovations. But this is not the rationalist ideal 
of corporeal transcendence: this is a vision of space generated outward via the body’s sensate 
reach. Woolf’s psychasthenic narrative frustrates the metonymic spatial claims of the 
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philosophy of “proportion” by exploring metaphor’s capacity to collapse spatial boundaries. 
In doing so, it imagines radical, embodied forms of sympathy and identification. Clarissa, 
learning at her party of Septimus’s suicide, experiences that radical sympathy: “Always her 
body went through it first, when she was told, suddenly, of an accident; her dress flamed, her 
body burnt. He had thrown himself from a window. Up had flashed the ground; through him, 
blundering, bruising, went the rusty spikes. There he lay with a thud, thud, thud in his brain, 
and then a suffocation of blackness. So she saw it” (156). This sympathy is Clarissa’s 
triumph, for though she feels it “her disaster—her disgrace” to “see sink and disappear here a 
man, there a woman, in this profound darkness,” that moment of radical identification affords 
her a crystalline moral truth. She sees Bradshaw for what he is: obscurely evil,” “capable of 
“some indescribable outrage—forcing your soul, that was it—if this young man had gone to 
him . . .” (157). Her vicarious experience of Septimus’s death is the very opposite of 
proportion’s violent spatializations: the distance between them collapses, allowing Clarissa to 
enter—in defiance of the Bradshaws of the world—Septimus’s “invisible geography.” 
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CHAPTER 2: “HAUNTED AND OBEAH”: GOTHIC SPACES AND MONSTROUS 
LANDSCAPES IN JEAN RHYS’S VOYAGE IN THE DARK 
 
A British colonial born in Dominica to a Welsh father and a mother of white Creole 
descent, Jean Rhys's identity as a Creole expatriate (belonging neither to the West Indies nor 
to Europe) imbues her novels with a sense of profound alienation and dispossession. It is 
perhaps appropriate, then, that scholarship has been dominated historically by two "Jean 
Rhyses": the postcolonial Rhys of her 1966 novel, Wide Sargasso Sea, and the modernist 
Rhys of her much earlier urban novels and short fiction. Yet even this doubled presence is 
ambivalent: while acknowledging Rhys as a significant modernist and postcolonial artist, 
critics agree that her presence in the various categories into which her writing is coopted—
modernist, feminist, postcolonial, British, urban—has been, in essence, marginal.6 In the 
context of urban modernism, for example, many have observed that her formal 
experimentation with narrative representations of subjectivity, interiority, and time resembles 
the innovations of other major writers of the city like Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, and 
Dorothy Richardson.7 But Rhys’s Paris and London novels are not quite at home in even this 
                                                 
6 Perhaps this consensus has come to an end: in her foreword to the 2013 essay collection Rhys Matters: New 
Critical Perspectives, Mary Lou Emery all but declares that “Jean Rhys has fully emerged from the margins of 
critical categories into which she never quite seemed to fit,” though she acknowledges that her “canonicity 
remains troubled” (xi). 
 
7 Discussions of Rhys’s position relative to other “high modernist” authors in the urban writing tradition are too 
numerous to count; the contributions most relevant to my purposes come from Deborah L. Parsons (who 
nevertheless looks backward toward the nineteenth-century flâneur and flâneuse) and Christopher GoGwilt, 
with whom I engage later in this paper. 
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modernist tradition of city writing. Mary Lou Emery notes that her narrative strategies of 
“fragmented perception” and “disjointed voices” are characteristic of modernist 
representations of “exile and the decentered self,” but also that, in Rhys’s work, such 
trademarks of modernist experimentation arise inevitably from the author’s unique subject 
position (“Politics of Form” 418). This marginal subjectivity is reflected even more directly 
in the highly autobiographical nature of her protagonists: “Displaced from their native 
Caribbean, outsiders to women’s traditional domestic world, and trespassers on masculine 
public territory, they walk the streets, not quite prostitutes, yet living on the edges of 
respectability, sanity, and dignity” (418). One could argue that liminality—“living on the 
edges”—is the defining characteristic of Rhys’s fiction. Her characters inhabit the narrow 
and precarious space circumscribed by the phrase “neither/nor”: neither “truly” British nor 
Caribbean, neither respectable women nor prostitutes, neither domesticated nor liberated.8 
I want to suggest that this liminality deeply shapes Rhys’s vision of geographies and 
spaces, a vision realized through the intensely personal and subjective mapping that her 
protagonists undertake in her urban novels. While this alone is not a new perspective on 
Rhys’s representation of the city,9 I argue that insufficient critical attention has been paid to 
her portrayal of London as a Gothic city, and that Rhys’s liminal cartography is also a way of 
reading the hybrid spaces of empire via navigation of Britain’s vast and mobile corpus of 
popular and literary texts. Similar ground (and much of it) has been covered regarding Wide  
                                                 
8 Conversely, Kerry L. Johnson and Mary Wilson describe Rhys “as very much a ‘both/and’ rather than 
‘either/or’ writer,” but advise that critics “grapple with the consequences of that both/and position without 
smoothing out Rhys’s contradictions, her prickliness, her rough edges” (17). Though I use the negative 
construction “neither/nor” in developing the concept of Rhys’s monstrous geography, I hope nevertheless to 
retain some of those “rough edges.”  
 




Sargasso Sea’s recuperation of Charlotte Brontë's vampiric "madwoman in the attic,"10 an 
emblematic but contentious moment in the postcolonial tradition of “writing back” to canon 
from the margins of the British Empire. But the role of intertextuality and allusion in Rhys’s 
earlier novel Voyage in the Dark (1934) has received comparatively little examination 
despite the Gothic and Caribbean resonances it shares with her re-envisioning of Jane Eyre 
(1847).11 Carol Dell’Amico, for instance, declares Voyage in the Dark “a Frankensteinian 
text—a monstrous conjoining of narrative fragments, constitutively intertextual” (39) before 
making clear that Rhys’s monster is stitched together from the cosmopolitan European texts 
which seemed to herald a century that would leave the romantic excesses of the Gothic far 
behind: Zola’s Nana (1880), Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1899), and Woolf’s The Voyage 
Out (1915).12 Those scholars who come nearest to addressing what I read in Voyage in the 
Dark as the novel’s Gothicism restrict their analysis to a specifically Caribbean framework 
by examining the various references in Rhys’s oeuvre to obeah, the Afro-Caribbean system 
of occult belief and ritualism practiced on her home island.13 Several of these studies 
participate in the ongoing formulation of a “postcolonial Gothic,” a critical enterprise which 
                                                 
10 Again, the abundance of scholarship addressing Rhys’s engagement with the Gothic in Wide Sargasso Sea 
makes an adequate overview of the literature difficult. For a relatively early examination of the novel’s 
development of a Caribbean Gothic, see Anthony E. Luengo, “Wide Sargasso Sea and the Gothic Mode.” 
11 A significant exception to this critical oversight is Thorunn Lonsdale’s thorough catalogue of literary allusion 
in Rhys’s short fiction and the four novels predating Wide Sargasso Sea. Like other scholars, Lonsdale focuses 
on Anna’s inauspicious reading of Zola’s Nana (1880) at the beginning of Voyage in the Dark. Elaine Savory in 
her Cambridge Introduction to Jean Rhys locates an unattributed line from Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan” (56), 
while Theresa O’Connor identifies the authors of two other texts mentioned in the novel, “The Iron Shroud” 
(1830) by William Mudford and The Rosary (1909) by Florence Barclay (132). 
 
12 Dell’Amico quickly drops the monster metaphor for an analogy from the cinema—“montage-narrative”—to 
describe the novel’s evocation of the “incommensurability of different histories, histories once known and 
familiar and now strange since having been brought into juxtaposition” (40). I argue that Rhys explicitly renders 
this irreducibility as gothic monstrosity.  
 
13 Much of this work—the overwhelming majority of which focuses on Wide Sargasso Sea—addresses the vital 
historical and political context of obeah in the West Indies, particularly its significance as a form of colonial 
resistance to slavery and imperial control. The essays in Fernández Olmos and Paravisini-Gebert’s collection 




has drawn connections between European Gothic tropes and issues of hybridity, 
unhomeliness, and alterity underlying the postcolonial condition.14 But these too have largely 
ignored Voyage in the Dark in favor of Wide Sargasso Sea.  
This critical omission might appear puzzling—or, perhaps for the same reasons, not 
puzzling at all—considering that Voyage in the Dark rehearses so many of the motifs found 
in Wide Sargasso Sea. In fact, one might reasonably argue that Wide Sargasso Sea is as much 
an intertextual retelling of Voyage in the Dark as it is of Jane Eyre. Thus while Lizabeth 
Paravisini-Gebert suggests that it is an affinity between “the vivid imagery and evocative 
environment of the Yorkshire moors” and “the lush and threatening Caribbean landscape" 
that has inspired West Indian writers to engage textually with the Brontës (248), I would 
point out that the motif which Rhys deploys repeatedly throughout Wide Sargasso Sea to 
signify the insuperable rift between Antoinette (Rhys’s version of Brontë’s Bertha Mason) 
and the unnamed Rochester figure is that of the utter and uncanny incommensurability of 
Caribbean and English landscapes—a conceit refashioned with very little alteration from 
Voyage in the Dark. This spatial conflict is not simply a metaphor for cultural or even marital 
misunderstanding; it arises from the anxious and violent operations of colonialism, 
operations which not only serve to carry out the administrative needs of empire but function 
also as a hermeneutics of imperial space. Empire is a text which reads and interprets itself as 
it is being written, and one of its aims is to be universally intelligible as a coherent and 
unified space when the heterogeneity of its actual spaces dictates that this can be achieved 
only with profound violence, if at all. 
                                                 
14 There have been several expansive investigations of the postcolonial Gothic, for example Höglund and Khair, 
Transnational and Postcolonial Vampires; Khair, The Gothic, Postcolonialism and Otherness; and Rudd, 




The argument at the foundation of this essay is that Rhys’s intertextual representation 
of London as a Gothic city in hybrid form—both European and Caribbean, modern and 
archaic—is a conscious thematization of the violence and futility of this imperial 
hermeneutics. Like Wide Sargasso Sea, Voyage in the Dark attempts to retrieve a 
marginalized (albeit white) colonial perspective by deciphering and remapping the terrain of 
British literature. But it deliberately fails in this endeavor to read the cultural space of 
empire, stopping short of writing all the way back to any originary canonical text. In order to 
contextualize the allusive spaces of Rhys’s London (and the abortive processes by which her 
characters attempt to read and navigate them), I begin with a brief discussion of her 
representation of physical books as synecdoches for England before moving on to an 
examination of how the four urban novels of the twenties and thirties collectively develop a 
labyrinthine, oneiric image of London from a Victorian Gothic tradition while remaining 
distinctly modernist in expression. I conclude with an analysis of her intermeshing of Gothic 
tropes from both Caribbean and English traditions in Voyage in the Dark. Rhys reinvents a 
nineteenth-century London Gothic by transporting the “undead” figures of obeah folklore to 
an English cityscape: the iconographic monsters of Shelley, Stevenson, and Stoker are recast 
in Voyage in the Dark as the zombis and soucriants of the West Indies, in whose monstrosity 
Anna Morgan, the novel’s Creole heroine, recognizes the abjection of her own divided 
identity. This hybridity manifests in Anna’s perceptions of imperial and colonial space, 
achieving its most terrifying incarnation at the novel’s end when the spaces of imperial center 






“Now I was alone except for books”: Reading England from the Margins of Empire 
Victorian readers of Jane Eyre would have instantly recognized in Brontë’s 
characterization of the Creole madwoman, Bertha, a subtext of cultural hybridity and racial 
indeterminacy consonant with Gothic representations of monstrosity. In reimagining Bertha 
as the younger Antoinette in Wide Sargasso Sea, Rhys was thus revising a European Gothic 
tradition that had long since looked to its colonial outposts for new and arguably more 
threatening horrors—horrors intimately connected to homegrown anxieties about race, class, 
and sexuality in ways that the European monks and aristocrats of Ann Radcliffe or Matthew 
Gregory Lewis were not.15 One strategy of this process of revision is the reversal of this 
imperial readerly gaze; when Antoinette’s engagement demands that she learn more about 
her future husband’s home country, she turns to one of the most authoritative sources for far-
flung British colonials: an English geography book. 
England, rosy pink in the geography book map, but on the page opposite the 
words are closely crowded, heavy looking. Exports, coal, iron, wool. Then 
Imports and Character of Inhabitants. Names, Essex, Chelmsford on the 
Chelmer. The Yorkshire and Lincolnshire wolds. Wolds? Does that mean 
hills? How high? Half the height of ours, or not even that? [...] After summer 
the trees are bare, then winter and snow. White feathers falling? Torn pieces 
of paper falling? (525)  
 
Strictly informative, the words do not, ironically, convey the information Antoinette seeks: 
the meaning of the word wolds, the height of English mountains, or the nature of falling 
snow. This information would make England real to the imagination, but the words and their 
typography are strange, “closely crowded, heavy looking,” a nullification of the “rosy pink” 
                                                 
15 Lewis, of course, had West Indian ties: his father was born in Jamaica and from him Lewis inherited the 
properties which prompted the writing of Journal of a West India proprietor, 1815-17. Alan Richardson notes 
that mention of obeah in British writing—abundant during the period which also saw the flowering of Gothic 
horror—“all but drops out of sight” in the interim between the publication of Journal in 1834 and Wide 




picture conjured by the colorful map and of the “chandeliers and dancing […] swans and 
roses and snow” (525) characteristic of the iconography of “Merry England” disseminated to 
British colonial subjects in large measure via the empire’s literature and folklore.  
This failure of the expected link between signifier (the printed word) and signified 
(England) reveals two important features of the relationship between Britain’s imperial 
territory and its literary canon in Rhys’s fiction. The first is a synecdochic association 
between printed English texts and England itself, which Rhys achieves here and elsewhere in 
her writing through the symbolic linking and juxtaposition of the two. This synecdochic 
linkage—the English text as representation of England itself—reveals that the authority 
shared by printed texts (as “official” records or culturally sanctioned artifacts) and the British 
Empire has a geographic and material basis: the vast majority of British texts would have 
been published in London, the geographic center of imperial power.16 As Rhys herself 
remarked, “All the books I read were English books and all the thoughts that were given me 
were English thoughts, with very few exceptions.”17 Moreover, Antoinette’s atlas appears to 
be modeled on a real-life counterpart,18 which Elaine Savory describes as “the definitive 
English geography book which confidently constructed national characteristics and managed 
to provoke unceasing thought about England, the colonial child’s first battle with erasure of 
                                                 
16 As Elaine Savory explains, colonials like Rhys grew up in a “culture where books were assumed to be written 
overseas, in England” (Jean Rhys 16). Like Antoinette, Rhys’s early knowledge about England was transmitted 
to her largely through books: “She did not know England or the English as a child except through 
representations in books and her society […]” (27). See also Savory, The Cambridge Introduction to Jean Rhys, 
12-13, for a brief catalogue of books read or encountered by Rhys in early life.  
 
17 From Rhys’s unpublished manuscript “Essay on England,” located in the Jean Rhys archive in the University 
of Tulsa’s McFarlin Library and quoted in Savory, Jean Rhys, 14. 
 
18 “Essay on England” describes an early experience reading a geography book which closely resembles 




self” (27).19 The equivalence of books and authority figures seems to have taken root early in 
Rhys’s childhood, during which books represented a power more absolute than even the far-
reaching British Empire: “Before I could read, almost a baby, I imagined that God, this 
strange thing or person I heard about, was a book” (Smile 20). Savory points out that while 
the notions of Englishness transmitted by the books of Rhys’s childhood were powerful, 
England itself did not hold up to the “fairy-tale promise created by a colonial English 
education” (Savory 28), a disappointment that is central to Rhys’s narratives of coming to 
England in Wide Sargasso Sea and Voyage in the Dark. Despite the discrepancy between the 
real England and the idealized image pieced together from Rhys’s childhood reading, the 
connection between England and printed texts was evidently powerful enough to rob reading 
of its pleasure: “In England my love and longing for books completely left me. I never felt 
the least desire to read anything […]” (Smile 111). This eradication of the desire to read 
would suggest that the English book—for colonial readers a synecdochic proxy for England 
itself—becomes redundant within the borders of the country it represents.  
The second significant feature of Rhys’s use of synecdoche is that such symbolic 
connections between empire and its representative parts (however material in foundation) can 
be undermined in the interpretative space of reading. Antoinette’s encounter with the 
geography book echoes Jane Eyre’s furtive reading of Bewick’s A History of British Birds 
(1797) in the opening pages of Brontë’s novel. Both books promise imaginative access to 
inaccessible parts of the world for their readers: for Jane, to the world outside the 
                                                 
19 Rhys herself acknowledged the prominence of England in her thoughts and in her reading: “I thought a great 
deal about England, not factually but what I had read about it” (Smile 63). She was particularly curious about 
the country’s colder weather, to which she found little literary reference: “Books, especially Dickens’s, talked 
of hunger, starvation and poverty but very rarely of cold. So I concluded that either the English didn’t feel the 
cold, which surely wasn’t possible, or that everybody had a fire. Bill Sikes and Nancy, in fact, talked in front of 




authoritarian Reed household and, for Antoinette, England. But while the geography book 
blocks vision for Antoinette, the opposite is true for Jane: her ability to ignore the printed text 
which so thwarts Antoinette (Jane prefers instead to look at Bewick’s engravings) only seems 
to multiply her imaginative power. This contrast suggests a difference between the reading 
practices of the colonial and the native English subject: Jane holds free imaginative rein over 
the territory which Bewick’s book covers (a freedom symbolized by the book’s subject 
matter: the birds which, though categorically “British,” are unbound by terrestrial borders).  
Yet in Antoinette’s sensitivity to the prickly furze of the geography book’s 
typography (where the symbolic connection between printed page and imperial territory is 
made all the more obvious) the possibility of a counter-narrative is generated. Though the 
geography book’s heavy typography obstructs her vision of the England signified by the 
book’s text, her sensitivity to the contours and spatial arrangement of the literal text 
ironically allows her access to its prophetic subtext. Puzzling over the geography book, she 
thinks, “I must know more than I know already. For I know that house where I will be cold 
and not belonging, the bed I shall lie in has red curtains and I have slept there many times 
before, long ago” (525). Antoinette’s story, as Rhys imagines it, is a re-writing of Brontë’s 
authorized narrative, but a story must be read before it can be re-written. Antoinette’s 
prescient reading of the geography book, however thwarted, thus endows her with a powerful 
narrative voice.20 Nevertheless, on a metatextual level this prophetic knowledge of 
Antoinette’s eventual confinement at Thornfield is provided by Brontë’s Jane Eyre, the 
                                                 
20 Rhys refers elsewhere in her work to the portentousness of typography. In Voyage in the Dark, Anna remarks 
of her copy of Nana: “The print was very small, and the endless procession of words gave me a curious 
feeling—sad, excited and frightened. It wasn’t what I was reading, it was the look of the dark, blurred words 
going on endlessly that gave me that feeling” (4). The effect of the typography resembles Anna’s descriptions of 




canonical British text that looms most ominously over Wide Sargasso Sea. Rhys uses 
Antoinette’s premonition to demonstrate how imperial power and control is played out on the 
figurative landscape of the British canon: even Rhys’s radical rewriting of Antoinette’s 
backstory does not change the ending of that narrative, nor does it change the histories of 
Britain’s colonized territories.  
To have been bereft of the desire to read must have been a profoundly isolating 
experience for Rhys. For a sensitive and lonely child, reading was a haven from a world that 
seemed hostile and bewildering even at a very young age: an early chapter of her 
autobiography ends with the statement, “Now I was alone except for books” (26). In this 
Rhys resembles the young Jane Eyre reading in the curtained window seat of the Reed 
household more than she does Antoinette. As Rhys explains, “[…] as soon as I could I lost 
myself in the immense world of books, and tried to blot out the real world which was so 
puzzling to me. Even then I had a vague, persistent feeling that I’d always be lost in it, 
defeated” (62). What Rhys would show in her own books is the way her characters, 
themselves so often “lost” and “defeated,” engage in a readerly “cartography” of allusion and 
intertextual referencing to navigate the world and understand their place in it.  
Reading London: Unnavigable Labyrinth, Inscrutable Text 
With the exception of her legacy as the author of Wide Sargasso Sea, Rhys is often 
considered an exemplary writer of the Parisian urban scene. Of Rhys’s four “urban” novels 
(Quartet (1928), After Leaving Mr Mackenzie (1930), Voyage in the Dark (1934), and Good 
Morning, Midnight (1939)), only Voyage in the Dark can be labeled with confidence a 
“London” novel.  Nevertheless, London appears in each of these texts, whether as memory or 




British Empire that I wish to draw attention to against the backdrop of her more familiar 
reputation as a modernist and postcolonial writer.  London—and, indeed, England—is 
experienced consistently in her fiction as a ghostly nightmare world, a world often rendered 
through the hazy gauze of memory or dreamlike trance.  Even in Paris, Rhys’s protagonists, 
as either British citizens or colonials with past ties to England, are often disturbed by 
unwelcome and anxious memories of London. Strolling down the Rue de Rennes, Marya 
Zelli in Quartet remarks, “This street is very like the Tottenham Court Road—own sister to 
the Tottenham Court Road” (119). “The idea depressed her…” the narrator adds—a concise 
summary of London’s effect on all of Rhys’s protagonists. This simple expression of 
Marya’s emotion appears straightforward, but the fact that the specter of London rises from 
the geography of Paris with such spontaneity hints at the greater complexity of Marya’s 
relationship with the British capital. 
One way that Rhys depicts London’s phantasmagoric quality is through the topos of 
the city as both labyrinth and impenetrable text.  Although this image was made an emblem 
of modernist literature by Joyce, Eliot, and other contemporaries of Rhys, Merlin Coverley 
notes that earlier authors like De Quincy, Stevenson, and Stoker had also used the image to 
establish an urban Gothic tradition that “present[ed] the city as a dreamscape in which 
nothing is as it seems and which can only be navigated by those possessing secret 
knowledge” (17). Several critics have noted Rhys’s use of the labyrinth image,21 but few 
have explored its connection to this past tradition of English Gothic literature.  Christine 
Wick Sizemore identifies the conceit of city-as-labyrinth as a frequent image in the works of 
other British women writers, particularly in the novels of Iris Murdoch. But in Murdoch’s 
                                                 




city, the labyrinth is “clearly negotiable” and is even a positive environment for some (108).  
This is truer for Murdoch’s female characters than for her male characters: “[…] the 
labyrinth is still tricky, but the female protagonist can work her way through the labyrinth of 
the city and of relationships by holding on to the thread of female virtues”—“female virtue” 
being the ability to “value attachment and love” unselfishly (120-121).  Rhys’s characters, on 
the other hand, negotiate the city in a detached, semiconscious trance (as if sleepwalking) 
rather than with any demonstrable competence. A further and more obvious difference is that 
Rhys’s city is no labyrinth of interpersonal relationships; her characters are solitary figures 
more or less unattached by blood or marriage. Theirs is the lonely and uncanny labyrinth of 
memory and personal history, a landscape walked by the ghosts of past selves.22  In this way 
Rhys’s city also differs fundamentally from the foggy, nightmarish labyrinths of male 
forebears such as Stoker or Stevenson, whose visions of the city Rhys’s work more 
superficially resembles.   
Sizemore ultimately dismisses Rhys’s vision of the city as adhering to what Irving 
Howe describes as the “modernist legacy” of “established hostility to the idea of the city,”23 
favoring instead those contemporary British women who “celebrate the city” in their novels 
(Sizemore 4). But not all critics shy away from Rhys’s unremittingly bleak representation. 
Deborah L. Parsons notes that, while her work is marked by a “penetrative cynicism” borne 
of an understanding of “the realities of women’s actual position in the economic and 
                                                 
22 This absence of a network of supportive female relationships also differentiates Rhys’s work from African-
American and Afro-Caribbean postcolonial women writers who, according to Gina Wisker’s argument, use the 
figure of the postcolonial vampire to “enable the visioning of new futures which emphasize the importance of 
hybridity as a positive development, and of community as potentially enabling, nurturing, offering a context for 
hybridity and new connectivities” (49).  Though Rhys uses the vampiric soucriant to explore issues of 
hybridity, hers is not a recuperative figure. 
 




consumer world of the city,” Rhys’s image of the “dehumanizing labyrinth” bears unique 
“psycho-geographic” resonances (125). In Voyage in the Dark, Anna Morgan’s first 
impression of this labyrinth is given in the form of a stream-of-consciousness memory of her 
arrival in England from the West Indies:  
… [T]his is London—hundreds thousands of white people white people 
rushing along and the dark houses all alike frowning down one after the other 
all alike all stuck together—the streets like smooth shut-in ravines and the 
dark houses frowning down—oh I’m not going to like this place I’m not going 
to like this place I’m not going to like this place […] (9)  
 
The passage’s structure mimics both Anna’s panicked interior monologue and the visual 
experience of looking at London for the first time. She repeats strings of words to herself in 
quick succession, much like the “white people white people” who rush down the streets one 
after the other as if repetitions of a human type rather than individual people. Like the refrain 
“I’m not going to like this place,” these phrases are linked paratactically, blending into one 
another like the identical dark houses “frowning down one after the other all alike all stuck 
together.” The layout of the street shapes Anna’s panicked thoughts in the image of itself. 
London’s buildings not only create an emotional response in Anna, they appear to emote 
themselves, “frowning down” menacingly at the terrified girl. Later she remarks of London 
generally, “Everything was so exactly alike—that was what I could never get used to. And 
the cold; and the houses all exactly alike, and the streets going north, south, east, west, all 
exactly alike” (111). This monotonous repetition, a feature of the labyrinthine city, accounts 
for what Anna finds so disturbing about London; in a maze in which every building and 
street looks like the other, it is impossible to find the identifiable structures and landmarks 
which allow people to locate and orient themselves in the city. The irony of Anna’s spatial 




transmit to the young West Indian a diffuse but authentic sense of English identity. As Ian 
Baucom notes, there had arisen in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a discourse of 
British national identity as rooted in place (rather than, for example, in race) which handily 
determined that sites of authentic “Englishness” could be located “not only in England but in 
the colonies, where, if England’s authentic and auratic architectures of belonging could be 
reconstructed, these identity-determining sites could secure the cultural identity of the 
colonists and Anglicize, reform, and civilize the colonized” (16-17). But in Rhys’s works 
national and cultural identity fails to cohere around such locales. Instead, identity tends to 
either splinter or fuse along odd fissures in the presence of these sites, evoking not only 
modernist tropes of fragmentation and alienation, but Gothic formulations of hauntedness, 
monstrosity, and the irrational as well.   
The uniform racial whiteness of England is also disorienting for Anna, who in the 
Caribbean was used to “never seeing a white face from one week’s end to the other,” as her 
English stepmother, Hester, complains (38). This loss of individuality and the 
phantasmagoric imagery which so disorient Anna are not features of an indifferent modernist 
metropolis, but signs of an active malice more suggestive of the malevolent spaces of Gothic 
fiction. As Anna begins to interpret her experiences in a distinctly Gothic cast, London's 
menacing quality intensifies.  Returning to London with her troupe of fellow chorus girls, she 
remarks that "the dark streets round the theatre [make her] think of murders" (10).  That she 
is likely thinking of Jack the Ripper's brutal slayings of prostitutes in London's Whitechapel 
district (only some twenty-five years before the events of the novel) accentuates her especial 




moonlighting as prostitutes, and the pressure to succumb to prostitution follows Anna to the 
end of the novel.  
It is to these Gothic resonances of the street that Anna seems particularly sensitive. 
On her first visit to Walter Jeffries’ home she observes: “When we went out the taxis and the 
lights and the people passing looked swollen, as if I were drunk. We got to his house in 
Green Street and it was quiet and watching and not friendly to me” (21).  Anna immediately 
discerns from its appearance that Walter’s house will not be welcoming, foreshadowing his 
eventual abandonment of her. Already London’s appearance is not quite right, not quite 
definite: the cars, people, and lights take on a grotesque, oneiric quality, appearing “swollen” 
and distorted. 
The yoking of nightmarish architecture and syntax which features prominently in 
Voyage in the Dark appears in Rhys’s other novels as well. In Good Morning, Midnight, 
Sasha Jensen describes walking at night “with the dark houses over you, like monsters” 
(362). She asserts that their emotional effect varies dramatically depending on whether or not 
one has “money and friends.” If one does, then houses “…are just houses with steps and a 
front-door—friendly houses where the door opens and somebody meets you, smiling.” To 
those who are “quite secure” and whose “roots are well struck in,” they appear to be nothing 
more than benign, inanimate structures: mere buildings. But in truth, as Sasha explains,  
They stand back respectfully, waiting for the poor devil without any friends 
and without any money. Then they step forward, the waiting houses, to frown 
and crush. No hospitable doors, no lit windows, just frowning darkness. 
Frowning and leering and sneering, the houses, one after another. Tall cubes 
of darkness, with two lighted eyes at the top to sneer. And they know who to 
frown at. (362) 
 
Houses are anthropomorphized, given eyes and faces with which to grimace at less fortunate 




they frown too—but with knowing prejudice. The perceptual experience of walking down an 
unfriendly and intimidating residential street is in fact not subjective at all, but a consequence 
of the judgment and ill-intent of the houses built there. Subjective experience of the city is 
not rooted in the individual; it is structured by the city’s Gothic topography.  
Urban terrain takes on a pronounced dreamlike quality in other novels as well. In 
After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, Julia Martin, having returned to London after a nearly decade-
long absence, notices the disorienting experience of attempting to navigate the city: 
These streets near her boarding-house on Notting Hill seemed strangely 
empty, like the streets of a grey dream—a labyrinth of streets, all exactly 
alike. 
She would think: ‘Surely I passed down here several minutes ago.’ Then she 
would see the name Chepstow Crescent or Pembridge Villas, and reassure 
herself. ‘That’s all right; I’m not walking in a circle.’ (300-301)  
 
Rhys makes explicit use of the labyrinth image here, describing the area of Notting Hill as a 
maze constructed from the “streets of a grey dream,” an impression similar to Anna 
Morgan’s London of identical houses and streets within which one cannot find one’s 
bearings. Parsons notes the futility of Julia’s situation, remarking that the “irony […] is that, 
even if she does not actually double back on herself, Julia still feels that she does, […] 
disorientatedly wandering in a circle with no sense of direction” (143).  London’s 
labyrinthine atmosphere is on one level a psychological effect—the shape of the wanderer’s 
mental topography rather than the city’s physical layout. The bewilderment accompanying 
this effect can presumably be allayed by a practiced knowledge of the city’s geography, but 
Parsons observes that, having boarded the top of a bus at Oxford Circus, Julia “closes her 
eyes to the panoramic view it offers,” disregarding the opportunity to gain a command over 




While a similar disorienting effect is created in Voyage in the Dark by Anna’s panic 
upon arriving in what she views as a hostile new country (as well as by her unfamiliarity, as a 
West Indies native, with the architecture and layout of English cities), the sensation of 
“walking in a circle” in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie mirrors for Julia a return to the past. An 
English native coming back from living abroad in Paris, Julia is overwhelmed with the 
sensation that she has never actually left London: 
She felt that her life had moved in a circle. Predestined, she had returned to 
her starting-point, in this little Bloomsbury bedroom that was so exactly like 
the little Bloomsbury bedroom she had left nearly ten years before. And even 
the clock which struck each quarter in that aggressive and melancholy way 
was the same clock that she used to hear. 
Perhaps the last ten years had been a dream; perhaps life, moving on for the 
rest of the world, had miraculously stood still for her. (271) 
 
The concept of circular movement appears here too, but as a temporal metaphor instead of a 
spatial pattern. Julia’s life is on an unavoidable, “predestined” loop, and indeed the novel’s 
narrative structure confirms this when, having initially sworn to herself never to petition Mr 
Mackenzie for money again, Julia returns broken and conciliatory to her former lover to beg 
for a hundred francs (343). This circular notion of time is an aspect of what Rhys called the 
“big idea” behind her works, “[s]omething to do with time being an illusion,” meaning 
“…that the past exists—side by side with the present, not behind it; that what was—is.”24  
And yet even this temporal labyrinth is grounded physically in Julia’s surroundings. 
The tangible environment of the room and the district of Bloomsbury triggers a presentiment 
that reflects the actual path of her life, a pattern of returns and flights from England, a series 
of men who rescue and then abandon her. London’s sonic landscape has psychological 
resonance as well, and its powers are twofold. The chiming clock, both symbol and keeper of 
                                                 




time—which remains “miraculously” inert—echoes the clock from ten years ago. But it also 
represents the hostility of present-day London, a city which is itself “aggressive and 
melancholy” for Julia. London is an immutable labyrinth, one that exists only for Julia while 
“moving on for the rest of the world.” 
Though time stands still for Julia only, the streets of the labyrinthine dreamscape are 
populated by other figures. According to Parsons, London’s streets are “submerged in [a] 
fog” that is “both physical and temporal” and “in which shadows and ghosts walk side by 
side […]” (134).  These shadows are the eerie, nightmarish figures who emerge from 
obscured streets and alleyways, never quite gaining definition until encountered face to face, 
and the equally, if not more, nightmarish figures of “the older women,” “drab and hopeless, 
with timid, hunted expressions,” who presage Julia’s inevitable end (273).  These older 
women are figures of a distinctly female nightmare, for they look “as if they were begging 
the world in general not to notice that they were women or to hold it against them.” These 
female shadows are haunting because they are all too familiar to Julia, whereas male 
shadows appear in unfamiliar, even inhuman shapes: “The street was a dark tunnel between 
the high walls of the houses. Down at the far end she saw a man walking very quickly, 
moving his arms as he walked like a tall, thin bird flapping its wings” (316).  Perhaps a 
muted reference to the Victorian urban legend of London’s Spring-Heeled Jack,25 this figure 
turns out to be Mr Horsfield, Julia’s current benefactor and lover; but within the foggy 
labyrinth, it is a distinction that she is only able to make once they have both drawn “level 
under a lamp-post.” 
                                                 
25 The bizarre, demonic figure of Spring-Heeled Jack was often described as bird-like (or, like Dracula, bat-
like), the flapping of his coat mid-air giving the impression of great wings. See Charlton Lea, Spring-Heeled 




The “ghosts” to which Parsons refers and which walk “side by side” with these 
shadowy figures are not anonymous specters, but the ghosts of Julia’s past selves. As Julia 
breaks through the fog to enter Tottenham Court Road, she sees that “[t]here was only a grey 
fog shot with yellow light and its cold breath on her face, and the ghost of herself coming out 
of the fog to meet her” (271-272). But it does not end up meeting her; it does not even 
recognize Julia, or the “living ghost that Julia has become” (Parsons 134): “The ghost was 
thin and eager. It drifted up to her and passed her in the fog. And she had the feeling that […] 
it looked at her coldly, without recognizing her” (After Leaving 272). Julia is already one of 
those “older women,” “begging the world in general not to notice that they were women”— 
begging, in fact, for it not to notice them at all. Julia views these women as “strange,” as 
removed from or other to her, not realizing that her perceptive recognition of the meaning 
behind their “timid, hunted expressions” might be owing to a mutual affinity (273). That 
these observations are made after her encounter with her own ghost reveals that Julia does 
not yet realize what she has become or how she has transformed. Her ghostly double’s failure 
to recognize her in the street is her own failure of self-recognition. 
Parsons argues that in Rhys’s urban novels “the streets of the city and the pilgrimage 
through them become internalized, as city and psyche become one in the surrealistic 
imagination and are then in turn translated into the pages of the text” (145). But there is a 
Gothic imagination at play here too. Rhys personifies the negative and alienating effects of 
the city as ghosts and nightmare figures, releasing them into London’s streets to amble 
alongside her characters.  In this manner, she both continues and subverts the masculine 
tradition of a Gothic London, replacing the fogbound city of archetypal ghouls and madmen 




marginalized women and the ghosts of past selves haunt London’s streets eternally. This 
comparatively dreary vision of the Gothic suits the subject position of Rhys’s characters, who 
are not the heroines of traditional Gothic tales, but often figures of the monstrous and the 
hybrid—of life-in-death—struggling to find coherence in their own narratives. But as we 
shall see, Voyage in the Dark stands out among these novels by creating its own Creole 
Gothic in order to construct a complex portrait of the national, racial, and psychological 
uprootedness experienced by white Creole women. 
The Iron Shroud: Collapsing Spaces and Geographies in Rhys’s Creole Gothic  
The attic at Thornfield which imprisons Bertha in Jane Eyre is an enduring Gothic 
image in the British canon: it links Brontë’s novel to Wide Sargasso Sea, marking the point 
where the two narratives intersect, and signifies women’s artistic oppression in Sandra 
Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s pioneering feminist text The Madwoman in the Attic (1979). But it 
is not the first claustrophobic intertextual space referenced in Rhys’s oeuvre.  In Voyage in 
the Dark, Anna ponders the gothic counterparts to her run-down London flat: 
I lay down and started thinking about [...] that story about the walls of a room 
getting smaller and smaller until they crush you to death.  The Iron Shroud, it 
was called.  It wasn't Poe's story; it was more frightening than that.  'I believe 
this damned room's getting smaller and smaller,' I thought.  And about the 
rows of houses outside, gimcrack, rotten-looking, and all exactly alike. (18)   
 
The tension of "The Iron Shroud," written by William Mudford in 1830, reaches its highest 
pitch at the moment the imprisoned narrator grasps the manner of his impending death.  It is 
the realization of this fact, rather than its execution, that constitutes the story's deepest horror. 
This brief literary reference, an early precursor to the attic in Wide Sargasso Sea, reveals a 




Though the early Rhys is so often cast as a writer of the city—a modernist flâneuse—
rooms and interior spaces are as important to her fiction as exterior public spaces. Andrew 
Thacker observes that, “[l]ike Benjamin’s flâneur, for whom the city street or café becomes a 
form of interior, Rhys’s characters feel most at home in places of fleeting location on the 
borders between inside and outside spaces” (193).  However, even the seemingly un-liminal 
“iron shroud” of Anna’s flat threatens to upset clear divisions between interior and exterior 
space: in Mudford’s tale, the impregnable walls of the narrator’s prison circumscribe a space 
of captivity, and yet the dissolution of that space—the erasure of any meaningful distinction 
between outside and inside—signifies certain death. Christopher GoGwilt notes that for 
Rhys’s women such liminal spaces, however familiar, reflect dire material realities.  The 
endless succession of rooms and streets which makes up the daily life of Rhys’s characters 
“heighten[s]” and simultaneously “expose[s] […] the phantasmagoria, or bourgeois illusion 
of a separate private interior space insulated from the place of work and social labor” (102).  
The impasse between exterior and interior space describes the typical Rhys heroine’s 
“compromised social position as a woman whose ‘market value’ is constituted by the relation 
between bedroom and street” (109).26 Escape from the iron shroud of Anna’s rented room 
promises only exposure to London’s hostile public spaces, its architectural structures 
“gimcrack, rotten-looking, and all exactly alike.” It is worth noting that the memory of 
Mudford’s Gothic tale occurs after Anna is accused of prostitution by her landlady.  While an 
obvious metaphor for her narrowing prospects, the reference to “The Iron Shroud” also 
                                                 
26 The term impasse, used by Rhys in the opening paragraphs of Good Morning, Midnight, is central to 
GoGwilt’s understanding of urban architectural space and geographic space in Rhys’s novels: “Connecting 
room and street in a word that undoes the separation of interior private and exterior public space, the ‘impasse’ 
delineates the experience Rhys's protagonists are bound to repeat in finding themselves trapped in the double-
bind of private and public metropolitan social space” (101). GoGwilt notes that Rhys uses the word impasse in 




suggests that, like Mudford's protagonist, Anna foresees in the landlady's accusation her 
ultimate fate. The “relation between bedroom and street” collapses in on itself much like an 
iron shroud, for Anna’s descent toward prostitution literally eliminates the distinction (and 
thus geographic distance) between the public space of labor and the private space of 
sexuality.  
Like many Gothic tales, “The Iron Shroud” compounds the terror of its macabre 
setting by locating it in a foreign (to the English) country. Likewise, in Rhys’s novels foreign 
landscapes are almost always claustrophobic and menacing. The difference between the 
familiar and the unfamiliar —a source of frisson for Gothic readers— is represented in 
Rhys’s “Caribbean” novels by the radical polarity of English and West Indian landscapes. In 
Wide Sargasso Sea, this difference functions as a device for characterizing the disastrously 
mismatched Antoinette and Rochester. Rochester despairs at the vibrancy of the West Indies, 
whose foreignness he connects with his exotic new wife: “Everything is too much, I felt as I 
rode wearily after her. Too much blue, too much purple, too much green. The flowers too 
red, the mountains too high, the hills too near. And the woman is a stranger” (498). The 
Caribbean’s rich colors and heavy scents are more than oppressive; the landscape threatens 
the Englishman: “. . . I understood why the porter had called it a wild place,” he says. “Not 
only wild but menacing. Those hills would close in on you. ‘What an extreme green,’ was all 
I could say […].” The image of contracting hills recalls both Anna’s description of the 
“smooth shut-in ravines” of London’s streets and the crushing walls of “The Iron Shroud.” In 
fact, Rochester’s feelings about the West Indies are essentially an inversion of Anna’s 




Amidst the “green menace” of the island, Rochester’s thoughts lead to the antipodal, 
inaccessible greenery of home: “English trees. I wondered if I ever should see England 
again” (559). Earlier in the novel, Rochester comments on the negating power of the 
hallucinatory scenery, which obliterates the ability to imagine alternative, even familiar, 
landscapes: “I could not imagine different weather or a different sky. […] There would be the 
sky and the mountains, the flowers and the girl [Antoinette] and the feeling that all this was a 
nightmare, the faint consoling hope that I might wake up” (530). The atmospheres of 
England and the Caribbean are so discordant as to suggest that the two landscapes are not 
experienced on the same level of consciousness. Rochester’s experience is representative of 
Rhys’s portrayal of characters in foreign landscapes; they experience their alien surroundings 
as an annihilating negation of the self, thereby underscoring the importance of the literal 
homeland to the formation of subjectivity and national identity.  
Antoinette, in turn, suspects that England must be a dream. “Is it true,” she asks 
Rochester, “that England is like a dream? Because one of my friends who married an 
Englishman wrote and told me so. She said this place London is like a cold dark dream 
sometimes. I want to wake up” (505). Rhys uses this inversion of Rochester’s statement to 
link the mutually negating dreamscapes of England and Jamaica to Antoinette and 
Rochester’s fundamental incompatibility: 
‘Well,’ I answered annoyed, ‘that is precisely how your beautiful island seems 
to me, quite unreal and like a dream.’ 
‘But how can rivers and mountains and the sea be unreal?’ 
‘And how can millions of people, their houses and their streets be unreal?’ 
‘More easily,’ she said, ‘much more easily. Yes a big city must be like a 
dream.’ 





The solitude of the menacing green hills which Rochester feels closing in on him are a 
comfort to Antoinette. “I am safe,” she says earlier in the novel. “There is the tree of life in 
the garden and the wall green with moss. The barrier of the cliffs and the high mountains. 
And the barrier of the sea. I am safe. I am safe from strangers” (471). The garden wall, the 
mountains, and the sea barricade Antoinette from England, keeping her “safe from strangers” 
overseas and from the tandem wifely and civic duties demanded of her by Rochester and 
British imperial authority.   
In the earlier novel Voyage in the Dark, Anna similarly characterizes her lives in the 
Caribbean and in England as two realities that cannot coexist: “Sometimes it was as if I were 
back there [the West Indies] and as if England were a dream. At other times England was the 
real thing and out there was the dream, but I could never fit them together” (3). As the novel 
progresses, however, it becomes clear that neither the West Indies nor England is “the real 
thing,” for England is depicted increasingly as a nightmare from which Anna cannot wake, 
while the Caribbean is expressed in the stream-of-consciousness style of memory and 
dreams. The psychological barrier between England and the West Indies is introduced in the 
opening lines of the novel, which depict Anna’s arrival in England as a radical perceptual 
shock:  
It was as if a curtain had fallen, hiding everything I had ever known. It was 
almost like being born again. The colours were different, the smells different. 
Not just the difference between heat, cold; light, darkness; purple, grey. But a 
difference in the way I was frightened and the way I was happy. (3) 
 
Rhys’s two opening similes—the falling curtain and the experience of birth—introduce the 
novel’s primary theme of irretrievable, intangible past. Anna’s immigration to England is 
experienced as rebirth or, as her experiences in the country increasingly suggest, a crossing 




new environment is so dramatically different as to produce changes not only in one’s sensory 
perception of the outside world (“heat, cold; light, darkness; purple, grey”), but also in the 
inward experience of emotion (fear and happiness). Rhys articulates this feeling of 
uncertainty, of finding oneself without bearings in a new setting, with the first word of the 
novel: “It.” “It was as if a curtain had fallen”—what was as if a curtain had fallen? Without 
this antecedent, we too are cut off from the prior knowledge that would reveal what Anna 
encounters in the present.  
The opening lines serve as a prelude to the rest of the novel, introducing the major 
themes which characterize Anna’s narrative and use of language: the severed connection 
between present and past, England and the West Indies; the importance of color and sensory 
detail to her perception of reality and unreality; and the characterization of England and the 
Caribbean as dreamscapes of memory and alienation. Thoughts of severed connection—the 
fallen curtain that signifies the impossibility of homeward passage—reappear throughout 
Anna’s narrative and are often prompted by observations of natural detail. Her earlier 
comment that she “could never fit [England and the West Indies] together” is later echoed in 
a comparison between English and Caribbean flowers: “But when I began to talk about the 
flowers out there I got that feeling of a dream, of two things that I couldn’t fit together, and it 
was as if I were making up the names. Stephanotis, hibiscus, yellowbell, jasmine, frangipani, 
corolita” (48). Anna cannot believe that England’s “little bright things” and the Caribbean’s 
“[f]lamboyant” flowers (48) exist under the same sun (“This thing here—I can’t believe it’s 
the same sun, I simply can’t believe it”) (45), and their violent contrast creates uncertainty 
about what is real and what is unreal. Nomenclature is vital to Anna’s preservation of the 




flora. However, her attempts to concretize memory into fact through the act of naming are 
thwarted by the unequivocal presence of the English landscape: “[…] I came in after walking 
about Primrose Hill in the rain (nothing but the damp trees and the soggy grass and the sad, 
slow-moving clouds—it’s funny how it makes you feel that there’s not anything else 
anywhere, that it’s all made up that there is anything else) […] (57).27 England’s dreary 
genericness, the sogginess of its unspecific foliage, causes the brilliantly detailed Caribbean 
to seem fantastical in contrast.  
Anna repeats throughout the narrative that her life in London feels like a nightmare 
from which she cannot wake: “Sometimes not being able to get over the feeling that it was a 
dream. The light and the sky and the shadows and the houses and the people—all parts of the 
dream, all fitting in and all against me” (96). London’s physical architecture and atmosphere, 
its topographical surfaces and textures, seem to conspire against her in a manner only 
possible in dreams. She fantasizes about waking in her idyllic, idealized homeland to find 
that England was in fact just “an awful dream” and that “it had started again my lovely life—
like a five-finger exercise playing very slowly on the piano like a garden with a high wall 
round it—and even now and again thinking I only dreamt it it never happened …” (84). Like 
Antoinette in Wide Sargasso Sea, Anna likens her safe and “lovely” former life to a walled 
garden, an enclosed, shielding space that is nonetheless partly open to the natural world and 
which nurtures and protects the flora of her beloved island. 
                                                 
27 Beth Wightman connects a British spatial discourse of “islandness” to Foucault’s concept of the heterotopia, 
which is, in Foucault’s words, “capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are 
in themselves incompatible” and of which the colony is particularly exemplary. Foucault’s thoughts regarding 
nomenclature seem apt here, for heterotopias “secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to 
name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy ‘syntax’ in advance, 
and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes 
words and things (next to and opposite one another) to ‘hold together’” (quoted in Wightman, 55). Andrew 





The image of a wall appears again, this time more ominously in a childhood memory 
of an English advertisement for biscuits depicting a little boy and girl in a “tidy” English 
landscape with “a high, dark wall behind the little girl” (91). Anna explains, “Underneath the 
pictures was written: The past is dear, / The future clear, / And, best of all, the present. But it 
was the wall that mattered.” The advertisement copy, another kind of text transmitting ideas 
of Englishness, is an ironic comment on Anna’s circumstances. For her, the future is 
uncertain rather than “clear,” and the past, however “dear,” is remote and troubled by 
disturbing undercurrents. The present is arguably the worst of the three, for by this point in 
the novel Anna has effectively resorted to prostitution in order to support herself. The biscuit 
advertisement “used to be my idea of what England was like,” Anna says, adding, “And it is 
like that, too” (91). Like the depiction in the advertisement, the real England is manufactured 
and mercenary. But it is “the wall that matter[s]” most in the illustration, for England is a 
“high, dark wall”—an iron shroud—cutting Anna off from home, cultural identity, and the 
past.  
The psychic distance between England and the Caribbean begins to collapse when 
Anna receives a letter informing her that Walter, her lover and a vital source of financial 
support, has broken off their relationship.  Before even being opened, the letter inexplicably 
elicits a childhood memory of paralyzing fear: 
. . . Uncle Bo was on the verandah lying on the sofa his mouth was a bit open . 
. . I got up to the table where the magazine was and Uncle Bo moved and 
sighed and long yellow tusks like fangs came out of his mouth and protruded 
down to his chin—you don’t scream when you are frightened because you 
can’t and you don’t move either because you can’t—after a long time he 
sighed and opened his eyes and clicked his teeth back into place and said what 
on earth do you want child—it was the magazine I said . . . I had never seen 





Anna’s Caribbean recollections have hitherto been idyllic, prompted by nostalgia and intense 
homesickness. But here the remembered scene is one of horror, a traumatic memory 
triggered by a moment of intense distress: her Uncle Bo has revealed himself to the 
unsuspecting child as a yellow-fanged monster. The novel’s Gothicism has hitherto been 
distinctly English, grounded in the country’s ghostly urban spaces, but Uncle Bo’s vampiric 
transformation marks the beginning of a monstrous convergence of metropole and colony, 
two spaces which seem divided by an impossible physical and psychological distance. 
Significantly, the Caribbean memory is linked stylistically to the space of the city: Rhys 
employs in this passage the syntax and stream-of-consciousness style used primarily in 
Anna’s nightmarish impressions of London, a style devoid of punctuation apart from the 
halting dashes which stand in for periods or stops. The effect of this parataxis is a rushing, 
yet stumbling, flow—the rhythm of panic, which is also the rhythm of the city. Of equal 
significance is that this sudden appearance of a distinctly Caribbean moment of Gothicism 
thwarts two acts of reading: the young Anna’s attempt to take the magazine from off the 
verandah table and the older Anna’s unsealing of the letter from Walter. Hence the 
frightening memory is linked both to the idea of the city as text and to the notion of failed 
reading. It develops the novel’s formal and allusive linking of texts to geographic space 
while indicating that such spatial texts will remain ultimately unreadable. 
The appearance of a Caribbean “vampire” (Uncle Bo) also plays on the novel’s 
anxious awareness of the conflation in Europe of the West Indies, miscegenation, and 
monstrosity. Uncle Bo is criticized by Hester for “having populated half the island” (39) with 
illegitimate children from—as one can guess from Hester’s venom and the trajectory of her 




transgression of racial and class boundaries, there is also a predatory, vampiric undercurrent 
to both the prolific (and extralegal) nature of Uncle Bo’s promiscuity and its contiguity with 
a history of white slave-owners’ sexual exploitation of slave women. Hester’s invective 
moves from Uncle Bo to an insinuation that Anna’s mother was of mixed race, though Anna 
insists she was not. As a colonial woman from the Caribbean, Anna is automatically 
stigmatized as both sexually and racially suspect: her fellow chorus girls nickname her 
"Hottentot" (7). Rhys’s Rochester also regards white Creole identity as hybridized, his 
perspective based on the common imperial suspicion of racial mixing between black and 
white islanders.28 English anxieties about the integrity of racial and sexual boundaries are 
thus offloaded onto the figure of the colonial, just as such anxieties find vent in Gothic tales 
of deviance, defilement, and degeneracy. 
In Rhys’s novels the specter of racial hybridity is translated into actual monstrosity in 
the form of obeah folklore, a Caribbean counterpart to her use of the European Gothic. In 
Wide Sargasso Sea, Rochester’s suspicions about Antoinette’s racial heritage are paralleled 
by suggestions that she has become a Caribbean version of the undead. The servant 
Christophine remarks that Antoinette has a “face like a dead woman” and “eyes red like 
soucriant” (528) (a female vampire figure from Caribbean folklore who sheds her skin at 
night and sucks human blood),29 while a taunting girl says to Antoinette, “Look the crazy 
girl, you crazy like your mother. […] She have eyes like zombie and you have eyes like 
zombie too” (486).30 The majority of scholarship on Rhys’s use of obeah focuses on the 
                                                 
28 He says of Antoinette’s fleeting resemblance to Amélie, the mixed-race maid: “Perhaps they are related, I 
thought. It’s possible, it’s even probable in this damned place” (Wide Sargasso Sea 535). 
 
29 See Rudd, Postcolonial Gothic Fictions, 32. 
 
30 In a fictional book on the West Indies, The Glittering Coronet of Isles, Rochester reads a definition of zombi 




notion of zombification and its connection to slave resistance in the Caribbean,31 addressing 
Rhys’s problematic identification with, and appropriation of, Afro-Caribbean culture. Less 
attention has been paid to the figure of the soucriant, despite Rhys’s rather obvious 
metaphoric vampirizing of its obeah origins. In Wide Sargasso Sea the soucriant comparison 
is a direct allusion to Jane Eyre’s description of “Bertha” as “the foul German spectre—the 
Vampyre” (Brontë 242). But in Voyage in the Dark’s London setting, the European parallel, I 
would argue, is Stoker’s Dracula (1897). Like the Count, the young colonial woman 
represents the foreign Other penetrating the heart of the imperial metropolis while 
endeavoring to “pass” (to borrow Stephen D. Arata’s phrasing) as native English (639).  
But whereas for Arata Dracula encapsulates an anxious imperial fantasy of “reverse 
colonization” (623), the white Creole represents a bidirectional threat of invasion both to the 
island populations exploited by white colonizers and to the British Empire’s home island, the 
location of authentic Englishness. This threat manifests in Voyage in the Dark in 
characteristically vampiric ways. Regina Martin observes that “Anna must be excluded from 
the category of home because she embodies the ‘contact zones’ and hybrid identities of 
empire that constructions of home are supposed to protect against” (142). In a seeming 
variation on the superstition against inviting vampires into the home, Rhys illustrates the 
threat posed by Anna’s hybrid identity by “repeatedly expelling her from homes and 
enforcing a state of constant mobility” (ibid. 142). But the “contact zones” which Anna 
embodies also expose the vampiric quality of the metropole and its methods of replicating 
                                                 
dead. A zombi can also be the spirit of a place, usually malignant but sometimes to be propitiated with 
sacrifices or offerings of flowers and fruit” (522). Rhys herself referred to a book on obeah to supplement her 
knowledge (see Smile Please, 31).  
 




itself via colonialism across the globe, which according to Baucom reveal “England as 
continuously discontinuous with itself, as that which may repeat itself but always repeats 
with a difference” (5). Thus Beth Wightman’s description of Wide Sargasso Sea’s narrative 
as telling the story of the “undead geographic Other” (Antoinette) “eternally returned to an 
eternally disavowing ‘home’” (Brontë’s Thornfield attic) (60) also applies to Voyage in the 
Dark in a more literally geographic sense, particularly at the novel’s conclusion when the 
spaces of the West Indies and England converge as one monstrous, “undead” landscape. 
Figures of the Caribbean undead come to the fore when Anna discovers she is 
pregnant. Unable to determine the father of the child and desperate for an abortion, Anna 
experiences her pregnancy and termination through a phantasmagoria of nightmarish images. 
At the onset of the morning sickness which reveals her pregnancy, Anna feverishly 
remembers the “haunted and obeah” mountains of her Caribbean island and the “obeah-
women”—witches or sorceresses—who dig up and mutilate the dead (100). As her morning 
sickness worsens, she becomes haunted by thoughts of “zombis” and soucriants:  
Obeah zombis soucriants—lying in the dark frightened of the dark frightened 
of soucriants that fly in through the window and suck your blood—they fan 
you to sleep with their wings and then they suck your blood—you know them 
in the day-time—they look like people but their eyes are red and staring and 
they’re soucriants at night—looking in the glass and thinking sometimes my 
eyes look like a soucriant’s eyes…  
 
The passage commences with an invocation of West Indies folklore, “Obeah zombis 
soucriants,” mimicking the rhythm of an incantation. As if intoning a spell, it ends with Anna 
transformed into a vision of a monster: a red-eyed soucriant, neither dead nor alive. Like the 
white Creole who might appear to be of European descent but whose racial purity will 
always be tainted in the minds of the native English by suspicions of miscegenation, the 




otherwise prohibited to it: the body, the bedroom, the world of the living, the metropole. 
Later, as her pregnancy progresses, Anna is plagued by an obsessive fear that her child will 
be born a “monster” (103, 106). While she imagines herself as the soucriant of her island’s 
folklore, her baby is simply a “monster,” suggesting an indeterminacy beyond even Anna’s 
hybridized Creole identity. Anna’s use of the nonspecific term rather than a West Indian one 
might signify a desire to abject—to “throw off”—the sense of her own monstrosity 
originating from her hybrid Caribbean identity onto her European child, thus protecting the 
sacrosanct bounds of her idealized past in Dominica.32 But it is still the spontaneous thought 
of the “veiled” blue mountains of her childhood home—both “haunted and obeah”—that 
triggers her nightmare vision (100). This emotional conveyance to England of occult imagery 
and figures native to Dominica allows Rhys to signify the private horror and isolation of 
unwanted, unaided pregnancy via a highly allusive personal mythology that yokes Anna’s 
experiences and memories from both countries. London is no longer a city haunted only by 
the archetypal specters of the English Gothic (vampires, ghosts, and brutish madmen); it is 
visited also by the West Indian undead and the fraught memories they dredge up with them.  
The psychological imposition of the Caribbean onto England is followed by its 
reversal. Anna has a nightmare in which she is at sea: “And the ship was sailing very close to 
an island, which was home except that the trees were all wrong. These were English trees, 
their leaves trailing in the water” (101). This nightmare is more disturbing to Anna than 
thoughts of obeah-women living in her island’s mountains, for the latter image is still a 
familiar one. The idea of her beloved island forested with the gloomy “English trees” of her 
place of exile (trees for which she has no names, unlike her long lists of Caribbean flora) is a 
                                                 




reminder that her home is not only forever lost to her, but tainted by England’s topography. 
Anna can never return to the island she remembers from her youth, nor will she ever fully 
escape England. However, the nightmare also suggests an aberration from the novel’s usual 
motif of severed passage. Like the spatial impossibility of Mudford’s iron shroud—whose 
walls constrict inward until there no longer exists any distinction between interior and 
exterior—this hybrid landscape obliterates even the liminal spaces which Anna and Rhys’s 
other heroines seem to navigate in perpetuity. It is a landscape monstrous in the truly Gothic 
sense: a transgression of geographic boundaries, a refusal of spatial logic. While Paravisini-
Gebert argues that "[t]he Caribbean is a space that learned to 'read' itself in literature through 
Gothic fiction" (233), appearing first as the barbarous backdrop for European Gothic tales 
before writing itself into its own Gothic literature, Anna’s inability to locate herself within 
the spatial logic of this monstrous landscape signifies a more universal failure to read 
coherence into the imperial narrative as it is told from the European colonial woman’s point 
of view. Redundant within the economy of the late empire’s needs, Anna struggles to "fit 
together" the two landscapes constituting her identity by reading them allusively via the cues 
of Gothic fiction. But these spaces remain fundamentally illegible. Voyage in the Dark does 
not ultimately succeed in “writing back” to English canon as does Wide Sargasso Sea—nor is 
it meant to. Rhys creates a Creole Gothic from the fundamental incoherence and monstrosity 
of her textual and geographic spaces. The novel’s Gothicism speaks to the inherent violence 
of imperial space, which cannot be repressed or rationalized. Through its refusal of 
cartographic coherence and its monstrous merging of England and the Caribbean into a 
hybridized landscape, Voyage in the Dark raises imperial space as the body of the undead. 
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CHAPTER 3: “TRYING TO GET THE WORLD HOME”: DOMESTIC SPACE AND 
DECADENT BODIES IN DJUNA BARNES’S NIGHTWOOD 
 
Since the publication in 1945 of Joseph Frank's essay "Spatial Form in Modern 
Literature," critics of Djuna Barnes' 1936 novel Nightwood have asked readers to consider 
the novel's demanding and occasionally bewildering narrative structure in terms of 
spatiality.33  Yet despite this early critical emphasis on the novel's spatial tendencies, 
surprisingly few scholars have devoted attention to the novel's striking catalog of physical 
spaces.  To be precise, space and place are common themes in Nightwood criticism: many 
have discussed the novel's engagement with exile, nationality, and the geography of the 
urban night-world which beckons Robin Vote's wayward flânerie.  Fewer critics, however, 
have attended to Barnes's meticulous descriptions of private interiors in the novel, which 
include the living spaces of nearly every major character. Fewer still have commented on the 
near-obsessive cataloging of personal objects and domestic decor which ornament these 
spaces. 
Why so little attention to these spaces which arguably anchor the novel's famously 
elusive narrative?  Traditional domesticity, and thus domestic space, has always sat uneasily 
with modernism despite the prevalence of such interiors in modernist fiction.  Moreover, 
Nightwood's domestic spaces evade straightforward classification.  At the heart of the novel 
                                                 
33 Frank argues that Nightwood’s eight chapters are joined structurally “not by the progress of any action—
either physical action, or, as in a stream-of-consciousness novel, the act of thinking—but by the continual 
reference and cross-reference of images and symbols which must be referred to each other spatially throughout 
the time-act of reading” (439). 
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is the extraordinary image of the apartment which Nora Flood and Robin Vote share, a near 
replica of the apartment shared by Barnes and sculptor Thelma Wood, whose relationship 
provided a basis for the novel's story (Benstock 257).  Of the chandeliers, stage-drops, music 
boxes, and ecclesiastical furnishings in the fictional apartment, only the objects taken from 
the circus lacked their real-life counterpart. "The juxtaposition of the sacred items with the 
secular and the contrast between the spiritual trappings of the apartment and the profane 
union this home supported are ironies that Barnes undoubtedly enjoyed..." writes Benstock, 
adding that "Decadence inhabited the domestic; the apartment was a world in which moral 
and sexual codes were reversed." I wish to expand on Benstock's brief commentary on 
Nightwood's decadent interiors in order to contend that Barnes's mixing of the "spiritual" and 
the "profane" is more than an ironic pleasure.  I argue that the décor of Nightwood's interior 
spaces attempts to negotiate a new form of domesticity that can make "the profane"—those 
marginalized identities deemed alien by traditional society—"at home."   
Borrowing Christopher Reed's terms, I trace within the text a conflict between 
domestic attitudes that can be characterized as "heroism" versus "housework."  When 
discussed in the context of Nightwood, I define "housework" as the modernist effort to cope 
with cultural alienation through the invention of a domesticity that can adequately "house" 
that alterity.  However, I further argue that much of the "housework" which Nightwood 
undertakes encompasses what I read as an attempt to "rescue" the decadent body from its 
corporeal transience by mooring it in the atemporal beauty of aestheticized interior space.  
"Heroism," on the other hand, is marked by a repudiation of domestic space and a flight to 
the more recognizable modernist space of the city street, a flight that is motivated by an 




words, the "heroic" is manifested not in a masculinist escape out of doors, but in the flight of 
the transient body which cannot be anchored by the confines of domestic space—a body that, 
despite its desire for a "home," slips in and out of being, escaping into the hazy, undelineated 
space which the novel terms "the night" (171)."  Though Nightwood provides descriptions of 
the living spaces of nearly all the characters in the novel, I focus primarily on three of these: 
Guido and Hedvig's house in Vienna, Robin's hotel room in Paris, and Robin and Nora's 
shared apartment in the same city.  These rooms, through the shared connection of the 
triangular relationship between Felix, Robin, and Nora, best characterize the interplay 
between heroism and housework as different modes of grappling with a range of modernist 
and decadent tropes: among them, identity, alienation, and the mortal condition.   
Modernist Domesticity 
"Modernism begins in a room," says Michael Levenson, referring to what he terms 
the "exemplary image" of the modern artist at work: "hard-pressed and enervated," estranged 
from society and strapped for cash, she withdraws into the imagination by first withdrawing 
to her cramped lodgings (3).  This is Virginia Woolf's "room of one's own": it is not a space 
in which to live, but a space in which to work.  The room is the "subjectivity materialised," 
and in this setting the walls of the artist's mind can extend outward to encompass the walls of 
his room (14).  For this reason, Levenson says, "[t]he modernist room is typically single and 
self-contained.  It is not a house for a family.  It is a box for a brain" (5).  The modernist 
room, then, is both symbol and symptom of the artist's alienation, and it is above all a solitary 
inhabitance. 
But in reality, modernist artists were interested in rooms outside the confines of their 




explains that, in an effort to usher the traditional home out of the Victorian era and into the 
modern, the British middle class turned to artists to cultivate their attitudes toward modern 
interior design (9).  Though this reliance on artists for the shaping of cultural tastes was not 
limited to England, an astonishing number of "…writers who now make up the canon of 
British literary modernism were connected with groups of artists and designers who were 
seeking to reimagine the British home" (10).  Among the many were Virginia Woolf, E.M. 
Forster, Lytton Strachey, Mina Loy, Ford Madox Ford, Thomas Hardy, and Wyndham 
Lewis—and of American expatriates there were Henry James, Natalie Barney, and Ezra 
Pound (10).  "A number of these writers dabbled in design themselves…" says Rosner.  
"…Loy designed lampshades, Lewis designed furniture, Hardy worked as an architect.  
…Others, including [Aldous] Huxley and Evelyn Waugh, wrote architectural journalism" 
(10).  If so many artists were involved in the reimagining of domestic space, is Levenson's 
assertion that the modernist room is "not a house for a family" correct? 
It is at least partially right.  In Bloomsbury Rooms: Modernism, Subculture, and 
Domesticity, Christopher Reed demonstrates that modernism's attitude toward domesticity 
and the conceptualization of domestic space was ambivalent and often sharply divided.  He 
argues that the development of modernism was not an "inevitable evolution," but instead a 
"sequence of choices" made from a series of ideological oppositions (2).  Among these 
diametric oppositions are masculine versus feminine, functional versus ornamental, and 
production against consumption (2).  Much of how we understand and define modernism 
today, Reed claims, is the result of the eventual privileging of one ideological attitude over 
its opposing counterpart.  




opposition he terms "heroism/housework" (2).  Central to modernism is the idea of the 
"avant-garde," which positions "art as onslaught" and "the artist as hero" (2).  "Exploiting the 
Odyssean contrast of heroic mission with domestic stasis," the avant-garde stance was thus 
predicated on a repudiation of traditional domesticity.  Champions of "heroism" such as Le 
Corbusier and Wyndham Lewis articulated this prejudice in interior design philosophy by 
decrying the homey, decorative clutter of the traditional home—what Le Corbusier called 
"sentimental hysteria" and Lewis a "wretched vegetable home existence"—and urging 
instead for a machine-like rationalization of private space which sought to bring the home 
closer in spirit to the office (design branded as "intended for Robots" and "robot modernism" 
by writer Raymond Mortimer and architect John Gloag) (1-2, 4, Rosner 9).  As early as 1910, 
Adolf Loos was lecturing that modern society had “outgrown ornament… fought [its] way 
through to freedom from ornament,” a polemic he would eventually publish as the manifesto 
“Ornament and Crime” (Loos 20).  “Absence of ornament has brought… the arts to 
unsuspected heights,” he proclaimed (24).     
Because art history has made "avant-garde domesticity an oxymoron," art that 
engaged with the domestic and the decorative were denounced as watered-down and 
superficial, and the artists who fell on the "housework" side of the schism were, in Reed's 
opinion, unfairly excluded from the canon of modernist art (Reed 5).  Reed identifies as 
exemplary of this domestic philosophy the members of the Bloomsbury group, artists whose 
contribution to modernism, he contends, has been regarded with insufficient seriousness.  A 
group of friends, relatives, and lovers who met and cohabited in each other's London homes, 
and whose name was taken from the neighborhood in which they lived, Bloomsbury 




Roger Fry, and Duncan Grant—all painters and members of Bloomsbury—founded the 
Omega Workshops in 1913 (closed in 1919), which created pottery, textiles, rugs, and 
furniture in the Post-Impressionist style that were intended for the home (15, Rosner 10).  
Bell and Grant went so far as to use the home itself as a canvas for their art; every available 
surface of Charleston, their farmhouse in rural Sussex, was covered with their paintings.  The 
distinction between art and decoration thus obscured, Charleston became an ideal space 
"…where domestic existence and aesthetic creativity reinforce[d] one another in a complex 
but coherent whole" (Reed 184).  Virginia Woolf commissioned murals from Bell and Grant 
for her London home at 52 Tavistock Square (223).  The murals, which, unlike the painted 
surfaces of Charleston, were set off by rectangular frames, mirrored the illustrated book 
covers that Bell (Woolf's sister) designed for the Hogarth Press editions of Woolf's novels 
(224, 227). 
Though their work was scoffed at as an unserious and inadequately daring 
contribution to the heroic endeavor of modernism ("The Omega style—so typically 
Bloomsbury in the way it diluted and distorted modernism in the interests of aesthetic 
sociability—made Cubism look homey and insipid," said one reviewer), Bloomsbury's 
dedication to domestic principles was resolute and deliberate (5).  In a letter to Woolf, Bell 
identified "'the domestic strain'" in her sister as "'the sign of real genius'" (5).  In Mrs 
Dalloway, Woolf centers the novel's events on an upper-middle class, middle-aged woman 
throwing a society party for her politician husband—an ironic detail in light of Wyndham 
Lewis's malicious charge that Bloomsbury's "'…efforts would not rise above the level of a 
pleasant tea party'" (4).  For Bloomsbury's leanings toward the "pleasant" and the "homey"—




and key trope of modernist art: their alienation from the cultural and social mainstream.  
Bloomsbury's members sought to create a domestic aesthetics—a "home"—because they felt 
they had none (6).  Marginalized artistically, politically, and sexually, Bloomsbury was 
united with the modernist mainstream in its razing of Victorian cultural domination and its 
traditional ideology of the home, but it broke with the main by building an alternative 
domesticity in its place. 
The room in modernist literature bears traces of the division between "heroism" and 
"housework" as well.  But whereas for those interested in interior design the heroic was 
marked by condemnation of the home as a site of neurosis, a space of "sentimental hysteria" 
where, in the words of Wyndham Lewis, the "'modern city man'" was diminished to nothing 
more than "'an invalid bag of mediocre nerves,'" in literature the heroic-modernist 
representation of interior space relies on this parallel with psychic interiors, for the intention 
is to bring the room into line with the disembodied self (Reed 4).  Levenson describes the 
heroic tendency as the attempt to "…exaggerate inwardness to the point of trespass: an 
inwardness that completes and exceeds the confined world of domesticity…" (4).  In other 
words, the modernist room "exaggerates" interiority by conflating interior space with 
individual subjectivity—"trespassing" the bounds of traditional domesticity by marking the 
intrusion of outside subjectivities as trespass itself.  The heroic in literature, despite its retreat 
into interiors, was still a rejection of the domestic, for its rooms gave "…a picture of 
singleness, of radical containment" (4).   
In this particular modernist vision, shared domiciles are doomed spaces.  Levenson 
points to the rooms in T.S. Eliot's The Waste Land, which are "nightmare sites of failed 




among its sensations… or the bedsitting room, where the typist and the clerk perform their 
depleted sexuality in cramped quarters" (12-13).  The rooms' inhabitants suffer a detachment 
from their own bodies, and hence they are unable to connect with the bodies of others.  For 
Levenson, Eliot's rooms are sites of alienation—from other people, from their own selves—
sites of degrading, sterile sex and failed communication.  It is unsurprising, then, that 
modernist literature often chooses to avoid domestic space altogether, focusing instead on 
public spaces, those "…locations more traditionally sanctified by the avant-garde: the street, 
the café, and the gallery, among others" (Rosner 3-4).   
Those texts that do remain "indoors," however, are confronted with similar problems 
to those modernists who, like the Bloomsbury group, embraced domesticity in real life.  "In 
modernist texts," Rosner argues, "whatever smacks of the radical—transgressive sexuality, 
feminism, or the spirit of the avant-garde—is either accommodated with difficulty by the 
domestic or simply shunted outdoors" (2).  Those texts which did attempt to house that 
radical transgression within a domestic setting often required a "redesign" of the meaning and 
function of interior spaces, whether those changes were made by characters to living spaces 
depicted within the narrative, or by the author negotiating the function of interior space on a 
textual level.  Rosner seeks to expand the standard concept of modernist interiority as put 
forth by critics like Levenson, which "…emphasizes the mind's ability to craft an individual 
reality, to live in a world exclusively populated by personal associations and memories" 
(Rosner 11).  Instead, she regards the term "interiority" as subsuming multiple interrelated 
concepts, from "the representation of consciousness to the reorganization of home life; 
revised definitions of personal privacy, intimacy, and space; and new assessments of the 




dominant culture still rooted in Victorianism, or rejected by a "heroic" modernism fearful of 
the enervating effect of the domestic sphere, Rosner argues that transgressive politics, 
sexuality, and art are shaped by interiors as much as the traditional culture which lays claim 
to these spaces.  Modernist literature, particularly that classed as "heroic" or avant-garde, 
"seeks a means of representation that is determined by the need to repudiate its connection to 
the past, and modernist spaces become the key to retrieving that submerged connection even 
as they deny their own history" (15).  Rosner reads interior spaces as "symptoms" revealing 
"inarticulable narratives," symptoms which, like those of hysteria, are "overdetermined in 
their meanings and painful to experience" (15).  Therefore, just as rooms can be used to 
dredge up hidden narratives beneath the surface of the plot, they can also be used to reveal 
the hidden narrative connecting modernism to literary movements of the past.   
While the members of the Bloomsbury group who participated in the Omega 
Workshops modeled their enterprise on William Morris's earlier Arts and Crafts Movement, 
Djuna Barnes decorates the fictional interiors of Nightwood in the spirit of the Decadence 
movement of late nineteenth-century Europe.  Erin Carlston explains that the Decadence, like 
Aestheticism, "insisted on the value of form, external appearance, and artifice and assumed a 
position of moral neutrality with regard to the content of the work of art"—in other words, 
"l'art pour l'art" (43-44).  As with the modernist avant-garde, decadents revolted against 
bourgeois and Victorian values.  But whereas the hyper-masculine modernism of Pound and 
Lewis privileged the stream-lined rationality of the machine and the office, Barnes's neo-
Decadence—as we shall see—comprised a revolt in the opposite direction.  Barnes followed 
her decadent predecessors in reacting not against the bourgeois home's "sentimental" clutter, 




and "'the reduction of human relations to utility and the market,'" favoring instead a principle 
of artifice and moral, social, and political "uselessness" (3).  Committed neither to a 
masculinist renunciation of the home nor to a conscious political effort to revise traditional 
notions of domestic order, Barnes's depiction of the domestic in Nightwood exists somewhere 
askew of the "nightmare sites of failed intimacy" of Eliot's vision and the concerted 
recuperation of domesticity practiced by Bloomsbury.  Nearly all of Nightwood's domestic 
interiors house a failed sexual relationship, yet the fixedness of Barnes's attention to these 
spaces suggests a significance beyond interpersonal alienation.  In a novel whose setting is, 
in Jeanette Winterson's words, "the shifting, slipping, relative world of Einstein and the 
Modernists," a world that hops about time and place with little warning or acknowledgment, 
the narrative's static and relatively prolonged focus on domestic interiors emphasizes one of 
the novel's central concerns: the opposition between the transient and the material, amid 
which the mortal body occupies an indeterminate and unstable position (Winterson x).   
The transience of the human body is central to decadent aesthetics; but as David Weir 
stresses, "…decay by itself does not a decadent make; or, more precisely, decay alone is not 
sufficient to sustain a culture of decadence.  What is required, really, is the desire for decay, 
the wish for degeneracy, the delectation of decline" (xii).  Yet while aesthetes celebrated the 
beauty of the decadent body, they also strove to create an art that would transcend 
temporality, if not mortality.  For them, only a purely aesthetic beauty untrammeled by moral 
or social functions could withstand time (Carlston 45).  The artificial and the decorative—
atemporal realms by virtue of their "uselessness"—were therefore intrinsically connected to 
the problem of human mortality.  In decadent philosophy, the timeless beauty of artifice and 




gives significance to the other.   
In Nightwood, the decadent interplay between corporeality and artifice (both in the 
sense of artistry and artificiality) constitutes the basis of both Barnes's treatment of character 
and the novel's domestic mise-en-scène.  In upholding a decadent aesthetic, the novel is faced 
with the difficult task of purging the domestic—that stronghold of patriarchal order and 
Victorian morality—of its traditional ideological and social functions.  Thus the familiar 
practical features of domestic space are absent from these depicted rooms: there are no 
kitchens or dining rooms; rarely does the narrative consider parlors or similar social spaces 
(bedrooms and toilets, spaces more intimately connected with the needs of the body, are 
more frequently described).  Instead, rooms are overwhelmed with decorative objects: "thick 
dragon's-blood" rugs spill across a floor, "exotic palms and cut flowers" create the illusion of 
a jungle trapped within a hotel room, and "ecclesiastical hangings" displayed alongside 
carousel horses mix the sacred with the sacrilegious (Barnes 8, 37, 61).   
These rooms rarely set the stage for action in the plot, but operate rather as extended 
descriptions of the characters that inhabit them.  Nightwood is a novel about homelessness, 
its characters ranging from American expatriates, wandering Jews, and homosexuals to 
itinerant circus performers and other cultural outsiders.  These characters are, as Winterson 
describes them, "magnificent tricks of the light," for Barnes situates decadent or "degenerate" 
bodies (as society has deemed them) in an uneasy ontological position between the transience 
of the novel's slippery temporality and the stable materiality of its domestic spaces 
(Winterson x).  Bodies, being mortal, are both material and transient, but in Nightwood 
characters do not merely advance toward death in a steady process of decay; instead, they 




baroque and artificial splendor of these domestic interiors acts as an external husk of 
personality that encases the transient body within, anchoring the elusive "trick of the light" to 
the fixed and knowable realm of material objects.  Just as Guido's family portraits serve as an 
"alibi for the blood," domestic interiors serve their inhabitants as an alibi for the self (10).  In 
so furnishing her interiors, Barnes joins earlier writers like Oscar Wilde and J.K. Huysmans 
in a decadent tradition which links decaying bodies with decorative objects—perversely, and 
with purpose. 
Nightwood's Aestheticized Homemaking 
Though Reed's "housework/heroism" binary is useful for mapping out—in somewhat 
broad strokes—conflicting attitudes among modernist artists, attempting to align Barnes with 
either the Vorticist or Omega camps would be both historically and aesthetically inaccurate.  
For one, Barnes moved among artistic expatriate circles in France, not England.  
Nevertheless, though the effort to promote a reformation of domestic life was less concerted 
in the literary salons of Paris's Left Bank than in Bloomsbury, Shari Benstock notes that the 
domestic arrangements of the lesbian artists with whom Barnes associated shared "an explicit 
rebellion against the heterosexual norm" (10).  And while reading Nightwood as a design 
manifesto for modernist domesticity may not be productive, the fact that the furnishings in 
Nora and Robin's apartment resemble the real-life decor of Barnes and Thelma Wood's home 
suggests to me that the novel's interiors have significance beyond their more obvious 
symbolic and biographical implications.  
Kathryn Rose Taylor argues that Nightwood is driven by "the problem of privacy," its 
characters "[struggling] to maintain the safety and isolation of the home and simultaneously 




dominant culture wherein the private space of the home is largely the domain of the 
"heterosexual housewife," Taylor explains, homosexual couples might assert ownership of 
private domestic life by adopting and adapting the heterosexual roles of husband and wife (as 
did Gertrude Stein and Alice B. Toklas) (99).34  As befits its decadent aesthetic, however, 
Nightwood flouts heteronormative domestic arrangements and instead creates for Nora and 
Robin a home which "…claims legitimacy by emphasizing their reclamation and reformation 
of the public/private dichotomy in the figure of the museum-home" (99).  This "blurring of 
the lines between private and public to carve a space…for homo-domesticity" allows Barnes 
to expose what Taylor argues is the fundamental dilemma of the same sex household: "it 
does not exist unless it is seen, and once it is seen it is in danger of attack from the outside" 
(135).  Ultimately, Taylor views Nora and Robin's museum-home as a "brief and tenuous" 
(135) attempt to legitimize homo-domesticity by transforming the shared apartment into an 
artifact that attests to a history of "the inevitable sequestering of homosexuality from both 
public visibility and standardized forms of private space" (98).  
Does Nora and Robin's effort at homemaking fail because of this inevitable 
sequestering, or because of the personal failure of their relationship?  Numerous critics cite 
the novel's ecumenical vision of human suffering as evidence of a general pessimism 
regarding the possible success and health of homosexual relationships.  Unlike the 
harmonious arrangement of the Wilcox/Schlegel/Bast household at the end of E.M. Forster's 
Howards End, for example, Barnes's characters find no happy alternative domestic 
arrangement for their unconventional relationships.  Such readings suggest that Nightwood 
envisions homosexual unions as doomed to seek refuge in "the night," a dictum which the 
                                                 




novel's conclusion seemingly bears out.  However, Mary Wilson argues that the target of 
Barnes's pessimism is in fact the concept of "home" as an organizing principle for the novel, 
referring to the longstanding tradition of uniting the architectural structure of the home with 
the narrative structure of the novel.  The novel has historically represented the private, the 
everyday, and the intimately interpersonal, much of which comprises the domain of the 
domestic (230).  What Barnes attempts, contends Wilson, is to "[craft] an undomestic 
narrative form" in order to "reimagine human relations—even domestic life—without 
reifying the central organizing, meaning-making structure of home" (429).  Nightwood 
"unhomes home, reveals it to be an impossible noplace, a utopia," and creates in its place "a 
modernist, experimental space of juxtaposition—the museum, not the house of fiction; the 
vaudeville stage rather than the room of one's own" (433).  In other words, Barnes unites 
form and content by freeing the novel from its domestic moorings while simultaneously 
exploring the human longing for home as one of her narrative's central conflicts.  
I want to stress the cogency of Wilson's argument before I illustrate how mine departs 
from it. No analysis of the significance of "home" and domesticity in Nightwood has 
articulated so compellingly the peculiar "utopic" (as opposed to "utopian") quality of its 
domestic spaces—"non-spaces" (i.e. non-centers of non-signification, the antithesis of the 
home) which are, paradoxically, encumbered by material clutter of deep personal 
significance.  Wilson is careful to specify that her argument does not simply align Nightwood 
with Reed's antidomestic "heroic" modernism, stating that the novel is no "avant-garde 
polemic against the everyday routines of home life" (433).  But neither does it recuperate 
domesticity, according to her reading.  My contention is that part of the reason why it is 




Reed might, or to account for it in the genealogy of the novel-as-house, as Wilson does, is 
that Barnes is reaching back to an alternative model of domesticity —and, indeed, an 
alternative aesthetics—offered by the Decadence.   
The masculinist, dynamic modernism associated with Lewis, Pound, and le Corbusier 
sought to sweep away the clutter of the nineteenth-century domestic interior and bring focus 
away from decor to the hard lines and angles of architecture.  Nightwood pointedly does not 
do this.  Wilson's observation that Nightwood's interiors are represented to the reader as 
spatially inchoate35 is significant to both our interpretations, though I argue that Barnes's 
mission is perhaps less overtly radical than to "explode, in form and content, the habits of 
domestic realism" (433).   Abstracting the novel's interiors as both "non-spaces" and devices 
for overhauling the conventional realist novel risks ignoring the ostentatiously material 
nature of these spaces and their peculiar accumulation of objects.  In fact, careful attention to 
Nightwood's decadent decor reveals that although not a novel-as-house, as Wilson correctly 
asserts, it does indeed rely on domestic forms to create structural meaning and coherence in 
the absence of a traditional narrative form.  Joseph Frank famously described Nightwood's 
structure as a "spatial form," organized not around a temporal "sequence of action" but by 
"the continual reference and cross-reference of images and symbols which must be referred 
to each other spatially throughout the time-act of reading" (439). Frank's definition of spatial 
form bears little resemblance to the architectural metaphor of the novel-as-house, but it does 
call to mind the visual patterning of the decorative arts.  I argue that the ornate patterning of 
Barnes's narrative structure and language is connected thematically to the decadent interiors 
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she furnishes for her characters. 
Nightwood begins somewhat deceptively by appearing to adopt as its ordering 
principle "the central organizing, meaning-making structure of home" (Wilson 429) and the 
heterosexual, reproductive relationship therein.  Felix Volkbein is obsessed with tradition, 
aristocracy, and lineage, and so it is appropriate that the novel opens with his story, 
commencing in the past with his parents and the events leading to his birth—a conventional 
beginning in a temporal trajectory.  "Bow Down," Ann Kennedy observes, "comes closest to 
a realist style; this section establishes the repressive foundations of linear narrative" (95).  
Even the novel's very first words—"Early in 1880…"—are grounded in time (Barnes 3).  But 
as the narrative soon reveals, the novel begins with a previous generation not because it 
intends to narrate the timeline of Felix's life, but because this sense of the past and of the 
passage of time is a fundamental element of the domestic interior that opens the novel.  This 
room—like the other rooms in Nightwood—is essential to understanding the character that 
inhabits it.   
"Bow Down" opens with Guido and Hedvig Volkbein, Felix's parents, and the 
elaborate home that Guido furnishes for Hedvig.  Guido, an Italian Jew who fabricates for 
himself a false title and aristocratic lineage, builds a home that is a "fantastic museum of [his] 
encounter" with Hedvig (7).  The house is more than a tribute to their meeting, however; it is 
also a museum of artifacts—evidence, public proof—that substantiate Guido's claim to an 
aristocratic Christian identity.  Kennedy links the chapter's near-linear structure to the 
oppressive historical forces which Guido is both excluded from and subjugated by, a history 
that renders him an exile and an interloper on the basis of his Jewishness.  History is one of 




transcendence and wholeness (re)hailing subjects back into an imaginary history of linearity, 
simplicity, and fulfillment.  They are deeply embedded in the narrative subject's desire for an 
identity continuous with history" (Kennedy 95).  Guido's (and subsequently Felix's) 
"nostalgia" for the past, his desire for a "wholeness" of identity that is only achieved through 
the invention of a false history, signifies his submission to an ideology in which he is already 
implicated as an oppressed subject.  Perhaps the clearest manner in which Guido makes 
himself a willing subject of this ideology is through the creation of the "fantastic museum" of 
his "encounter" with Hedvig. 
The "encounter" to which Guido pays tribute is, in fact, his brief brush with historical 
legitimacy.  Brief because Guido dies before witnessing the event that would establish him as 
part of a true lineage: the continuation of the bloodline through the birth of his son, Felix.  
Appropriately, the room which Guido furnishes (and in which his son will be born) is 
suffused with images of blood and allusions to lineage.  The bed on which Hedvig gives birth 
is an image of a womb: "…a canopied bed of a rich spectacular crimson, the valance stamped 
with the bifurcated wings of the House of Hapsburg, the feather coverlet an envelope of satin 
on which, in massive and tarnished gold threads, stood the Volkbein arms…" (Barnes 3).  
The bed is a blood-red, enclosed space which surrounds and protects the infant.  It is marked 
by the symbol of the Hapsburgs and the Volkbein arms, the infant Felix's supposed maternal 
and paternal ancestry.  The image of the bed as a protective "envelope" furnished with 
"feather[s]" and "wings" also evokes a nest.   
The house itself is not a sheltering maternal space however.  It is patrilineal: "large, 
dark, and imposing," the space impresses the reader with the aristocratic bloodline of its 




In the study are "…two rambling desks in rich and bloody wood," and on the floors is a 
"…thick dragon's-blood pile of rugs," the reference to dragons suggesting medieval 
ancientness.  The most striking of the house's claims to ancestry is the pair of portraits 
depicting Guido's parents.  The woman and the man, opulently dressed and bearing "…a 
remarkable resemblance to Guido Volkbein, the same sweeping Cabalistic line of the 
nose…" are fakes (9).  Not only are the subjects not Guido's parents, the figures themselves 
are not what they claim to be: they are actors in costume.  Despite the presence of a telltale 
"Cabalistic line of the nose" that might betray his Jewish identity, Guido purchases these 
paintings as "an alibi for the blood" (10).  Also hanging in the house are "…impressive 
copies of the Medici shield and, beside them, the Austrian bird" which reference Guido and 
Hedvig's respective nationalities and insinuate a link to aristocracy (8).  But these too are 
only "copies."  Guido has the Volkbein field "hammered" into the desks of his study, but the 
image "…turned out to be a bit of heraldry long since in decline beneath the papal frown" 
(8).  Though counterfeit, Guido imprints his identity into the surfaces of his home. 
If these rooms are a testament to Guido's ancestry and its furnishings his proof, 
Hedvig herself serves as a piece of evidence in that house.  Not only is she mother to Guido's 
son, she is the one authentic feature in a house full of imitations, having a legitimate claim to 
all of those things from which Guido is cut off: blood, empire, her "military beauty" (3) and 
strength, this latter suggesting her entitlement to the power and authority of nationhood—
unavailable to Guido as a "wandering Jew" (3).  Their son inherits Guido's "…obsession for 
what [Felix] termed 'Old Europe': aristocracy, nobility, royalty" (11).  True to the spirit of 
their shared "obsession" with pedigree, Felix inherits his father's doomed quest to legitimate 





Like the Volkbeins' mock family portraits, Nightwood's opening is a sham genesis 
narrative that seems to centralize home, family, nation, ancestry and progeny as the novel's 
organizing principles, only to marginalize them over the course of the narrative.  Thus, while 
the Volkbein home appears to function as a contrast to the novel's other dwellings, it is 
actually an ironic bellwether.  As Wilson notes, "The places that get called home enact the 
characters' alienation: they are collections of fragments, of objects dissociated from context, 
and the character that spurs the establishment of home… is herself objectified" (438).  
Though some might argue that, on the contrary, the Volkbeins' anxious assertion of their 
suspect aristocratic heritage "doth contextualize too much," these furnishings are quite 
literally "dissociated" from their authentic context—are in fact pilfered and counterfeit.  
 The opening pages also nod to one of the novel's own decadent ancestors: Joris-Karl 
Huysmans's Á rebours (1884).  Like Nightwood, Á rebours begins with a deceptively 
biographical prologue that belies the structure and style of the rest of the novel.  Huysmans 
introduces his protagonist, Duc Jean des Esseintes, through the ancestral portraits housed in 
the Chateau de Lourps, the des Esseintes family home.  These ancestors, striking in their 
martial vigor, bear little resemblance to the portraits of their descendants: "The decline of this 
ancient line had undoubtedly followed the usual course; the effeminisation of the males 
became more noticeable, and… the Floressas des Esseintes had, over the course of two 
centuries, intermarried their children with one another, using up the remains of their vigour in 
these consanguineous unions" (35).  Like the Volkbeins, the continuation of the des Esseintes 
bloodline results in its decline; however, for the noble des Esseintes, the attenuation of 




with impermissible blood," do "everything to span the impossible gap" (5) rent by their 
Jewish ancestry and continue the family line, for as Felix says, "To pay homage to our past is 
the only gesture that also includes the future" (43).  The Volkbein obsession with aristocracy 
and heraldry is markedly similar to Huysmans's description of des Esseintes's elder relatives 
who, "old as the world, would interrogate each other about the quarterings of noble arms, 
heraldic crescents and outdated ceremonials… a fleur de lis seemed to be the only thing 
imprinted on the soft pulp of their aged brains" (38).  Even the family Volkbein home, with 
its "long rococo halls, giddy with plush and whorled designs in gold" (Barnes 7-8), resembles 
the Paris mansion "entomb[ing]" the Montchevrel des Esseintes in "Pompadour-style 
catafalques, all rococo and wainscotting" (Huysmans 38-39). 
Though the descriptions of the Chateau de Lourps and the Montchevrel mansion are 
meant to illustrate by way of contrast des Esseintes's aesthetic revolt, they also demonstrate 
Wilson's description of homes as "profound centers of significance," spaces which, quoting 
Rita Felski, function as a "'symbolic extension and confirmation of the self'" (Wilson 438).36  
I would argue that des Esseintes's "studied decrepitude" (40) is a more deliberate upheaval of 
this traditional mode of homemaking than the domesticity on view in Nightwood, for 
Barnes's spaces are earnest attempts to symbolically "extend" and "confirm" not just the self, 
but an intimate relationship.  As Ella Orphir writes of Nora and Robin's apartment, the 
domestic space becomes a home by "externalizing their relationship, forming a protective 
shell. The objects that accrete around them are consonant with the book's baroque, perhaps 
outlandish, atmospherics" (16).  This consonance between decor and linguistic style is 
crucial, as the dissolution of this and the novel's other "centers of significance" is enacted at 
                                                 




an aesthetic, rather than merely personal, level.  
Monika Kaup uses the concept of the neobaroque to make sense of Nightwood's 
discursive linguistic style, though she does not connect the neobaroque to the novel's 
decadent interior spaces.  She describes the novel's style as "ornate, circular, obscure, 
rambling, hyperbolic," a functionally "non-communicative and transgressive" style which 
"flaunts its artificiality" (85).  Like decadent style, the neobaroque eschews functionality for 
the artificial.  Echoing Frank and other critics, she notes that Nightwood achieves unity 
through style, rather than content—one explanation for why it evades the rationalism and 
coherence of the novel-as-house model.  Yet for all its artifice and surface ornamentation, 
this neobaroque style "forms the basis of a decentralizing structure of significance" by 
"simultaneously filling in empty spaces and articulating—reaffirming—the void" (86).  
Barnes's language "bur[ies] 'natural' and literal signification under successive layers of 
artifice" (99) and "de-naturalizes the objects and concepts it re-presents" (102).  I would unite 
Kaup's and Wilson's arguments to suggest that Barnes uses the layers of artifice which 
furnish Nightwood's homes to de-naturalize and decentralize domestic space without 
consequently re-centering urban public space as the legitimate domain of modernist art (as 
might a wholesale rejection of domesticity).  A more useful metaphor for Nightwood's 
structure than the novel-as-house might then be the repetitious and baroque patterning of 
wallpaper and similar decorative arts, which simultaneously and systematically "fill in" and 
"articulate voids," but without creating a centralized, holistic "structure of significance."  
  This stylistic interplay between layers of artifice and voids of signification can be 
mapped onto a thematic conflict between the transience of corporeality and the permanence 




the transience of the decadent body than the hotel room in which Dr. Matthew O’Connor and 
Felix Volkbein meet an unconscious Robin Vote.  Barnes connects each of the main 
characters in Nightwood with a description of a domestic space, but the one home that we do 
not see in detail is the space shared by Felix and Robin in their married life.  Instead of the 
domestic space in which the relationship exists, in “La Somnambule” we are given a 
description of the room in which their first “encounter” actually happens: the room at the 
Hôtel Récamier.  Whereas Guido’s rooms grant an artificial identity which he must build 
himself, Robin’s room is described as a naturalistic setting and an extension of her self: 
On a bed, surrounded by a confusion of potted plants, exotic palms and cut 
flowers, faintly over-sung by the notes of unseen birds, which seemed to have 
been forgotten—left without the usual silencing cover, which, like cloaks on 
funeral urns, are cast over their cages at night by good housewives—half 
flung off the support of the cushions from which, in a moment of threatened 
consciousness she had turned her head, lay the young woman, heavy and 
dishevelled.  (37-38)    
 
This is the reader’s first view of Robin.  She is “[o]n a bed,” we are told, but her physical 
description is delayed again and again by a series of clauses which describe the surrounding 
room.   This is one instance of what Monika Kaup identifies as Nightwood’s neobaroque 
style and an example of Severo Sarduy’s concept of “radial reading”: “‘a chain of signifiers 
which progresses metonymically and which finally circumscribes the absent [ . . . signified], 
tracing an orbit all around it’” (Kaup 92).37  The absent signified, in this instance, is Robin 
the autonomous subject, whom the novel’s circumlocutory language perpetually attempts to 
objectify by blurring the boundaries between her subjectivity and the preponderance of 
ornament that surrounds her.  Chad Bennett argues that the decorative arts (or, quoting 
                                                 




Wilde, “the arts that touch us”38) “[mediate] our contact with the desired body, functioning 
like a sensuous, shared skin” (297).  Yet this “ornamental skin” is also an impediment to 
more “direct contact.”  Bennett asks, “Is ornament a formal ‘structuring element’ or 
‘peripheral and nonsignifying’?  Where does ornament end and the body begin? Can we 
distinguish between décor and des corps?” (299). 
On the level of content, we could describe the hotel room’s domestic features as 
“circumscribing” or “tracing an orbit” around the tenuous presence of Robin’s sleeping body. 
This body itself is described in the language of primeval decay: it gives off the scent of 
“earth-flesh, fungi” and is “broad, porous and sleep-worn, as if sleep were a decay fishing her 
beneath the visible surface” (38).  Robin is in fact defined by circumscription, by the 
uncertain boundaries separating her from the surrounding world: “About her head there was 
an effulgence as of phosphorus glowing about the circumference of a body of water—as if 
her life lay through her in ungainly luminous deteriorations”—“the troubling structure” of 
one who “lives in two worlds.”  That Robin’s natural state of being seems to be one of 
“porous” decay allows Nightwood’s baroque language to easily encroach upon the bounds of 
her subjectivity.  The sympathy between Barnes’s prose style and the living decay of Robin’s 
body is part of a decadent tradition of “…literary style modeled on physical decomposition: 
just as the decaying body comes apart in pieces as it putrefies, so the page gives way to the 
sentence, the sentence to the phrase, the phrase to the word” (Weir xiv-xv).  The model of 
physical decay acts as an antidote to the calcifying effect of linguistic artifice and sets up, for 
Barnes, a thematic tension between bodies and objects. 
                                                 




 For all its “studied decrepitude” and “delectation of decline,” decadent fiction often 
exploits the symbolic link between bodies and objects by entertaining a fantasy in which the 
permanence of objects is transmitted to the human body.  This transference is literally (and 
most famously) imagined in Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890), where the 
“horrible sympathy” (102) between subject and portrait ensures that Dorian will forever 
“keep the glamour of boyhood” (103).  And it is also examined, albeit more ironically and 
less fantastically, in Á rebours.  The ailing des Esseintes furnishes his home at Fontenay so as 
to artificially reproduce specific sensory experiences: 
In his opinion, it was possible to appease certain desires reputed to be the 
most difficult to satisfy under normal conditions—and that, what’s more, by a 
subtle subterfuge, by an approximate simulation of the object of those very 
desires…. By transposing this specious deviation, this adroit deceit, into the 
realm of the intellect, there is no doubt that you could enjoy—and just as 
easily as in the material world—imaginary pleasures resembling the real thing 
in every aspect….  (53). 
 
Enervated in body and devoted to a “stay-at-home existence,” des Esseintes can recreate 
“without fatigue, without fuss,” for instance, “the sensations of a long sea voyage” by 
furnishing his dining room to resemble a ship’s cabin (53).  Through artifice, des Esseintes 
declares, one can learn to “abstract [oneself] sufficiently to bring about the hallucination and 
therefore substitute the dream of reality for reality itself” (54).  The artifice of the mind can 
transcend the natural limitations of the body.    
 The artificial wilderness of Robin’s room at the Hôtel Récamier resembles the 
simulated sea voyage of des Esseintes’s dining room, with the exception that Robin is not the 
engineer of this virtual experience.  Robin is lost among “exotic” plants and the music of 
birds hidden from sight, the first of many associations of Robin with the wild and the 




hotel room appears to be either “turning human” or turning “beast”: the description of the 
wild, leafy setting is undercut by a simultaneous domestication of its features.  The plants are 
in fact “potted,” the flowers “cut,” and the birds whose singing seems to come from overhead 
are actually caged and singing because they’ve been left uncovered.   
 Nevertheless, Robin’s room is significant because it is not a typical domestic space.  
It is a hotel room, the dwelling of travelers, foreigners, and other transient inhabitants.  
Robin—an American, seemingly homeless—is all of these things, and it is also telling that 
the passage identifies her as in opposition to the domestic.  She has “…left [the birds] 
without the usual silencing cover, which, like cloaks on funeral urns, are cast over their cages 
at night by good housewives.”  Robin is emphatically not a good housewife.  Moreover, 
housewifery is moribund and “silencing,” like a “funeral,” whereas Robin is more connected 
with the life and wildness of the room’s plants and sounds.  
 Felix, upon meeting Robin after this first encounter, observes that even when 
“[r]emoved from her setting”—the plants and the birds that seemed a part of her—she still 
carries “…the quality of the ‘way back’ as animals do” (44).  The hotel room is her natural 
“setting,” but it is her animal nature that gives it its wildness and not vice versa.  For as Felix 
and Nora find out, Robin cannot be housed within a domestic space.  In the hotel room she 
seems to “…lie in a jungle trapped in a drawing room (in the apprehension of which the 
walls have made their escape), thrown in among the carnivorous flowers as their ration…” 
(44).  Though the walls appear to have retreated, the wilderness remains “trapped” within the 
domestic space.  Robin has been “thrown in” to this trap to feed “carnivorous flowers”—the 
“cut flowers” that, for all the wildness they add to the room, have been cultivated and tamed 




must leave the arrangement of household objects undisturbed or else Robin “…might lose the 
scent of home” (61).  Later, when Nora visits Dr. O’Connor’s room, she is overwhelmed by 
the sense of being made an unwilling “accomplice” just by her presence in the space, and 
upon seeing the doctor in bed she thinks immediately of the wolf waiting to catch Little Red 
Riding Hood (85).        
 Even in the hotel room, Robin seems to have been tricked or exploited into inhabiting 
a domestic setting.  The room is called a “… set, the property of an unseen dompteur, half 
lord, half promoter, over which one expects to hear the strains of an orchestra of wood-winds 
render a serenade which will popularize the wilderness (38).”  Robin is at the mercy of a 
hidden dompteur—an animal trainer—who controls her as if she were a wild thing tamed for 
the circus, where the jungle is a mere “set” and an orchestra mimics the sounds of the 
wilderness for the audience.  But Robin cannot be tamed, and Barnes represents this essential 
condition by various characters’ failures to contain Robin in a domestic space. 
  Felix fails utterly to create a home with Robin: again, we are never given a 
description of their living space as we are with Guido and Hedvig and with Nora and Robin, 
though we know that they reside in Vienna and Paris during the brief span of their marriage.  
This rare omission of a domestic interior signifies the untamed quality of Robin, but it also 
comments on the manner of homemaking that Felix inherits from his father.  It is at this point 
in the novel that we begin to see the conflict between “heroism” and “housework.”  Like 
modernist artists, the characters in Nightwood manage their marginalization from society—
their homelessness as racial or sexual outsiders—by either creating the home that society 
refuses them or by rejecting domesticity all together.  Felix however, unlike the modernists, 




two sham portraits of his ancestors, and thus inherits along with them the counterfeit identity 
of his parents' house.  Felix's response to his alterity is to deny it by masquerading in the 
tradition that rejects him.  In this way, Felix represents a traditional domesticity outside the 
modernist tradition, the home as the instantiation of cultural norms and ideals. 
 Though the array of domestic spaces in Nightwood portrays a range of approaches to 
homemaking, their shared emphasis on ornament is a distinctly decadent aesthetic.  The 
decadent reverence for the beauty of artifice is represented here by the false heraldic symbols 
and counterfeit family portraits adorning Guido and Hedvig Volkbein’s home, and by the 
apartment “teeming with second-hand dealings with life” in which Jenny Petherbridge lives 
as a sort of spiritual “squatter.”  Yet none of the ornamentation and artifice of these rooms 
quite represent the practice of “art for art’s sake”; not even Matthew O’Connor’s tiny bedsit 
risks becoming the sterile husk of isolated aesthetic pleasures which a Des Esseintes or a 
Dorian Gray might inhabit.  These are domestic spaces, and each betrays a desire for human 
intimacy. 
Nevertheless, even the novel’s most radical renovations of domestic space exhibit a 
decadent tendency to embalm rather than foster intimate relationships.  Brian Glavey argues 
that this is representative of the novel’s general “ekphrastic principle” (a term he borrows 
from Murray Krieger): that is, “literature’s attempt to usurp the solidity of the plastic arts as a 
stay against the ravages of time” (751).  “The overall structure of the book is in a sense 
ekphrastic,” remarks Glavey, “attempting to fill with an endless profusion of words the void 
left by a black hole of images” (757). Glavey’s ekphrastic structure is Kaup’s neobaroque 
style, and both critics identify Robin Vote as the void which eludes art and artifice.   




keeping with the predominant scientific notion of lesbianism as narcissistic “inversion.”39  
Writing on the Aesthetic interiors of 1870s and 1880s Britain, Michael Hatt explains that 
narcissism was the “key means by which the Aesthete and sexual deviance were connected” 
(107).  The “narcissistic” interior of Aestheticism demonstrated “the objectifying of the self, 
seeing oneself as a beautiful object out in the world,” but also its inverse, “the subjectifying 
of the world, looking out and seeing evidence of one’s own loveliness everywhere” (109).  
Hatt’s article demonstrates how the Aesthetic interior was recuperated from the negativity 
and sterility of the Narcissus metaphor, and his caveat for those who would read domestic 
interiors as mere aesthetic surfaces illustrates a problem which I argue is the undoing of Nora 
and Robin’s domestic relationship. He warns that interiors are not static, but temporal, 
...in the way they are changed by familiarity, aspects becoming invisible 
through daily acquaintance…. This, in turn, points to a further concern. 
Interior spaces are not simply stage sets into which characters walk and act. 
The relationship between self and space is more complex, and the interior 
needs to be understood as a mix of the real and the imagined; the projection of 
the imagination onto or into space and space itself enabling that imagining. 
The interior, certainly for any sexualized reading, is not just four walls, 
furniture, paper, fabric and so on; it is a locus of experience.  (106) 
 
The home that Nora makes with Robin in “Night Watch” is perhaps the best example of what 
I view as an attempt to reinvent both domestic space and a decadent aesthetic in order to 
make a home for the types of bodies and relationships deemed decadent or “degenerate” by 
society.  Yet it is also an instantiation of what Hatt argues living spaces are not.  Not only is 
their apartment furnished with objects from the literal stage and circus ring, its function as a 
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heterosexual unions, and visions of lesbian existence as fraught with pain and suffering, disguised by makeup 




carefully preserved “museum-home” prevents it from becoming a “locus of experience” that 
can harbor their relationship.   
Like Guido and Hedvig’s home, Robin and Nora’s apartment is described as a 
“museum of their encounter”:  
In the passage of their lives together every object in the garden, every item in 
the house, every word they spoke, attested to their mutual love, the combining 
of their humours. There were circus chairs, wooden horses bought from a ring 
of an old merry-go round, venetian chandeliers from the Flea Fair, stage-drops 
from Munich, cherubim from Vienna, ecclesiastical hangings from Rome, a 
spinet from England, and a miscellaneous collection of music boxes from 
many countries.... (61) 
 
While Guido's collection of artwork and furnishings “attested” to his false identity, here the 
accumulation of objects and mementos is truly meant to honor Robin and Nora's union, a 
“combining of their humours.” Robin begs Nora to make this home for her lest Robin 
become “lost again,” knowing that “...she belonged to Nora, and that if Nora did not make it 
permanent by her own strength, she [Robin] would forget” (60).  Robin charges Nora with 
the task of homemaking, but their relationship begins as an ideal domestic collaboration, for 
it is Robin who selects the apartment in the rue du Cherche-Midi.  .  Their domesticity is a 
testament to their “mutual love,” the “passage of their lives together” (emphasis mine).  The 
apartment also speaks to their shared identity as expatriate wanderers: the objects in their 
home come from Venice, Rome, Vienna, Munich, England and many other cities and 
countries.  The circus chairs, apart from signifying the place of their first meeting, link Robin 
and Nora's relationship—deemed deviant by society—to the tight-knit circus communities 
which band together outside of a mainstream society that regards them as freaks or 




Despite the cooperative beginning of their domestic life, the apartment also attests to 
the doomed nature of their relationship.  The wooden horses, removed from the carousel, 
portend the eventual end of their circular relationship: their years together are a seemingly 
endless cycle of Robin leaving and returning to Nora and the house.  The stage-drops suggest 
that the apartment is a false setting and that their domestic life is as artificial as a dramatic 
performance.  They also share a doll which Nora refers to as “'our child,'” an obvious symbol 
of the impossibility of reproduction in a lesbian relationship (156).  But it also signifies the 
fruitlessness of all of Robin's relationships.  She ends the Volkbein bloodline by giving Felix 
a weak and feeble-minded son; he once catches her “...holding the child high in her hand as if 
she were about to dash it down” (52).  Later, Nora finds Robin with the doll “...high above 
her head, as if she would cast it down, a look of fury on her face” (156).  Eventually it is 
violently smashed. 
 The failure of Robin and Nora's relationship results in part from the conflict between 
Nora’s optimistic domesticity and Robin's pessimism regarding the ability of anything to 
withstand the decay of time.  From the beginning of “Night Watch,” Nora is associated with 
houses.  In America she hosts a “'paupers' salon” in her house for “poets, radicals, beggars, 
artists, and people in love” (55).  When Dr. O'Connor sees her out in the Paris streets 
searching for Robin, he observes, “There goes mother of mischief, running about, trying to 
get the world home” (66).  Waiting alone at home for Robin to return, Nora: “...suffer[s] 
from the personality of the house, the punishment of those who collect their lives together” 
(61).   
At night Nora dreams of her grandmother's house “set with all [her] belongings” and 




of leaving it” (67-69).  Nora views domestic spaces as suffused with the identity of its 
inhabitants, and she is haunted by rooms that are continually abandoned by their owners.  
Nora believes that the actual arrangement of the house—its interior design—can keep Robin 
from leaving her: “Unconsciously at first, she went about disturbing nothing; then she 
became aware that her soft and careful movements were the outcome of an unreasoning 
fear—if she disarranged anything Robin might become confused—might lose the scent of 
home” (61). For Nora the construction of the home is the construct of identity.  Rooms have 
a “personality,” they can be “saturated” with “lost presence[s],” and their interior 
arrangement can give off an identifying “scent.”   These are not inherent qualities of the 
buildings but qualities bestowed by the inhabitants.  Robin, however, does not recognize 
identity in interior space.  She is forever in danger of losing that identifying “scent.” 
 If Nora's strong ties to domestic space and her long hours spent waiting for the return 
of her lover liken her to The Odyssey's Penelope, then Robin is Odysseus.  She constitutes the 
novel's “heroic” attitude toward domesticity, shunning houses in exchange for long journeys 
in the streets.  Barnes portrays Robin as the classic flâneur: the detached urban spectator who 
strolls the Paris streets aimlessly, without reason or destination, merely for the sake of 
wandering (Wolff 40): 
Once out in the open Robin walked in a formless mediation, her hands thrust 
into the sleeves of her coat, directing her steps toward that night life that was a 
known measure between Nora and the cafés.  Her meditations, during this 
walk, were a part of the pleasure she expected to find when the walk came to 
an end.  It was this exact distance that kept the two ends of her life—Nora and 
the cafés—from forming a monster with two heads.  (Barnes 65) 
 
The flâneur, the quintessential figure of modernity for Walter Benjamin, is recognizable in 
Robin's “formless” walking and the “pleasure” she takes in her journey from the apartment to 




measure” between her domestic life and the anonymous carousals and couplings of her night 
life.  Robin takes “pleasure” in the safe distance between the two, for the “monster with two 
heads” is the conflict between these two lives—one with Nora, one with the night—that 
Robin cannot reconcile.  Unlike Nora, Robin cannot create a new domesticity to contain her 
exile status: her expatriate identity, her unconventional sexuality, and her alienation from 
traditional culture are all given to wandering.   
To conclude, the conflict at Nightwood’s core can be characterized in one way as the 
struggle between the containing power of the domestic dwelling and the irresistible pull of 
the city street, between the desire to shore oneself up against the ruins of time and the desire 
to fully surrender to it.  This conflict is insurmountable for Nora and Robin, for at the scene 
of Robin's betrayal with Jenny Petherbridge, when “Robin's eyes and hers met,” Nora is 
witnessing the outside scene from within the apartment (Barnes 69).  The denouement of the 
relationship is enacted across an insuperable barrier between exterior and interior space.    
In the 1940s Djuna Barnes left Europe forever, settling in a small apartment in New 
York City's Greenwich Village (Benstock 257).  The return to America was accompanied by 
a complete upheaval of her former way of life.  The heady days of intellectual stimulation 
among the cafés and literary salons of Paris were replaced with the “'simple and ordered 
domestic situation'” of her tiny New York apartment.  Her reclusive and Spartan lifestyle, 
Benstock argues, betrayed “...a desperate need to establish control over her daily life.”  The 
effort to enact control, transformation, and meaning through the manipulation of interior 
space is evident throughout Nightwood.  Domesticity, traditionally the province of cultural 
prescription and moral order, became a site of radical engagement with identity among 




rejected domesticity typically turned to the city streets as the setting for modern life, while 
those who embraced it set about a reinvention of the home.  Nightwood, however, explores 
this conflict between “heroism” and “housework” in the relationships centering on Robin 
Vote while reaching back to a decadent literary tradition that juxtaposes the frailty of bodies 
against the eternal beauty of artifice.  For many of Barnes’s characters, homemaking is the 
means by which they build both identity and relationships, but it can also function as a means 
of objectification and entrapment. The inability of characters to “house” Robin's identity 
foretells the doom of their relationships with her, for Robin resides not in interior space, but 
in the street: the “known measure” between domestic space and the anonymous spaces of 
Paris's cafés and bars (Barnes 65).   
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CHAPTER 4: DECOY DÉCOR: HOME FRONT SPACE IN ELIZABETH BOWEN’S 
THE HEAT OF THE DAY 
 
The image of a cracked cup, disquieting in its ordinariness, appears in two oft-
discussed pieces of writing about the Blitz, the period of aerial bombing by German forces 
which lasted in Great Britain from September 1940 to May 1941. It appears first in Graham 
Greene’s essay “At Home,” written only a month into the nightly air-raids: in it, Green 
argues that the uncanniness of bombed houses (homes “neatly sliced in half,” for example, 
their bathroom plumbing “odd and twisted seen from the wrong side”) is belied by the 
familiarity of its implied violence, for even the depressed “waste lands” of Britain before the 
war “. . . demanded violence, like the rooms in a dream where one knows that something will 
presently happen—a door fly open or a window-catch give and let the end in” (Greene 447-
448). This long memory of foreboding, Greene writes, “. . . is why one feels at home in 
London—or in Liverpool or Bristol, or any of the bombed cities—because life there is what 
it ought to be. If a cracked cup is put in boiling water it breaks, and an old dog-toothed 
civilization is breaking now.” 
Greene’s “cracked cup” of British civilization is an efficient metonym for the various 
spaces, both conceptual and literal, put under pressure during the “war on the home front.” 
The polysemous image of the fractured vessel evokes the damaged buildings and interior 
spaces in which Londoners and other city-dwellers sheltered during the nightly air raids, 
while its broader associations with afternoon tea link it to the everyday customs that 
constitute British cultural identity and enable a “lived” connection to national space. But as
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Greene’s title, “At Home,” indicates, it is the cracked cup’s synecdochic relationship to the 
household (the domestic object standing in for the domestic space to which it belongs) that 
unites these meanings as a metaphor for how the concept of “home,” in its various senses, is 
both imperiled and mobilized during wartime. 
The “cracked cup” appears again in Elizabeth Bowen’s 1945 short story “The Demon 
Lover”; in it, an unremarkable housewife visits her evacuated London home during a day of 
errands in the city: 
The desuetude of her former bedroom, her married London home’s whole air 
of being a cracked cup from which memory, with its reassuring power, had 
either evaporated or leaked away, made a crisis—and at just this crisis the 
letter-writer had, knowledgeably, struck.  The hollowness of the house this 
evening cancelled years on years of voices, habits and steps. (Bowen, “Demon 
Lover” 84-85) 
 
“The Demon Lover” is both a ghost story and a war story: in short, a woman receives an 
impossible letter from a fiancé killed in action twenty-five years earlier, reminding her at the 
height of the Second World War of an unearthly promise made during the First. Yet the 
“cracked cup” of Mrs. Drover’s home, emptied of the accumulated sum of its domestic 
history by the family’s evacuation from the blitzed city, suggests the opposite of a traditional 
“haunted house,” a site, usually of trauma, in which past events leave traces so indelible as to 
make their supernatural presence felt in the “natural” present. Instead, it is the rapid ease with 
which Mrs. Drover’s home is emptied of history and meaning that constitutes the space’s 
threat, the “crisis” at which the sinister letter-writer strikes with strategic precision. What 
new meanings invade and occupy the emptied space of the wartime home will fulfill this 
threat’s promised consequences. 
I argue that Bowen responds to these rhetorical tactics in the late-modernist novel The 




the decoy, a mode of artifice that borrows its strategies of (dis)simulation, seduction, and 
diversion from military tactic, but which Bowen specifically employs in her representation of 
domestic spaces during the Second World War. While the mutual implication of architecture, 
writing, and subjectivity in Bowen’s work has proven rich critical territory for scholars of the 
Anglo-Irish late modernist, this chapter endeavors to unsettle some of this scholarship’s 
assumptions by demonstrating the experimental reformation of Bowen’s aesthetic and 
political paradigms in her wartime writing. As constitutive elements of both subject and 
subjective experience, texts, interiors, and interiority interchange fluidly for Bowen: both her 
ancestral home in Bowen’s Court (1942) and the “hermetic world” of Stella Rodney and 
Robert Kelway’s relationship in The Heat of the Day are likened to “Flaubert’s ideal book 
about nothing,” which stays “itself by the inner force of its style.” But The Heat of the Day 
presents a relationship between subjective and architectural interiority that is radically 
different from Bowen’s Court’s conservative vision of the home as repository of family 
tradition, history, and identity. The sham expressiveness of The Heat of the Day’s “decoy” 
interiors is used to seduce, camouflage, and entrap in a domestic drama that functions not as 
an allegory for global political conflict so much as its actual microcosm, that in fact 
represents the home front war machine’s garrisoning of the entire semantic field of home.  
Home Front Heterotopia 
The introduction in World War One of air raids on British soil disturbed distinctions 
between public and private beyond the blasting open of homes to public view. Susan Grayzel 
argues that the formation of a “home front” licensed the state to invade the private sphere of 
the domestic, an ideological garrisoning which nevertheless required “the manufacturing of 




of the state’s field of operations into the territory of the domestic (in both senses of the word) 
is one part of the larger project of what Patrick Deer terms “war culture.” Modern war 
cultures, as Deer defines them, not only depend on their influence and control over modes of 
cultural production for shaping a prepared and compliant home-front citizenry (particularly 
as regards how a conflict is represented to and interpreted by the public), they are sustained 
by a “drive to normalize the state of conflict and a process of war‐making” (Deer 4, 7), an 
objective achieved in part by saturating culture in the rhetoric and discourse of strategic 
warfare. But because WWI had resulted in a public mistrustful of government propaganda, 
subterfuge, and censorship,40 the forming of a conflict-literate (but ideally uncritical) 
populace relied on covert strategies of cultural infiltration, which Deer refers to collectively 
as “camouflage” (5). This camouflaged invasion of the cultural sphere ransacked “traditional 
discourses of British militarist imperialism, of Boy Scouting, Arthurian legend, the mythic 
landscape of ‘Village England’, and the sportsman‐like playing fields of England's reformed 
public schools” (2); it also penetrated “state‐sponsored cinema, documentaries, and radio 
comedy . . . official war poetry and reportage, art, music, and drama” (3). According to 
Adam Piette, these maneuvers of cultural conquest reached far beyond the territory of public 
and communal life: they endeavored to turn “private imagination into public spirit” (Piette 2), 
for, as he notes, “a militarized culture does not merely incidentally invade the private 
imagination, but actually covets it as its own, wishes to transform it for its own uses, to make 
                                                 
40 Adam Piette’s reading of Mass Observation archives demonstrates “how far the public realm, in the form of 
press and news, had invaded, occupied and preoccupied private minds, creating an atmosphere of suspicious 
resistance to being duped, partly to keep the mind from being swamped. This resistance took the form of the 
national pastime of forensic reading-between-the-lines, or between the bars of style and lies, people being 




it its creature” (5). Thus, by laying claim to both civilian public and domestic life, the 
militarized territories of the home front breached even the most private of spaces. 
Yet in a kind of double-agentry, the artists and intellectuals of the home front—many 
of whom were employed by the Ministry of Information in the production of war 
propaganda—used similarly clandestine tactics to counter and critique the official war 
culture. In the face of the “traumatic impact of total war,” Deer argues, these writers “had to 
discover, and often camouflage, their own subversive tactics of resistance” against “the 
overpowering official visions of patriotic Englishness, fortified masculinity, and compliant 
femininity . . . of a disciplined Home Front and loyal Empire at war” (Deer 5). For Elizabeth 
Bowen (who volunteered her services as a spy during the war, reporting to Churchill on 
public sentiment in neutral Ireland41), the very act of writing during wartime constituted an 
act of resistance. In her 1944 postscript to The Demon Lover and Other Stories, she remarks, 
“I wonder whether in a sense all wartime writing is not resistance writing? Personal life here, 
too, put up its own resistance to the annihilation that was threatening it—war” (220). These 
reflections on what Bowen calls “war-climate” (217) anticipate Deer’s and Piette’s 
retrospective assessments of the extensiveness of war culture and the stultifying effect of its 
“overpowering official” representations of conflict. Gauging the psychological toll of war on 
the home front, Bowen writes: 
. . . I do not think that the desiccation, by war, of our day-to-day lives can be 
enough stressed. The outsize World War news was stupefying: headlines and 
broadcasts came down and down on us in hammerlike chops, with great 
impact but, oddly, little reverberation. The simple way to put it was: ‘One 
cannot take things in.’ What was happening was out of all proportion to our 
faculties for knowing, thinking and checking up. The circumstances under 
which ordinary British people lived were preposterous—so preposterous that, 
in a dull way, they simplified themselves. (Bowen, “Postscript” 219) 
 
                                                 




Bowen attributes the mental incapacity to grasp the scope of total war to the authorized 
representations of conflict which, ironically, were meant to make such events 
comprehensible to those within the “island fortress.” The terse power of newspaper headlines 
and government propaganda becomes stentorian rather than straightforward, she suggests, 
and the simplification of everyday “circumstances” which follows indicates not an easy 
understanding of global events outside Britain, but rather a blunting of the “faculties” needed 
to process such information about the war. Bowen does not, remarkably, attribute the 
spiritually depleting atmosphere of the home front to the violence of the air raids or to the 
privations and sacrifices which civilians suffered, but instead to the exhaustive and 
exhausting self-narrativizing of a war culture at the height of conflict. Her emphasis is 
significant in view of the critical tendency to overlook this aspect of her war writing by 
focusing on her heady, romanticized depictions of the London Blitz and on the social 
changes instigated by violent alterations to the spatial environment.42 This scholarship’s 
attention to space is not misplaced, however, as Bowen describes the pervasive wartime 
atmosphere and consequent search for psychological outlets in spatial terms: “I see war (or 
should I say feel war?) more as a territory than as a page of history: of its impersonal active 
historic side I have, I find, not written” (217). There is a sense in Bowen’s postscript that she 
wishes to bypass the logical progression by which “hammerlike” war headlines inevitably 
assume the faceless authority of historiography. By refiguring war as spatial rather than 
temporal, a territory in which to maneuver and to act rather than a period of history to be 
endured, Bowen endows the writer with a degree of agency and a claim to the territory in 
question. War writing (theoretically) becomes resistance writing. 
                                                 




         Essential to this spatial conception of war as a vast, all-encompassing territory are 
compensatory alternative spaces, “small worlds-within-worlds” which she calls “saving 
hallucination[s]” (221). These mental refuges are intensely personal, ranging from the purely 
imaginary to the many real spaces made unheimlich by the war, and though not every 
person’s “saving hallucination” takes a spatial form, she describes the general retreat into 
“those little dear saving illusory worlds” as a movement from one space to another (221). 
Once again, she refers to the psychic stranglehold of official war culture, asking her readers 
to “[r]emember that these impulsive movements of fantasy are by-products of the non-
impulsive major routine of war” (222), for “life, mechanized by the controls of war-time, and 
emotionally torn and impoverished by changes, had to complete itself in some way” (219). 
This relocation of psychological and emotional life to the space of fantasy, a displacement 
rather than a destruction thereof, resembles Foucault’s concept of heterotopia: “counter-
sites” which reflect, invert, or contest real sites, but which differ from utopias by their 
capacity to exist in real spaces (Foucault, par. 12). For Bowen, even the most fantastical and 
utopic hallucinatory spaces (black-out London transformed by moonlight to the lost city of 
Rider Haggard’s She in “Mysterious Kôr,” for example43) retain some connection to real 
sites, however shattered: 
To survive, not only physically but spiritually, was essential. People whose 
homes had been blown up went to infinite lengths to assemble bits of 
themselves—broken ornaments, odd shoes, torn scraps of the curtains that had 
hung in a room—from the wreckage. In the same way, they assembled and 
checked themselves from stories and poems, from their memories, and from 
one another’s talk. (Bowen, “Postcript” 220) 
 
But for those whose homes had not, as yet, been destroyed by bombs, the impulse to salvage, 
reconstruct, and reinforce one’s sense of self also functioned as a stay against the conformist 
                                                 




demands of the home front. For them, “every object or image or place or love or fragment of 
memory” became both a symbol and a guarantor of “individual destiny” (220), even in the 
face of mass destruction and the subordination of private concerns to the needs of the 
collective. Bowen’s statement, “You cannot depersonalize persons” (220), reads 
ambiguously in the “Postscript” as both statement and interdict. 
Mapping the Territory 
While Foucault’s heterotopia captures the reactive impulse of the “saving 
hallucination,” a more comprehensive framework for understanding Bowen’s distinction 
between the “non-impulsive” mechanisms of war and the “impulsive” counteractions of 
fantasy can be found in Henri Lefebvre’s concepts of representations of space and 
representational spaces. During war, representations of space would equate to the abstract, 
rationalized conceptions of space and territory directed by military strategists and the 
wartime government, while representational spaces describe the complex and richly 
symbolic affective spaces of “lived” experience and artistic representation—Bowen’s 
“saving hallucinations” (Lefebvre 38-39). Both types of spatial representation, when brought 
into relation with one another via spatial practice (what Lefebvre terms the active 
“deciphering” of spaces which lends them a cohesiveness, if not a logical coherence), have 
the capacity to produce and alter real spaces. 
The opening up of a home front meant that such alterations could take seemingly 
inverted forms. In a reversal of the panoramic bent of official representations of space, 
government anti-invasion and austerity measures enacted a kind of cartographic and 
topographic censorship: in London, as elsewhere in Britain, street and railway station signs 




production of the city’s A-Z Guide.44 Conversely, civilians were made to improvise their own 
mental atlases to the blacked- and blotted-out city, adapting conventions of representations of 
space to navigate a cityscape denuded of its usual signposts. As Bowen recalls, “Walking in 
the darkness of the nights of six years (darkness which transformed a capital city into a 
network of inscrutable canyons) one developed new bare alert senses, with their own savage 
warnings and notations. And by day one was always making one’s own new maps of a 
landscape always convulsed by some new change” (Bowen, “Postscript” 223). “Inscrutable” 
and volatile, Bowen’s description of blackout London is kin to the imprecise but deeply 
significant geography of her fictional worlds (what she calls “Bowen terrain”) which, being 
“unspecific,” “cannot be demarcated on any existing map” (Bowen, Mulberry Tree 282). 
Like the “convulsed” spaces of the Blitz, this “inner landscape” is assembled “at random” 
and out of “the unfamiliar,” generated from “the changes and chances, the dislocations and . . 
. the contrasts” of her life (282-283). Yet, in spite of its protean genesis, Bowen insists, this 
fictional space must nevertheless represent “a recognisable world,” “geographically 
consistent and having for [the author] a super-reality” (283).  
But if Bowen’s fictional spaces require an orienting “super-reality,” her depiction of 
actual spaces frequently gesture to their own affective forms of structural integrity. As with 
Lefebvre’s representational spaces, which cohere around an “affective kernel or centre” 
(Lefebvre 42), it is emotion which renders her nonfictional images of wartime spaces 
intelligible during a time when physical order and stability could not be guaranteed. In 
“Britain in Autumn,” for example, the winnowing of feeling and sentiment wrought on 
Britons by home-front pressures exposes the skeletal network of a national fury:  
                                                 




One thing absorbs us—anger. This anger varies over the face of Britain: I 
suppose you could make a chart of it. There is no acre on which it does not 
exist: in London and round the Dover coast its pressure is at the highest. This 
anger has lost us our native fat; the moral muscles stand out in everyone. And 
this anger acts like a weight in the base: it keeps us upright. (Bowen, People 
52) 
 
Here collective feeling is rendered spatially: its acreage and pressure can be mapped 
topographically; it buoys the country, merging moral uprightness with physical orientation, 
the “stiff upper lip” made contiguous with the rest of the national body. But it is feeling far 
removed from the realm of the “dear saving illusory worlds” which shelter “individual 
destiny” and private emotional life. Instead, anger is collectively pooled and rationed 
according to the measures of an emotional austerity. Bowen takes the centripetal affective 
force of representational spaces—here, the anger which unifies the space of the nation—and 
rationalizes it via the abstract conventions of representations of space, transforming outrage 
into measurable and chartable data. 
Bowen’s various wartime meditations move nimbly between tropes of representations 
of space and representational spaces, blending and subverting the sibling languages of war 
culture and war resistance to create an authentic depiction of life on the home front. Yet the 
subtle mobility of her rhetoric opens up spaces of ambiguity which threaten to undermine its 
purported aims. Her suggestion that all wartime writing might be, by nature, “resistance 
writing” remains not only an unanswered question in the “Postscript,” but an unanswerable 
one: for what, precisely, does Bowen mean it to resist? “Personal life” might shore up a 
spiritual resistance to “the annihilation . . . threatening it,” as she remarks, but to what extent 
can writing be considered an act of resistance to war if it is also capable of replicating—via 




the official war culture? Her hopeful suggestion of mass and uniform “resistance” elides the 
uneasy potential for its treasonable opposite: collaboration. 
It also constitutes an obvious misprision of the propaganda work undertaken by many 
British writers at the Ministry of Information’s behest, including Louis MacNeice, Dylan 
Thomas, George Orwell, and others (though to varying degrees of reluctance). Nevertheless, 
Piette insists that collaboration with domestic propaganda efforts, however voluntary, must 
be ascribed in part to the totalizing and invasive demands made by home-front war culture. 
Echoing Bowen’s comments on the “desiccation” of wartime life, he observes that, having 
first been “enervated and outclassed” by the British war machine’s “gigantic energies and 
complexities,” the “private imagination” was inevitably made complicit in the “network of its 
fabrications” and in the “double-dealing of its rhetoric and history-making” (Piette 2). This 
duplicitous rhetoric, entrenched, as it were, in a complex “network” of wartime 
“fabrications,” is one of The Heat of the Day’s central thematic concerns and extends, I 
argue, to the novel’s thinking about space. If war had become, as Deer says, “a master trope 
to explain all forms of political, economic, cultural, or social activity” (Deer 7), then the 
overlapping spatial language of official representations of space and unofficial 
representational spaces contained the potential not just for “camouflaged” forms of cultural 
resistance, but unintended treachery too. What Shafquat Towheed calls space’s “polysemic 
slipperiness”—of which the efforts to render home-front space at once intelligible to its 
citizenry and indecipherable to the enemy are just one expression—might permit it to elude 
“hegemonic codes of time, power and knowledge” (Towheed 115), but I would add to this 
that space likewise makes its fluidity and indeterminacy available to the slippery 




of experiences, practices, and uses also endows it with a particular knack for sustaining 
paradox and incongruous meanings, and in this way even the most private and sacred of 
Lefebvre’s representational spaces—“bed, bedroom, dwelling, house”—can be made 
continuous with the double-speak and obfuscation of propagandistic language and imagery 
(Lefebvre 42). 
Territories encompass the actual and the abstract, both representations of space and 
representational spaces. Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden explain that, for Lefebvre, territory 
“must be understood not as a fixed container of political action and international relations, 
but rather as a dynamic and constitutive dimension and stake of struggle” (36) whose volatile 
workings extend beyond territorial disputes and the deployment of state power to include the 
“production of ‘mental spaces’” composed of “politically meaningful architectural forms” 
and “popular representations of state power and its associated geographies” (21). A global 
war which threatened to turn sovereign nations into occupied territories heightened the 
significance of such orienting political representations even as their expression became more 
tenuous in the face of mass physical destruction. For example, the German air raids which 
radically altered the spatial features of Britain’s besieged cities also disfigured their 
recognizable “Britishness,” as with the infamous “Baedeker raids” targeting locations 
identified in the German Baedeker travel guide as sites of British cultural and historical 
significance (Saint-Amour 132). These deliberate attacks on public monuments and cultural 
symbols served as reminders of what, on the whole, Britons were fighting for, but the 
destruction of homes and private residences could not be counted on to foment an equivalent 




physical domicile into rubble—turning the private domain of the home into a veritable 
battleground—for what, then, could the private citizen be called upon to take up arms?  
Contrary to the propagandistic representation of Great Britain as an impenetrable 
“island fortress,” which appears to demarcate a territory bounded by clear geographical and 
rhetorical borders, the imaginative transformation of the nation into a mobilized home front 
required a more fluid concept of space, one predicated on a metonymic logic of continuity. 
The threat of German invasion required a mobilized British citizenry, but nightly air raids 
would leave millions without a literal home to fight for. The propagandistic recasting of 
Great Britain as a “home front” enabled an imaginative relocation of the “home” to the 
besieged island as a whole. This metonymic logic also meant that any part of the realm, 
however small, could stand in for Britain and empire. No matter the destruction or 
dispossession visited on the British, the notion of home—and hence country—would always 
be mobile, always capable of being displaced to safety, so long as there existed Britons to 
constitute that space imaginatively. Yet by the same principle, the boundlessness of this 
space’s rhetorical reach meant that boundaries themselves, already tenuous in wartime, could 
be dissolved, reconstituted, and relocated with similar facility. Bowen’s The Heat of the Day 
and other wartime writings serve, I argue, as a careful record of how the spatial, linguistic, 
and conceptual continuity between home and home front allowed the public space of the state 
to invade and subsume the private spaces of domestic life, reshaping interiors and interiority 
in its image.  
“The inner force of its style” 
As a girl Bowen imagined a career as an architect, and architectural metaphors often 




memories, and family history function in her writing process, Bowen once commented, much 
like “a box of bricks, out of which a child might build a building” (Bowen, Listening 33). At 
times buildings and books appear interchangeable: in 1942’s Bowen’s Court, a history of her 
family’s ancestral home in neutral Ireland, she compares the imposing County Cork house to 
“Flaubert’s ideal book about nothing” which “sustains itself on itself by the inner force of its 
style” (Bowen, Bowen’s Court 21). It’s a metaphor she uses again in The Heat of the Day to 
describe the seemingly “hermetic world” of Stella Rodney’s relationship with Robert 
Kelway, “a habitat” which, “like the ideal book about nothing, stayed itself on itself by its 
inner force” (90). As constitutive elements of both subject and subjective experience, texts, 
interiors, and interiority often interchange fluidly in this manner for Bowen. But critical 
discussion of the house and home in Bowen’s writing has tended to focus on the roles of the 
Protestant Ascendancy and the Anglo-Irish big house in books like Bowen’s Court and The 
Last September (1929). The necessary specificity of the Irish big house—that is, its function 
as both symbol and physical proof of a particular family’s enduring place in the country’s 
history—prevents much of this scholarship from attending to the broader and less 
conventional significances of Bowen’s other domestic spaces, particularly those depicted in 
World War II writing like The Demon Lover and Other Stories and The Heat of the Day. 
Like many Britons enduring war on the home front, Bowen found frequent occasion 
to contemplate the idea of home, particularly as a concept independent of the physical 
edifices whose existences had become tenuous since the air raids. As she writes of that time: 
“The violent destruction of solid things, the explosion of the illusion that prestige, power and 
permanence attach to bulk and weight, left all of us, equally, heady and disembodied” 




Christmas Toast is ‘Home!’” Bowen offers encouragement to those made homeless by the air 
raids:     
In so far as home is a material thing—a house—we must face it that this may 
be demolished at any time. . . . In those cases, have we been left with nothing? 
Is “home gone? No, assuredly no. . . . Homes wait in our hearts till we can 
make them again. . . . War has taken away, for the time being, what we used 
to regard as the three essentials—safety, privacy, independence. But were 
these essentials really? For without them home still goes on. . . . Outer 
changes, temporary deprivations, have left the core intact. (Bowen, People 
131) 
 
Bowen’s essay valorizes a conventional image of the home as a metaphysical but enduring 
repository of feeling, tradition, and authenticity—of “everything dear and old” (128). Here 
the metonymic relocation of “home” from the physical space of the house to the “hearts” of 
the members of the household is meant to console and hearten dispossessed or displaced 
readers, but it also replicates the rhetoric of wartime propaganda which insisted that the 
morale and patriotism of British citizens would be the primary bulwarks against enemy 
threats to the homeland: no matter what happened to one’s personal domicile, there would 
always be a “home” to fight cheerfully for. Yet Bowen’s disturbing suggestion that “safety, 
privacy, independence”—rights temporarily sacrificed during the state of emergency—might 
be dispensable after all excavates the home of the very meanings she insists transcend 
physical domiciles. If home’s “undying value” endures while these “essentials” disappear, 
what precisely does home signify? 
This question should not diminish Bowen’s real concern for the welfare of physical 
homes however. In a war which compelled people, as she put it elsewhere, to “search for 
indestructible landmarks in a destructible world” (“Postscript” 220), her easy assessment of 
the value of “rooms and tables and chairs” in “The Christmas Toast is ‘Home!’” belies her 




Woolf regarding the destruction during an air raid of the Woolfs’ home, she asks anxiously, 
“When your flat went did that mean all the things in it too? All my life I have said, 
‘Whatever happens there will always be tables and chairs’—and what a mistake” (qtd. in 
Ellmann 145). This “mistake” must have been deeply upsetting for Bowen, whose lifelong 
fascination with domestic spaces informs her writing so consistently that Phyllis Lassner has 
declared the house Bowen’s “controlling ‘poetic image’” (Lassner 5).  
Several critics have given considerable attention to Bowen’s idiosyncratic 
preoccupation with the things and objects that shape and fill the built environment, 
underscoring the strange process by which her metaphorical bag of bricks is made material 
again. What these scholars observe, in various configurations, is how in Bowen’s writing 
things seem repeatedly to undermine the supposed primacy of subjects over objects. 
Jacqueline Rose (2000) construes The Heat of the Day’s motif of the inter-permeability of 
people and things as both posing and evading a question about the individual’s relationship to 
history via the subject’s “hallucinatory” relationship to “the objects of the phenomenal 
world” (J. Rose 78). Maud Ellmann (2003), who is particularly attentive to the prominence of 
furniture amid the everyday objects cluttering Bowen’s fiction, follows Rose by cataloguing 
further instances of Bowen’s “ambushes” on “our ontological security,” claiming that 
Bowen’s “addiction to personification” compels her to depict a world in which “things 
behave like thoughts and thoughts like things” (Ellmann 5) and where architecture can 
exceed its function as a force which shapes or instills character by instead “usurping 
personality from the protagonists” in order to “[take] the place of character” (66). While 
Ellmann describes the inanimate world in Bowen as carrying out a “vampiriz[ing]” (148) 




Bowen’s objects not to the transference of human qualities onto the nonhuman, but to what 
she identifies as a “literary animism” which does not depend on the presence of “a human 
mediator . . . to act as the source of or inspiration for such acts of personification” (Inglesby 
306-307). Elke D’hoker (2012) provides the most direct examination of Bowen’s “poetics of 
house and home,” stressing the need to expand beyond the narrower scope of the 
aforementioned body of criticism situating Bowen’s houses in the twilight history of the 
Anglo-Irish, “with its loss of privilege, power and, indeed, house in twentieth-century 
Ireland” (D’hoker 268). D’hoker’s readings of Bowen’s short fiction recapitulate Ellmann’s 
formulation of Bowen’s prosopopoeic method as a “feedback loop between character and 
object—or house” whereby “the thoughts and feelings evoked by certain objects are 
projected back onto those objects and translated as characteristics of material reality itself” 
(272). Bowen’s pathetic fallacy becomes, D’hoker explains, “a kind of domestic fallacy” 
which “[t]ransfers . . . agency from character to house, thus dwarfing, draining and—in de 
Man’s idiom—‘defacing’ the characters” (273). 
I extend these readings on the symbiotic relationship between subject and object to 
explore the relationship between homes and inhabitants in The Heat of the Day. I argue that 
Bowen uses this relationship to elaborate both an aesthetics and an ethics structured around 
the concept of the decoy, a mode of artifice that borrows its strategies of simulation (and 
dissimulation), seduction, and diversion from the tactics and strategies of the larger war 
culture. Bowen’s novel, I argue, addresses the conditioning of public and private life around 
the practice of surveillance and the tactics of warfare by attending to the interior design of the 
home front’s domestic spaces during a crisis which threatened both concealment and 




moment. Bowen’s attention to the arrangement of domestic interiors not only raises 
important questions about the ideological functions of homes during and outside of 
wartime—a question that would be addressed with great urgency after the war as Europe 
began to rebuild its domestic spaces—it forecasts the intersections between private space, 
war, and surveillance that would continue on into the twenty-first century. 
In a 1977 interview, Michel Foucault remarks that “[a] whole history remains to be 
written of spaces—which would at the same time be the history of powers…from the great 
strategies of geopolitics to the little tactics of the habitat” (qtd in Thacker 6). If not a history 
per se, The Heat of the Day is unquestionably a story about space and power, about both “the 
strategies of geopolitics” and “the tactics of the habitat.” Plotted during WWII around the 
sexual blackmail by a British intelligence agent of an English woman whose lover may or 
may not be a German spy, the novel’s staging of the “little tactics of the habitat” which 
punctuate moments of crisis between characters serves more as a microcosm of global 
conflict than an allegory thereof: the stratagems and subterfuges which characters use to 
pursue their personal interests and security literally involve the interests and security of the 
wartime states implicated by their allegiances. And whether political or personal, global or 
domestic—and of course the doubled meaning of domestic is a crucial complication here—
conflict is represented repeatedly as a conflict over space. 
The motif of spatial conflict is established early in the novel with the introduction of 
Bowen’s heroine, Stella Rodney. Stella waits in her flat for the appearance of an unwelcome 
but expected visitor: Harrison, the man who is pressuring her to exchange sex for clemency 




Nazi spy. But while Stella has not yet been able to verify the veracity of Harrison’s claims, 
she is at an advantage in their coming meeting because it will happen on her territory: 
In so far as she had set the scene at all, everything had been arranged to show 
that she did not care—either for him, which he should know already, or as to 
anything more he might have to say. To show the careless negligence of her 
way of living, she had left the street door unlatched and the door of her flat, at 
the head of the stairs, ajar: thus it was left to him to make his own way in, 
unmet half way, without even that little taste of imperiousness to be got from 
the ringing of the bell, and with the best face he could. (23) 
 
Stella’s strategy here is not merely malicious; her careful “setting of the scene” is a way of 
maintaining power—and robbing a little of Harrison’s—in a situation where she is otherwise 
tremendously disadvantaged. Leaving the door ajar is a statement that she has nothing to 
hide—but it leaves herself vulnerable in the process. The “careless negligence of her way of 
living”—an “unstudied” effect which is of course a deliberate strategy meant to imply 
Stella’s innocence and indifference regarding Harrison—could also be perceived as evidence 
of her “negligence” concerning Kelway’s doubtful loyalty: her lack of care may have 
allowed a traitor to infiltrate her most private spaces. To Harrison’s surveillant eye, Stella’s 
arrangement of the room must declare having nothing to hide, but in doing so admits its own 
failure to surveil. 
Stella does not fail to surveil Harrison’s encroachments on her private space, 
however. Upon hearing him mount the stairs to her floor, Stella turns to a mirror to “[study] 
at just one more remove from reality” his entrance into the flat. But the surveillant 
advantages of the mirror’s ability to distance the observer at “one more remove” are traded 
for a more direct display of strength. Listening to Harrison’s awkward and stumbling 
progress up the stairs play out just as she’d designed, she changes tactics: “she swung around 




her dark dress. There came to be something dynamic, as he entered, about her refusal to 
move at all” (24). If Harrison is literally to invade the private space of her home and of her 
personal relationships, he must be made to do so in such a way that assaults him with the full 
invasive awkwardness of his actions, a stratagem to undermine his confidence. 
         Stella’s tactical thinking proves successful, and as she continues to operate the 
encounter as if the room’s floorplan were a war-room map, Harrison becomes cognizant of 
the skirmish he’s become drawn into: “He, having settled with the door, looked at the carpet, 
at the distances of carpet between them, as though thinking out a succession of moves in 
chess. Under a slight, if anything humble, frown, his downcast eyes zigzagged from chair to 
table, from table to stool; step by step he came forward behind his look” (26). Whether he 
fully grasps the full moral affront of his blackmail and exploitation of Stella (which he seems 
not to), he is made to feel the invader and the enemy: standing awkwardly with “feet planted 
apart in the lamplit drawing-room, he looked about him like a German in Paris” (44), Bowen 
writes. “You ring up like the Gestapo” (33), Stella tells him. When a phone call from Stella’s 
son Roderick breaks the tension of the standoff, Harrison is compelled finally (but 
reluctantly) by the domestic ritual of Stella’s preparations for Roderick’s arrival to leave the 
flat: “Harrison could not but be drawn to the doorway, in which he remained standing—he 
searched, with his eyes, the room, the built-in cupboards, the satin low bed, her face reflected 
in the dazzling mirror” (45). The “little tactics” of Stella’s habitat prevail.  
         These domestic tactics of control, deterrence, and surveillance are reprised in a much 
more sinister and suffocating configuration in the novel’s scenes at Holme Dene, the 
aesthetically-offensive suburban Edwardian home where Kelway was raised and where his 




principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, 
lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which 
individuals are caught up" (Foucault, Discipline 202), then Holme Dene is panoptic interior 
design par excellence: 
The concentrated indoorness of the lounge was made somehow greater rather 
than less by the number of exits, archways, and outdoor views; the staircase, 
lit from the top and built with as many complications as space allowed, 
descended into the middle of everything with a plump. […] Stella, keyed up to 
meet Robert’s mother, did not know in which direction to look first: a small 
bowl of large orange dahlias drew her attention, like an arranged decoy. A 
silence, more than a sound, made her turn round quickly—Mrs Kelway, in one 
hand holding her knitting, had already risen out of her chair. (107-108) 
 
The power Mrs Kelway derives from her spatial position within Holme Dene is panoptic: 
“By sitting here where she sat,” Bowen writes, “and by sometimes looking, by sometimes 
even not looking, across the furnished lawn” Kelway’s mother projects a power which, if it 
“came to an end at the white gate, so did the world.” Of the odd positioning of Mrs Kelway’s 
armchair in the center of the house’s lounge, Stella wonders, “Was this position strategic?—
from it she commanded all three windows, also the leaded squints in the inglenook” (108). It 
is absolutely strategic, and if Holme Dene is not actually architecturally capable of producing 
the power dynamics of the panopticon, Mrs. Kelway’s seeming “psychic sight,” as Bowen 
puts it, reinforces its panoptic effects, particularly its spatial control of the bodies inhabiting 
it. The “sort of playful circumlocution” of its architectural complexity “combine[s] to fuddle 
any sense of direction and check, so far as possible, progress from room to room” (256). But 
this effect on the children growing up in Holme Dene was anything but playful. The now 
unoccupied upstairs rooms “were, in fact, not hollow,” Kelway thinks, “being flock-packed 
with matter—repressions, doubts, fears, subterfuges, and fibs.” Mrs Kelway’s household was 




up to,” where transgressing out of the bounds of her panoptic gaze was “blackmarked as 
‘hiding,’” where the children spent “their private hours… nerving themselves for inevitable 
family confrontations such as meal-times, and in working on to their faces the required 
expression of having nothing to hide” (257). Like the decoy dahlias positioned to allow Mrs 
Kelway to sneak up on Stella unawares, Holme Dene’s “swastika-arms of passage leading to 
nothing” enable the unnerving surprise encounters by which Mrs Kelway exercises control 
over her family and from which, as Bowen’s metaphor indicates, Robert Kelway learned to 
become a traitor (258). 
However, the notion of “decoy” décor brings us back to Stella’s home. As subtle and 
tasteful as its décor seems to be—especially in contrast to Holme Dene’s middle-brow 
grotesqueries—Stella’s rented flat is one of the stranger domestic spaces in the novel. It is 
implied several times that Harrison’s attraction to Stella derives from, or is perpetuated, by 
his attraction to the furnishings of her home and what they express about herself. But they are 
not Stella’s belongings—she has rented the flat pre-furnished. 
Here in Weymouth Street she had the irritation of being surrounded by 
somebody else’s irreproachable taste: the flat, redecorated in the last year of 
peace, still marked the point at which fashion in the matter had stood still—to 
those who were not to know this room was not her own it expressed her 
unexceptionably but wrongly. Sensitive whitish walls registered every change 
in the mood of the London weather; a complete and no doubt valuable set of 
dark glass pictures of Regency goddesses hung round them. […] Some books 
of her own were wedged among those not hers in the shelves in the arched 
recesses. (24) 
 
Like Mrs Kelway’s dahlias, Stella’s flat is a decoy—a diversion. It fools the invader with its 
authenticity while throwing him off the scent of her authentic private self. This added tactical 
advantage in her skirmish with Harrison is enabled by the pervading home-front atmosphere 




many other people, reinforcing what was in her an existing bent: she never had asked much, 
from dislike of being in turn asked” (26). But this is guardedness taken to a self-negating 
extreme: Stella lives as a simulacrum of herself, with the perpetual “irritation” of “someone 
else’s” good taste which, perhaps more irritatingly, is a convincing imitation of her own 
aesthetic inclinations. Stella’s private space transforms from a haven made private and 
personal by anonymity (rather than personality) into something which distrust and political 
disaffection has made into a vacuum—a spatial concept which Bowen returns to again and 
again in her writing with misgiving and even foreboding. Stella remarks that the war seems 
“indoor-plotted. . . a war of dry cerebration inside windowless walls” (142). When Kelway 
finally reveals his treachery to Stella in the bedroom, her instinct is to adhere to the 
behavioral prescripts conditioned by the nightly blackouts: “In her infestation by all ideas of 
delinquency any offence against the black-out seemed to her punishable by death: it could be 
the signal moment,” Stella thinks, “for which Harrison had been waiting—posted as he could 
be, as she pictured him, by some multiplication of his personality all round the house” (276-
277). Stella has been conditioned not only to follow the protocols of the blackout, but to 
imagine an impossible multiplication of Harrison’s surveillant gaze around the house, an 
army of watchers. The instinct to adhere to the blackout, in other words, is not the protective 
instinct of love and the desire for privacy, but of social conditioning to the demands of 
wartime. The sham expressiveness of The Heat of the Day’s “decoy” and surveillant interiors 
is used to seduce, camouflage, and entrap in one of the war’s domestic theaters, a microcosm 
of the larger global conflict that, in fact, represents the home front war machine’s 
commandeering of the entire semantic field of home.
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